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Now that globalization is in the air, it is discernible in various forms and assuming 
varying contacts and ramifications. Globalization already affects national treatment and 
practice. It raises a number of questions that cannot be readily and easily answered. It 
may have to strengthen or weaken, in some respect or to some extent, the traditional 
concept of national boundary or territoriality, within which only one supreme authority 
exists without any external interference or interposition. Gradual and natural erosion of 
t sovereign authority of a state is superseded by that of a global, supranational, or regional 
~ 
entity. 
In particular, the globalization of finance has created a significant evolution of the 
international financial system in recent years. Very rapid increases in telecommunication 
and computer-based technologies have reduced the costs of borrowing and lending across 
traditional national boundaries, and thereby led to a dramatic expansion of cross-border 
financial flows entailed by the instantaneous transmission of information around the globe. 
Notably, the global financial integration has eroded economic and regulatory barriers to 
1 
competition across the marketplace for financial services. The growing global financial 
system is demonstrated to be far more efficient today than ever before in that it has 
significantly facilitated cross-border trade in goods and services, and thus substantially 
contributed to standards of living worldwide. 
However, the world financial system has witnessed that the efficiency of the global 
system has exposed and punished underlying economic weakness swiftly and decisively, 
which has been accompanied by the effective transmission of financial disruptions as 
shown in considerable worldwide economic turbulence over the last decade, and the risks 
that internationally active banking and financial institutions have had to cope with have 
become more complex and challenging. As evidenced in recent financial crisis episodes, 
the world's financial regulators have been struggling with dealing with new and complex 
financial instruments and techniques driven by the financial innovation over the preceding 
decades. In particular, bank regulatory authorities have not succeeded in keeping pace 
with the dynamics of evolving international financial system, such as improvements in risk 
management in banking organizations, thereby failing to catch up with the market. 
2 
In the circumstances, the globalization of finance spurred by the information revolution 
has called for the integrated international regulation of banking organizations. At the same 
time, recent financial crises have raised a question of global governance as an agenda for 
rethinking about the rules and norms that underpin the world order, because the current 
global governance agenda emphasizes the universalization of understanding of global 
governance based on the efficiency and effectiveness through one-size-fits-all formulas, in 
which democratic accountability and participation is a secondary variable. Although 
implementing internationally acceptable financial standards is important, but remains 
problematic, because the national differences in financial systems and regulatory 
frameworks that underpin existing practices complicate the process of identifying and 
enforcing the standards. Despite strong pressures for the convergence of one-size-fits-all 
standards throughout the global system, the current global governance agenda has given 
little attention to the tension between harmonizing pressures of financial globalization led 
by advanced financial centers and prevailing diversity of financial systems and to their 
economic consequences. Prevailing variations in national financial practices continue to 
3 
complicate policy and regulatory cooperation through international institutions. Thus, the 
continued failure of national regulatory authorities to collaborate effectively attenuates 
prospects for the successful restructuring ofthe global financial regime through 
international cooperation based on harmonization. Here persistent national differences in 
financial market structures and institutions have significant implications for international 
cooperative efforts at global financial governance. 
In order to restructure global governance toward a just new world order in the 
international finance, it needs to explore specific policy and regulatory options to national 
and international policy makers in devising patterns of regional and international 
cooperation. An important issue is how to enhance democracy, legitimacy, and 
accountability in the global financial regime dominated by the leading industrial states. 
Further, it needs to address what should be the appropriate national and international 
responses to the growing needs for regional cooperation through regional institutional 
coordination, as international regulatory cooperation continues to be difficult. 
4 
5 
While the private sector activities have increasingly dominated global financial 
transactions, the wider public sector policy and regulatory objectives of financial 
governance have become more difficult. Further, there is a recognition that in light of 
ongoing global financial integration, emerging forms of governance and regulation involve 
a shift in power and authority from public sector institutions, across international layers, to 
forms of private sector and, increasingly, private interest governance and regulation. This 
situation pertains in both developed and emerging market economies. In particular, 
~ regulatory refonn efforts on the part of national regulatory authorities and institutional 
institutions are important, but they are not sufficient for the effective governance of global 
finance. Notably, the role and influence of private sector actors in the elaboration of public 
policy with regard to financial regulation have been considerably enhanced at national, 
regional, and international levels. While the private sector is crucial to the governance of 
financial system at national, regional, and global levels, what should be the proper balance 
between public authority and private interests? To that end, the role ofthe state is deemed 
5 
F 
to stand in need of reevaluation in an increasingly integrated global economy, as the private 
sector involvement is essential to the effective governance of global finance. 
In line with the analyses above, this study attempts to address that in search of a just 
new world order in the global finance what should be the proper national, regional, and 
international responses to the global financial integration. At first glance, it analyzes the 
globalization of finance. The impact of globalization on state sovereignty is also 
demonstrated. In this regard, this study seeks to reconceptualize the traditional notion of 
state sovereignty. Here it highlights the increased interaction and interdependence 
between states and nonstate actors in the global economy. Then, this study moves on to 
the anatomy of the dynamics of global governance through government 
networks-independent national regulatory agencies-among states in terms of 
transgovernmentalism. In the context of an increasingly global economy, it acknowledges 
the rise of trans governmental regulatory organizations in various areas and the 
achievements of these government networks, but it attempts to point to problems with the 
networks. With the investigation ofthe trans governmental theory in light of global 
6 
» 
governance, this study identifies the features oftransgovemmental financial regulatory 
organizations. 
Thereafter, the focus of this study shifts to the examination of international banking 
regulation and supervision under the auspices of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (Basel Committee). As noted, no other sector than banking has become more 
global in its operations, and thus more difficult to monitor and supervise it. As such, 
global convergence in banking has made greater strides than in any other financial sector. 
However, some skepticism has run over the argument that global standards in banking have 
been established by the international financial community's concerns about the safety and 
soundness of the global financial system. Arguably, hegemony of Western powers began a 
drive to move in terms of hegemonic stability more than their concerns about a global 
banking crisis. In this context, this study attempts to assess the Basel Committee's bank 
supervisory standards and capital adequacy rules, and thereby rethink whether global 
convergence in banking regulation is desirable and inevitable. To that end, it seeks to 
address the impetus for the creation ofthe Basel Committee, and explore driving forces 
7 
behind the internationalization of bank regulatory and supervisory standards. Following 
the theoretical analysis of systemic risk, historical experiences of bank failures are 
reviewed to answer the question about whether systemic risk has really played a key role in 
the internationalization of bank regulatory and supervisory standards. 
More importantly, this study attempts to explore the origins ofthe Basel Accord on 
bank capital adequacy. To do so, it largely relies on current theories on the process of 
negotiating the capital adequacy standards in the areas of political science and international 
political economy. At this point, this study takes a position as a break against the force of 
international market failure logic that has enjoyed an exceptionally positive reception 
among economists, political scientists, and legal experts. Nonetheless, it does not intend to 
freeze the international coordination and cooperation of banking regulation. 
Given the understanding of the politics behind the creation of the Basel Accord, this 
study evaluates the Basel Accord of 1988 and the new capital adequacy framework (Basel 
II), and then moves beyond the assessment of the capital adequacy standards. In doing so, 
it attempts to draw lessons from Basel toward a just world order in the global finance. In 
8 
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search of a new international financial order, this study analyzes the dilemmas of 
international financial regulation. Then, the role of private regulation is examined. While 
this study stresses the importance of the private sector in the governance of financial system 
at national, regional, and international levels, it addresses what the proper balance should 
be between the public authority and private interests for the appropriate pUblic-private 
partnership. Given the difficulties of institutional collaboration at the international level, 
this study emphasizes the importance of regional cooperation for global financial 
~ governance. In this way, it seeks to contribute to an assessment of proper balance between 
the market and regulatory discipline that would ensure that financial institutions have 
sufficient opportunities to compete fairly and profitably in a global marketplace. Finally, 
this study attempts to answer the question of what should be the appropriate national, 
regional, and international responses to global financial integration, and thus provide a new 
paradigm for the just world order in global finance. 
9 
I. The Globalization of Finance 
A. Introduction 
Globalizationl has begun in various dimensions. Since the inception of the 
globalization process in numerous aspects, all our global neighbors are increasingly seeing 
the new issues and counter-effects that government and societies must confront. Amidst 
the enormous challenges driven by the process, it is worth noting that globalization 
propelled by information revolution2 and technology innovation has created the increasing 
~ needs of cross-border relationships between countries, which extend across widely 
c 
dispersed locations, transcending territorial borders. The global financial system has been 
evolving at ever-fast rates in the past decades. New technology has radically reduced the 
cost of borrowing and lending across national borders, facilitating the development of new 
I Globalization commonly refers to the erosion of geographical borders between states in the form of cross-
border exchange of goods, services and information technology along with cultural transfers. See Roman 
Terrill, What does 'Globalization' mean?, 9 TRNASNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217,218 (1999); Greenspan 
describes globalization as "the interaction of national economic systems." See Alan Greenspan, Opening 
Remarks presented at the symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, titled Global 
Economic Integration: Opportunities and Challenges (August 24-26, 2000), at 1. 
2 The information revolution has raised the significance of the "back office operations" supporting other 
business activities, which were formerly considered as mere "plumbing," but now main operational process of 
business organizations seeking more profits. See Jane K. Winn, Catalytic Impact of Information Technology 
on the New International Financial Architecture, 34 INT'L L. 137, 146 (2000). 
10 
instruments and drawing in new players.3 Indeed, computer and telecommunication 
technology has made it possible to use the integrated system and programmes for 
conducting highly complex financial transactions and for the immediate and systemic 
exploitation of the flood of available infonnation that may be of relevance for financial 
operations. 4 The massive use ofthe Internet, therefore, has created not only a huge jump 
in transaction volumes but also the utilization of highly complex financial innovations, such 
as the whole range of ever more sophisticated derivative instruments5 which are used to 
refine further the allocation of risk, and mostly traded in over the counter6 markets. 7 As a 
result, electronic exchanges have been used around the globe for traditional stock-exchange 
3 See Alan Greenspan, Testimony before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, US House of 
Representatives (January 30, 1998), at 1. 
4 Mario Giovanoli, Virtual Money and the Global Financial Market: Challenges for Lawyers, 1 Y.B. INT'L 
FIN. & ECON. L. 3, 16 (1996). 
5 A derivative is a financial instrument whose value is based on (derived from) other assets or variable. 
Derivatives include options, swaps, and warrants. See generally Hal S. Scott & Philip A. Wellons, 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, ANDREOULATION 921-998 (5th ed. 1998). 
6 Securities transactions are conducted through a telephone and computer network connecting dealers in 
stocks and bonds rather than through an exchange. See id. at 800-801. 
7 See Giovanoli, supra note 4. 
11 
business, and for futures8 thanks to the specific programmes along with modem data-
processing techniques. 
However, the growth of global networked information systems poses serious threats to 
the soundness of financial markets, and thus destabilizes markets around the world because 
financial information can be transmitted too quickly across borders.9 It is argued that 
"excessive computerization has also tended to deform the financial services industry into a 
game driven by sheer lust for financial gain, without a broader sense of self-discipline or 
concern for the overall welfare of the economy or society."l0 The worldwide prevalence of 
greed among informed and sophisticated market participants of the money game creates a 
serious threat to the healthy development of financial markets because unsophisticated 
customers cannot access the accurate information rather than false rumors. As a 
consequence, a good number of gullible investors in a scam investment scheme can 
destabilize the safety of financial markets by rushing in and out of the market based on 
8 Futures is an agreement to buy or sell a fixed quantity of a particular connnodity, currency, or security for 
delivery at a fixed rate. Unlike an option, a future contract involves a defmite purchase or sale and not an 
unlimited loss. See generally Scott & Wellons, supra note 5. 
:0 See Winn, supra note 2, at 137. 
Toyoo Gyoten, Global Financial Markets: The Past, The Future, and Public Policy, in REGULATING 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: ISSUES AND POLICIES 18 (Franklin R. Edwards et al. eds., 1991). 
12 
= f , 
misperceptions. ll Despite regulators' sustained efforts, serious violations in business 
ethics by the swindlers in the market through sophisticated technologies have brought about 
the exploitation of uninformed investors, and illegal actions such as securities fraud, which 
have a great impact on the global financial stability. 
Undoubtedly, the global integration of information technology has become the 
challenges to the participants of the financial markets. On the one hand, financial services 
providers need to survive increasing competition with competitors through the prudent 
management ofthe risks entailed by acting on the opportunities offered by new 
technologies. On the other hand, regulatory and supervisory authorities should keep pace 
with the rapid financial innovation, and make endeavors in striking an appropriate balance 
in the midst of rapidly changing market environment since the evolution of the financial 
services industry driven by technological advances is not likely to stop. In short, the 
financial markets need to operate more efficiently and prudently to the extent that same 
degree of access is available to all of the participants of the market, and an appropriate 
11 S W' ee mn, supra note 2, at 143. 
13 
balance between market and regulatory discipline ensures sufficient opportunities to both 
financial services providers to compete prudently and their unsophisticated clients to take 
advantage of advances in technology. 
B. Financial Integration 
Over the past decades, financial markets have tended to become more tightly linked 
across national boundaries. A notable example of capital market linkages among the 
countries is the introduction of Euro along with the advent of EMU (European Monetary 
Union), which represents a significant change since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
system in 1971 and the movement to floating exchange rates in 1973.12 The EMU has 
eliminated exchange rate fluctuations among the eleven (11) participating countries, and 
reduced dramatically interest spreads and the volatility of the spreads.13 The emergence of 
12 See Horst Koeler, The Euro-An Emblem Success and Challenges of European Integration, Remarks on the 
Occasion of the Informal Meeting of the ECOFIN Council (December 14, 2001), available at http://www.imf 
orglextemaVnp/speeches120011l21401.htm (last visited January 10,2003). See also Bertold Wahlig, 
European Monetary Law: The Transition to the Euro and the scope of Lex Monetae, in INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY LAW: ISSUES FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 121 (Mario Giovanoli ed., 2000). 
I3 The participating countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain. All the European countries are expected to join the EMU by 2010 under 
14 
2 ..... ------------------------------------------~ 
a unified money market for liquidity with the rapid start of EMU has created a two-tiered 
structure. The first tier includes the large banks in each domestic market, which compete 
for the European Central Bank (ECB) funds at auction and trade liquidity among them, 
effectively distributing liquidity throughout the euro area. These large banks operate as 
hubs for distributing liquidity to a second-tier of smaller institutions in national markets.
I4 
As for emerging market economies, a dramatic evidence of their linkage to global 
financial markets was drawn during the Asian financial crisis, which was preceded by a 
massive surge in gross private capital flows to emerging market countries and a deep 
compression of spreads for emerging market borrowers. I5 Notably, the five Asian crisis 
countries (Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines) received $47.8 
billion in foreign bank loans in 1996. This capital inflow turned into a $29.9 billion 
the condition that all goes well and the monetary union is prosperous. See Robert Mundell, The Euro: How 
Important?, 18 CATOJ. 441, 444 (Winter 1999). 
14 See International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Key Policy 
Issues 13 (September 2000). 
15 See Michael Mussa, Factors Driving Global Economic Integration, paper presented for the symposium 
sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, titled Global Economic Integration: Opportunities 
and Challenges (August 24-26,2000), at 34-38. The Chart 5 in Mussa's paper illustrates the fInancing 
conditions for emerging markets between 1990 and 2000. According to Mussa, factors driving global 
economic integration fall into three categories: technological developments, social and individual for the 
benefIts of globalization, and public policy. Mussa stresses that these factors have acted individually and 
interactively in driving integration. 
15 
outflow in 1997-a turnaround of almost $80 billion.16 In this regard, one argues that these 
changes represent "a shift in tastes of global investors either toward lower assessment ofthe 
risks of investing in [ Asian] emerging markets or toward greater acceptance of such 
risks.,,1 7 Encouragingly, a recent annual data on net private capital flows to emerging 
markets show that net inflows stabilized in 1999 after large falls during 1997-1998.18 
While with the financial globalization, international capital flows have increased 
markedly in the 1990s, some observers emphasize the need to determine ifthere has been a 
genuine increase in financial market integration because cross-border financial market 
linkages do not necessarily imply high degree of financial integration.19 It is worth noting 
that according to the causes of the increase in financial market integration, the evaluation of 
degree of financial integration may be variably different. In short, this is because the 
16 Martin N. Baily et aI., The Coloro/Hot Money, 79 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 101. 
17 
See Mussa, supra note 15, at 34. 
18 See IMF, supra note 14, at 44-45 ("The stabilization of net private capital flows reflects continuing growth 
in foreign direct investment and a recovery in portfolio investment, which more than offset a continuing 
cutback in bank lending"). According to the report, net capital inflows to five Asian crisis countries have been 
broadly unchanged from 1998. 
19 See Juan Ayuso & Roberto Blanco, Has financial market integration increased during the 1990s?, BIS 
Conference Papers No.8 (March 2000), International Financial Markets and the Implications for Monetary 
and Financial Stability, at 175-195. Ayuso and Blanco focus on stock markets and compute direct measures of 
the changes in market integration in 1990s. They argue that the main driving factor behind the increase in 
financial market linkages is the information globalization that affects fmancial prices rather than a higher 
degree of market integration. 
16 
f 
welfare and policy implications ofthe apparent higher linkages depend on whether they are 
the outcome of greater market integration-fewer barriers to free financial trade in the 
context of financial services liberalization-or the globalization of information which still 
entails barriers.20 
Here, there is still a need to investigate the persuasive evidence of growing international 
financial integration over the last decade. One adopts two indicators to support the 
evidence.21 The first indicator is the sharp expansion in the scale of both gross and net 
capital flows between industrial countries, and between developed and emerging markets.22 
According to a balance-of-payments statistics, net inflows into emerging economies rose 
from virtually zero in 1989 to reach $307 billion in 1996 before falling half that level 
during 1997-1998.23 Although the financial crisis has subdued the economic growth in 
20 See id. at 192. 
21 See William R. White, Evolving International Financial Markets: Some Implications for Central Banks, 
BIS Working Papers No. 66 (April 1999) at 2. 
22 For the features of net and gross flows of capital, see International Monetary Fund, International Capital 
Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Key Policy Issues (August 2001) at 6-7 ("Although net capital flows 
provide useful insights about balance-of-payments fmancing and net funding requirements, they can 
considerably understate the volume and volatility of international portfolio rebalancing. Gross flows more 
closely reflect international transactions and are more relevant in terms of their impact on market prices and 
volatility") 




emerging economies and private capital flows to these markets, net capital inflows are 
expected to be about $160 billion in 2002, a significant increase from the $80.5 billion in 
1999, and the $130 billion seen last year but well below the levels of the mid-1990s.24 
Nevertheless, gross capital inflows have risen sharply to about six times the level of net 
flows on a global basis since the mid-1980s.25 As such, the growing global financial 
integration has occurred despite financial crises over the preceding decades. 
In the meantime, it should be recognized that before strengthening the domestic 
financial system the increase in the volume and volatility of international capital flows 
driven by the capital account liberalization in light of financial liberalization has been a 
driving factor behind the recent costly financial crises.26 That is, the financial integration 
as a process of the financial globalization has increased the potential risk of financial crisis. 
However, some argue that financial globalization along with the international financial 
24 See IMF, supra note 14, at 46. See also IIF, Integrated Approach Proposed/or a New Phase o/Crisis 
Prevention and Crisis Management to Revive Emerging Market Capital Flows, IIF Press Release (April 9, 
2002). 
25 See IMF, supra note 22, at 7 ("The high level of gross flows relative to net flows suggests that countries 
and regions that have small net capital flows can nevertheless experience substantial gross inflows and 
outflows of capital") 26 • 
See Barry Eichengreen et aI., Liberalizing Capital Movements: Some Analytical Issues, IMF Economic 
Issues No.17 (Feb. 1999) ("It is not fmancialliberalization that is at the root of the problem but rather weak 
management in the fmancial sector and inadequate supervision and regulation, whose consequences are 
magnified by liberalization."). 
18 
integration will eventually reduce the possibility of financial crisis since it is associated 
with the increasing direct investment, which is not so risky as portfolio investment.27 By 
contrast, one argues that recent financial crises have been caused mainly by the financial 
market liberalization and deregulation rather than the global financial integration.28 It is 
worth noting that the period between 1945 and 1973 was seemingly calm and prosperous 
since financial markets were operated by a stable system of pegged exchange rates under 
the Bretton Woods system, widespread controls over capital flows, and strict restrictions on 
banking activities.29 Arguably, the relaxing ofthese financial regulations after 1974 
brought about not only economic benefits but also potential risks of financial crisis.3o 
Another indicator of the increase in financial integration is the creation of new financial 
markets and instruments to facilitate diverse transactions around the world.3! As noted, the 
27 Paul Krugman, Crises: The Price of Globalization, paper presented at the symposium sponsored by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, titled Global Economic Integration: Opportunities and Challenges 
(Aug. 24-26, 2000) at 104. Krugman stresses although the process of globalization increased the risk of 
financial crisis, the increase in trade as tradeoffs of the policies reducing the risk of financial crisis via costly 
restrictions on capital flows may lead to a reduced likelihood of fmancial crisis in the long run because a 
depreciation of the currency is likely to have net explanatory effects with increased trade. 
28 Charles Goodhart, Commentary presented at the symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City, titled Global Economic Integration: Opportunities and Challenges (Aug. 24-26, 2000) at 108. 
29 /d. at 107. 
30 Goodhart stresses that there is a need to restructure the framework for regulating banking and fmancial 
sector s to restrict volatile short-term capital flows rather than as direct control. /d. at 110. 
31 See White, supra note 21. 
19 
forces of technological innovation and globalization have driven remarkable changes in 
financial services industry. The offshore markets--extemal markets located in a different 
political jurisdiction and only linked by the currency used to denominate the financial 
claims to the national market-have seen the rise of financial transactions in domestic 
currencies to be conducted abroad although it is argued that the markets generated by the 
providers' inducement on the users due to the financial regulatory discrepancies, and the 
differences in the investors' perceptions of markets32 rather than the fair share of financial 
innovation.33 
c. Financial Innovation 
New financial instruments and financing techniques have rapidly developed and grown 
in response to the desire of market participants over the last decades. The advent of asset 
securitization, which links banking markets with capital markets has spread to meet the 
32 Movements of money from the national markets to offshore banking centers have been motivated by four 
factors: the profit incentive, financial privacy and secrecy, tax benefits (tax savings/avoidance), and protection 
of assets from lawsuits and other liabilities. See B. Chad Bungard, Offshore Banking in the British 
Dependencies, 9 TOURO INT'L L. REv. 141, 143-145 (2001). 
33 
Gunter Dufey & T. Chung, International Financial Markets: A Survey, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND 
INVESTING 3-29 (R. Kuhn ed., 1990), cited in Scott & Wellons, supra note 4, at 7. 
20 
needs of financial market participants. This new method of financing helps the financial 
institution, or corporation (originator) transform their illiquid financial assets into highly 
liquid securities to improve their financial situation and liquidity. 34 This new technique 
has been used to remodel all the assets such as home mortgages, credit card debt, student 
loans, car loans and equipment leases into asset-backed securities. As a result, credit has 
been expanded to consumers, and the liquidity (flexibility) for lenders and the modulation 
for investors have been getting greater.35 
Likewise, derivative instruments have developed to meet the market participants' needs 
to repackage credit risk into discrete bundles and thus increase the debt market liquidity 
together with the improvement ofthe participants' balance sheets. According to the recent 
data, at the end of 2000, over-the-counter derivatives markets amounted to $95 trillion in 
34 Securitization refers to the process by means of which primary creditors (originators) transfer a diversified, 
segregated illiquid income producing pool of assets (underlying assets) to a third party (special purpose 
vehicle) to transform and restructure these underlying assts and sell them into tradable equity or debt 
instruments. The means by which these transformation and restructuring are accomplished include pooling, 
unbundling, repackaging and refmancing of existing financial assets into securities or instruments that can be 
sold to and traded by investors in capital markets. See Tamar Frankel, SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED 
FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSETS POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES, Sec. 1.1, at 3 (1999). For example, a 
special purpose vehicle (entity) purchases a pool of car loans from the creditor, using money it got by the sale 
of securities that are collateralized by the loans. As a result, interest and principal payments on the car loans 
:Je used to pay interest and principal on the asset-backed notes. 
See Diana B. Henriques, The Brick Stood Up Before. But Now?, The New York Times, Mar. 10, 2002, at 
Section 3, Page 1, Column 1. 
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notional principal, and daily aggregate global turnover rose to about $1.4 trillion.36 As 
recognized, financial derivatives have created considerable benefits by allowing investors 
to unbundle and redistribute diverse risks-foreign exchange, interest rate, market and 
default risks-, and thereby contributed to the improvement of market liquidity and 
increase in the capacity of the financial system to bear the risk and intermediate capital.37 
However, there is a concern that heavy reliance on new and innovative financial techniques 
and instruments can cause a serious turbulence resulting in financial panics and banking 
crises38 
Although asset backed securitization can create several benefits in the financial market, 
it also raises some potential risks, particularly to the banking system. Most importantly, a 
financial institution may be in trouble when the originator could not achieve a true sale of 
the assets, but recognize the incurred losses when the assets cease to perform 
subsequently. 39 Also, potential risks arise when banks in pursuit of a favorable market 
36 
See IMF, supra note 22, at 30. 
37 
See IMF, supra note 14, at 79. 
38 
Id. at 83. 
39 See Basel Committee on Banking on Supervision, Asset Transfers and Securitization (Sept. 1992), at 6. 
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reception for the securitized assets may tend to sell off the highest quality assets despite 
their retention of lower quality assets, and thereby increase the average risk in the 
remaining portfolio.4o Securitization may also raise systemic risks leading to the increase 
in the fragility of the financial system in both national and international contexts as long as 
it reduces the proportion of financial assets and liabilities held by banks in countries where 
the variable minimum reserve requirement system control the central bank's operation.41 
Moreover, various securitization plans have been introduced to reduce the third world 
debt,42 which arose by the loan of unprecedented sums of money from commercial banks in 
industrial countries to developing countries of the third world in the 1970s due to the 
increase in the reserves resulting from an influx of oil-generated deposits by the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).43 As highlighted in the third 
world debt crisis of the 1980s, arguably securitization plans may be inadequate measures of 
40 ld. 
41 Under the system, a country's central bank can control the domestic money supply by raising or lowering 
the level of minimum reserves, which banks should maintain. The effectiveness is reduced with the decrease 
in the overall level of assets and liabilities held by fmancial institutions. ld. at 7. 
42 Mostly, these plans entail repackaging of debts into a negotiable instrument, such as bond, which creditor 
banks may thereafter sell on the secondary markets to private investors. See Robert Plehn, Securitization of 
!:ird World Debt, 23 INT'LLAW, 161, 162 (1989). 
See Alfred J. Puchala, Jr., Securitizing the Third World Debt, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 137 (1989). 
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alleviating the debt problem so far as the plans cannot address the debt nation's major 
problem of simply having too much external debt to service in the near or medium-term 
44 future. 
Similarly, derivatives activities can cause the build up of financial system fragilities and 
adverse market dynamics in some cases as demonstrated in the recent events of near 
collapse ofthe U.S. hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM),45 and the Enron 
debac1e46 in the mature financial markets. The turbulence of the near-failure ofLTCM in 
44 It is argued what the debtor nations really need is for creators to forgive and write down a portion of the 
debt until the situation stabilizes and only thereafter, should securitization of the debt be considered. See 
David W. Leebron, First Things First: A comment on Securitizing Third World Debt, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. 
REv. 173 (1989). 
45 Between January and September 1998, LTCM, one of the largest U.S. hedge funds and most important 
market-makers and providers ofliquidation in securities markets, lost almost 90 percent of its capital. By 
August 1998, with less than $5 billion of equity capital, LTCM had earned a very highly valued counterparty 
status and highly leveraged trading positions through assembling of a trading book that involved about 60,000 
trades, including on-balance-sheet positions totaling $125 billion and off-balance-sheet positions including 
about $1 trillion of notional OTC derivative positions. In September 1998, the Federal Reserve determined 
that rapid liquidation of LTCM' s trading positions and related positions of other market participants might 
raise a serious threat to already unsettled international financial markets. As a consequence, the Federal 
Reserve facilitated a private sector recapitalization to prevent the collapse ofLTCM. See United States 
General Accounting Office (GAO), Long-Term Capital Management: Regulators Need to Focus Greater 
Attention on Systemic Risk, Doc. No. GAO/GGD-00-03 (Oct. 29,1998), at 1. See also IMF, supra note 14, at 
85. 
46 Enron was the main dealer, market-maker, and liquidity provider in major segments of the OTC energy 
derivatives markets, and at end-September 2001, its overall derivatives trading liabilities stood at nearly $19 
billion. However, its non-recurring charges amounted to $1.01 billion for the third quarter of2001, and net 
income was reduced back to 1997 by $586 million, or 20%. The collapse resulting from the aggressive use of 
accounting techniques to mask the Emon's excessive leverage and weak earning caused important volatility 
in fmancial markets, and considerable losses for market participants, which may lead to the risk of systemic 
consequences for financial markets. The plummeting of Emon's shares and credit rating in October 2001 
~esulted in its filing for bankruptcy in two months. Arguably, the Enron case raised three capital market 
ISsues: inadequate oversight of financial activities ofnonfmancial institutions, ineffective private market 
diSCipline, disclosure, corporate governance and auditing, and misallocation of retirement savings. See IMF, 
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late 1998 was preceded by the accumulation of a complex network of derivatives 
counterparty exposures, encompassing a high degree ofleverage in the major markets 
through late summer 1998, and the adverse shift in market sentiment following the Russian 
crisis in mid-August 1998.47 In short, the near-collapse raised concerns that heavy reliance 
on innovative financial techniques and undue reliance on historical information got the 
market participants into serious trouble.48 As such the severity ofthe LTCM turbulence 
posed the risk of systemic impact on the global financial system and real economic 
activities. 
Meanwhile, the collapse of Enron, interestingly a nonfinancial institution as an energy 
trading and distribution corporation in late 2001 highlights uncertainties about the effective 
Global Financial Stability Report (March 2002) at 41-42. See also,Iohn R. Emshwiller, Rebecca Smith & 
Jonathan Weil, Enron Slashes Profits Since 1997 by 20%, WALL ST. 1., Nov. 9,2001, at A3; Enron 
Corporation, Press Release, Enron Reports Recurring Third Quarter Earnings of $0.43 per Diluted Share; 
Reports Non-Recurring Charges of$1.01 Billion After-Tax; Reaffinns Recurring Earnings Estimates of$1.80 
for 2001 and $2.15 for 2002 and Expands Financial Reporting (Oct. 16,2001), available at http://www.enron. 
com/corp/ pressroom/release/200l/ene/68-3QEarningsLtr.html (last visited January 15, 2003). 
47 The Russian turmoil due to Russia's devaluation and unilateral debt restructuring sparked a broad-based 
reassessment and repricing of risk and large scale deleveraging and portfolio rebalancing that cut across a 
range of global financial markets. See IMP, supra note 14, at 85. 
48 The Russian crisis deprived the LTCM of its engaging in highly leveraged bets on the historical interest 
rate spread between riskier debt instruments and US Treasury bonds, and thereby drove investors' worldwide 
flight of high risk investments to safety. See Steve Lipin, Matt Murray & Jacob M. Schleginger, Bailout 
Blues: How a Big Hedge Fund Marketed its Expertise And Shrouded Its Risks, WALL ST. J., Sep. 25, 1998, at 
AI. 
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functioning of credit-risk transfer vehicles49 used to hedge or take on credit exposures 
across markets and sectors. 50 Even though these financial instruments and markets, which 
are usually driven by regulatory arbitrage offer some benefits to the market participants 
including nontraditional players, the complexity of financial transactions and markets have 
posed new challenges to the market.51 As demonstrated in the Enron case, the vast use of 
derivatives by way of credit risk transfers raised concerns over potential systemic riskS.52 
Moreover, the Enron case called for "much greater transparency and the increased 
completeness in the accounting treatment of derivatives,,53 since it seemingly engaged in 
manipulative accounting transactions to minimize financial-statement losses and volatility, 
49 Notably, credit risk transfers can foster the efficiency and stability of credit markets overall the allocation 
of capital with the growth of the markets by the separation of credit institution from credit risk bearing. Also, 
they can reduce the concentration of credit risk in fmancial systems by helping nonfinancial corporations take 
on the credit risks held by banks. Additionally, credit risk transfers create the diversification of fmancial 
institutions' credit exposures across markets and sectors, and facilitate the trading of credit risk, and thus, 
financial and nonfinancial institutions can flexibly manage their credit exposures. Moreover, liquid credit risk 
transfer markets can enhance price discovery and provide price information. See Global Financial Stability 
Report supra note 46, at 38-39. 
50 Id. at 41. 
51 Arguably, there are some concerns about these instruments and markets. First, they reduce transparency 
regarding the institutional distribution of credit risk and its concentration. Second, they may create or magnify 
channels, which help credit events-associated distress spread across institutions and markets. Third, these 
instruments are not seemingly regulated as well as banks, and not necessarily have the experience required to 
price properly and manage these risks. Finally, the mechanism of credit risk transfer augments the potential 
for mispricing and misallocation of capital by adding the leveraged instruments to the total amount of credit. 
Id. at 39. 
52 Greenspan stresses that despite providing of greater flexibility to the financial system, due to the 
complexity, the counterparties could get vulnerable to serious risk that "they do not currently recognize, and 
hence these instruments potentially expose the overall system if mistakes are large." See Allan Greenspan, 
Testimony Before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 27,2002) at 8. 
3 See id. 
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augment profits, and avoid adding debt to its balance sheet. 54 There were no requirements 
to disclose information about its risks to counterparties, and the market prices or conditions, 
and thus the derivatives activities have not been regulated in spite of the size of derivatives 
market, complexity, and pivotal role in the energy derivatives markets under the 2000 
Commodity Futures Act. 55 
In these circumstances, same financial techniques used for the asset securitization were 
arguably applied to "construct the elaborately camouflaged and boody trapped 
partnerships" resulting in the Enron's collapse. 56 That is, non-consolidated special purpose 
entities (vehicles) were used to hedge certain Enron investments in its manipulations. 
However, it should be recognized that the problem in Enron case is not the securitization, 
the process of creating asset-backed securities but the more Enronic uses of structured 
54 As a consequence, the Enron's credit rating was damaged, and thus its credibility in energy trading 
business was hurt. See Report of Investigation by the Special Investigation Committee of the Board of 
Directors ofEnron Corporation 4,36,68, 78, 97 (Feb. 1,2002). 
55 See Global Financial Stability Report, supra note 46, at 41. However, the U.S. Congressional Hearings 
have affIrmed that certain energy derivatives activities do not fall into the categories that are exempted from 
~ey regulatory provisions under the act. 
6 See Henriques, supra note 35. 
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finance. 57 Arguably, the Enron's abuse of special purpose vehicles posed fundamental 
questions whether its Spy transactions transferred risks ofthe hedged assets owned by the 
Enron to others58 because ofthe SPVs' inability to perform their hedges resulting from the 
simultaneous fall in Enron's asset and stock values.59 In this sense, the Enron collapse has 
not been caused directly by the new financial techniques and instruments. Rather, partly 
ineffective private market discipline, disclosure, corporate governance, and inadequate 
accounting rules should be blamed for the Enron case.60 
Consequently, financial regulatory and supervisory authorities should catch up with the 
financial innovation and new instruments to improve robust financial system. Any 
regulatory re-evaluation needs to take a long-term perspective so that market participants 
can take advantage ofthe ever-lasting financial innovation in the age ofthe information 
economy. Also, financial institutions need to strengthen their credit risk management 
57 Id. (quoting law professor Ronald Gilson that "Enron gives a very useful tool a bad name for no reason. 
Structured finance is used for a zillion different and worthwhile purposes. The problem is Enron used it to 
~feate a structure that was genuinely not transparent, to hide things."). 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron, and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 7 
(July 2002), available at http://ssm.com/abstracUd=306820 (last visited Dec. 19,2003); see also Henriques, 
SUpra note 35 (quoting law firm partner David Eisenberg that "securitization is about transferring risk to 
~9thers - and Enron only appeared to be doing that, when in reality they were retaining the risk themselves"). 
See Steven L. Schwarcz, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION 
~ec. I: 1 (3d ed. 2002); see also Schwarcz, supra note 58, at 7 n.41. 
See Global Financial Stability Report, supra note 46, at 41. 
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practices to foster their review of new financial instruments. Needless to say, the market 
participants' attention to the lessons from the recent episodes, and adoption ofthe adequate 
policies and controls will substantially prevent or minimize the risks of repeating similar 
. h fu 61 excess III t e near ture. 
D. Financial Deregulation 
As noted, the regulatory authorities are continuously getting behind the structural 
changes in the financial services industry, and thereby cannot but react to immense 
pressures by relaxing the financial regulations or implementing new regulations. 
Despite regulators' sustained efforts, the increasing complexity of financial services 
transactions involving the cross-institutional and cross-border activities has reduced the 
effectiveness of financial regulation, and thus eroded statutory and physical barriers 
between financial sectors and jurisdictions, which led to regulatory changes and 
convergence of financial regulatory standards in response to the regulatory arbitrage. 
6) Ri h 
card Spillenkothen, Testimony Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 
COmmittee on Government Affairs, U.S. Senate (Dec. 11,2002), at 6. 
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These structural trends have blurred traditional distinctions between banking and other 
types of financial activities resulting in "one-stop" shopping for the customers of the 
financial services industry, and a concentration of financial services in larger institutions 
through merges and acquisitions. As such, there has been a remarkable convergence of 
banking and financial sectors. The recent repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act (Section 20), 
which prohibited banks from engaging in securities underwriting, under the Financial 
Modernization Act of 1999 (the Gramme-Leach-Bliley Act) in the U.S.,62 and the 
dismantling of Japan's statutory separation of banks, securities firms, and trust banks63 are 
examples of the new regulatory approach to the structural trends. 64 
Moreover, the international competition between national regulatory authorities based 
on regulatory discrepancies65 has intensified the pressure for deregulation of financial 
62 Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.c. sec. 377 (repealed 1999); and Gramme-Leach-Bliley Act section 101(a). 
63 In light of the financial "Big Bang," the Law Amending related laws for Financial System Reform 
amended over 21 laws including the Securities and Exchange Law, Banking Law, and Insurance Law (Law 
No. 107 of 1997). See Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, The Japanese Banking Crisis: Some Historical and Regulatory 
Aspects, y.B. INT'LFIN. & ECON. L., 205, 217 (1999). 
64 At the extreme, the regulatory trends are toward the German-style ''universal banking," in which banks are 
allowed directly to underwrite securities and invest in equities of non blank institutions. See Richard 1. Herring 
& Robert E. Litan, FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE GLOBAL REGULATION 10-11(1995). 
65 Differences in regulatory constraints between national financial systems have driven the shift of fmancial 
activities from one location to another than to accomplish their intended goals in some cases. See id. at 20. 
Such cases demonstrate that the regulators need to anticipate to the providers' circumvention of the regulation 
through the fmancial innovation, and thereby react by new regulation or deregulation. In particular, 
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markets in the domestic arena. As a result, international pressures along with the 
globalization of financial markets spurred the domestic financialliberalization.66 Also, this 
competitive deregulation and liberalization process have removed anti-competitive 
regulatory restrictions, and brought the increased competition for the financial market 
industry, which resulted in efficiency and lowered costs in the financial services sector.67 
That is, financial market participants have enjoyed net benefits from both lower prices for 
financial services and the improvements in quality and access to new financial instruments 
through deregulation and liberalization.68 
In the meantime, there are some concerns about the potential risks and other 
shortcomings raised by financial deregulation. 69 In short, the issues fall into the broad 
categories: the financial market volatility resulting from the large swings in financial 
deregulation has played an important role in stimulating fmancial innovation while innovation has spurred 
financial deregulation. In short, fmancial innovation and regulation are mutually reinforcing. 
66 For example, Japan's financial liberalization in the early 1980s resulted from the United States' pressures 
for Japan to make its financial services industry effective. See K. Osugi, Japan's Experience of Financial 
Deregulation Since 1984 in an International Perspective (Basle: Bank for International Settlements, Jan. 
1990), cited in OECD, Regulatory Reform in the Financial Services Industry: Where Have We Been? Where 
Are We Going?, FIN. MKT. TRENDS, June 1997, at 36. 
67 See OECD, supra note 57, at 53. While fmancial deregulation has created gains from efficient resource 
allocation such as the improved capacity of consumers and private businesses to allocate their spending over 
time thanks to increased capital mobility, it has also raised extensive changes in the financial and macro-
~;onOrnic environment. !d. at 59-63. 
69 Id. at 56. 
!d. at 63-75. 
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market prices, debt build-ups and asset price bubbles preceded by the flexibility of 
available financial instruments and the increased access to credit, banking sector problems, 
and recent international debt problems due to international capital flows. However, it is 
argued that the costs and risks of deregulation can be outweighed by its benefits if only 
deregulation is appropriately implemented and entailed by necessary policy reforms 
affecting financial incentives.7o More importantly, the financial deregulation process 
should be accompanied by proper reform efforts such as prudential supervision and 
regulation of financial markets to ensure the financial stability. In this regard, the 
regulatory competition can focus on the quality of regulation such as its ability to deliver 
results in terms ofthe financial efficiency and stability rather than the regulatory laxity.7l 
In sum, the financial deregulation and liberalization should not be inappropriately 
implemented to bring about the laissez-faire activities or functions free of the prudential 
regulation and supervision of financial markets in the wake of recent financial crises around 
the globe. 
70 
7\ /d. at 75. 
See Wendy Dobson & Pierre Jacquet, FINANCIAL SERVICES LIBERALIZATION IN THE WTO 112 (1998). 
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E. The Convergence of Regulatory Standards 
There have been some debates over whether the cross-national convergence of 
regulatory policy is desirable by the pressure of globalization. Arguably, globalization 
pushing the elimination of all barriers and differences 72 among states and cultures has 
brought sharing same values accompanied by the convergence 73 of economic and political 
systems despite differences between countries with market economies.74 In particular, the 
financial globalization has caused policy convergence/5 that is, a general convergence of 
policy goals, policy instruments, and policy style. Namely, in response to the financial 
globalization, the international cooperation has produced the widespread adoption of 
72 However, some argue that globalization is misunderstood as "the promotion of homogeneity across the 
face of the earth ... as a bulldozer. ... [G]lobalization is a technological and telecommunications revolution, a 
phenomenon of the information age, which will not necessarily erase all differences and barriers between 
nations and cultures." See Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of "Global Convergence" in 
Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 321, 326-327 (2001). 
73 As for the meaning of convergence, one defmes it as "the process of applying increasingly similar rules to 
a given situation in different jurisdictions, and is closely related to the harmonization and approximation of 
laws." See Andrew M. Whittaker, Tackling Systemic Risk on Markets: Barings and Beyond, in THE FUTURE 
FOR THE GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKET 259,261 (F. Oditah ed. 1996). Similarly, convergence is described as 
"the process by which the rules, regulations, or political institutions governing economic activity in different 
countries become more similar." See Henry Laurence, Spawning the SEC, 6 IND. J. GLOBALLEGALSTUD.647, 
649 (1999). 
74 See Alex Y. Seita, Globalization and the Convergence of Values, CORNELL INT'L L. J. 429, 465-469 (1997) 
(arguing that sharing the same values promotes "similar expectations and a common ground for 
understanding" and thereby creating the closer relationship in human society). 
75 Policy convergence is composed of different dimensions including policy goals, "a coming together of 
intent to deal with common policy problems," policy instruments, "the institutional tools available to 
administer policy, whether regulatory, administrative or judicial," and policy style, "a more diffuse notion 
signifying the process by which policy responses are formulated." See C.J. Bennett, What is Policy 
Convergence and What Causes it?, 21 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 215,219 (1991). 
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similar regulatory technique and harmonized global standards by way of negotiated and 
multinational agreements among different national regulatory authorities.76 
,-
While the convergence advocates note that the global convergence does not necessarily 
imply the convergence of identical regulatory standards and structures among different 
nations, they emphasize the convergence of basic values and fundamental systems to 
promote the reliance on market forces, and thus attracting international businesses and 
increasing economic bene:fits.77 At this point, there is a growing cognizance of the need to 
evaluate the international cooperative efforts at the harmonization and unification of 
regulatory standards. 
In this regard, one of the most controversial debates in the field of international 
economic law concerns the desirability of international cooperation. By explaining the 
relationship between internationalization and public choice, one of the proponents for 
international cooperation advocates that "international cooperation is likely to be welfare-
76 One describes this convergence process as "negotiated convergence" because it is the byproduct of 
extensive negotiation among different regulatory authorities and the usual compromises and trade-offs 
inherent in bargaining. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor, Convergence and Competition: The 
~ase of Bank Regulation in Britain and the United States, 20 MrcH. J. INT'L. L. 595, 597-598 (1999). 
See Laurence, supra note 73, at 649-650; Seita, supra note 73, at 466-469. 
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improving in the majority of contexts, though the exact nature of that cooperation must 
vary from one subject to another.,,78 The defender identifies several reasons why 
international cooperative efforts should be encouraged.79 First, as the ability of national 
authorities to regulate transnational activities is eroding, and noncooperarive strategies 
become less successful, international cooperation will become more attractive. Second, 
international cooperation is desirable and successful because of the increase in welfare 
associated with the cooperation in trade liberalization under the WTO despite it's the value-
subtracting cooperation. Third, even if international cooperation can be welfare-reducing, 
the argument for cooperation may be strengthened since the cooperation allowed nations to 
consider a broader range of interests and thus producing a remarkable growth in trade and 
welfare. 
78 
See Andrew T. Guzman, Public Choice and International Regulatory Competition, 90 GEO. L. J. 971, 972-
974 (2002). By contrast, Stephan and O'Hara's skepticism identifies about the potential hazards of 
international cooperation resulting from the probability and the costs of welfare-reducing international 
agreements through facilitating transfer payments and logrolling. See Paul B. Stephan, The Political Economy 
of Choice of Law, 90 GEO. L. J. 957, 960-961 (2002); Erin A. 0 'Hara, Economics, Public Choice, and the 
~erennial Conflict of Law, 90 GEO. L. J. 941, 948-956 (2002). 
See Guzman, supra note 78, at 978-979. 
35 
To support the argument, the international cooperation advocates assert the 
determination of the appropriate level of cooperation when it should be used.8o In 
particular, it is worth noting that when the other levels of cooperation fail, supranational 
standards and regulations should be alternatively taken into account because of their 
potential to reduce the cost of transfers among nations, which makes it easier to reach an 
agreement. 81 
In contrast to the international cooperation advocates, some argue that international 
cooperative efforts have faced a great degree of skepticism at the national level because the 
efforts lack the political accountability of elected and appointed officials at national and 
local levels. 82 That is, the domestic decisionmakers or bureaucrats face severe constraints 
on their behavior as opposed to international lawmakers, and thereby bears some political 
80 See Guzman, supra note 78, at 980-983 (providing several levels of cooperation that are available: fIrst, a 
laissez-faire system as the lowest level of cooperation, second, a nation's setting of the terms of its 
interactions with other nations through a unilateral selection of choice-of-law rules, third, an agreement on 
choice-of-law rules without any comments on substantive rules, fourth, harmonization of substantive laws as 
a higher level of cooperation, alternatively, supranational standards and regulations as the highest level of 
cooperation) 
81 . 
. See Guzman, supra note 78, at 983 (taking as the best examples of this strategy, international trade and 
mternational intellectual property under the WTO, and international banking regulation through the Basle 
Accord). 
82 
See Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 
'! A. J. INT'L L. 743, 752 (1999) (arguing that this is because "[n]o mechanism exists for voters to pass 
Judgment on the international lawmakers. At best, they can vote for the domestic governments that in turn 
choose the drafters of international agreements."). 
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accountability for their choices.83 Also, international cooperative efforts have brought 
about skepticism because they lack the transparency of local lawmaking. 84 Due to the lack 
of transparency, a substantial amount of economic rent-returns in excess of what is 
necessary to keep a given resource from transferring to other occupation-have been 
sought all over the world. As such, bureaucrats may foil the cooperative efforts unless they 
have chances to engage in rent seeking, thereby decreasing transparency and engaging in 
turf protection. 85 Furthermore, the pessimistic perspective on cooperative efforts classifies 
into two categories the reasons why international cooperation may produce undesirable 
outcomes: 
First, negotiators may give excessive weight to the preferences of private groups with 
unrepresentative preferences but especially low organizational costs .... Second, persons 
with an interest in the institutions established or promoted by international cooperation may 
83 
84 Paul B. Stephan, Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J. INT'LL. & Bus. 681,682,732 (1997) 
See id. at 689 ("interest groups tend to have somewhat lower costs of expressing their preferences to 
executives engaged in international lawmaking than in conveying their wishes to domestic legislators, and ... 
~e general public has higher monitoring costs with respect to international lawmaking"). 
See id. at 706. 
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seek the adoption of agreements that expand the competence, discretion, and authority of 
those institutions at the expense of desirable regulatory outcomes.86 
More importantly, this pessimistic point of view on the cooperative efforts points out 
the costs of cooperation and welfare-reducing agreements.S? The grounds for welfare-
reducing international cooperation fall into three categories: 
First, [the negotiators] have powerful incentives to achieve some kind of agreement 
regardless of substantive outcome.88 Association with a concluded agreement brings 
prestige opportunities to offer interpretation, and invitation to participate in subsequent 
negotiations. Second, the legislatures ... face take-it-or-leave-it choices that limit their 
power to shape what gets adopted. Thus they are [unlikely] to reject agreements that may 
reduce overall welfare.89 Third, the difficulty of reaching the sustained level of agreement 
86 
See Stephan, supra note 78, at 960-961. 
87 In general, the costs incurred by a potentially undesirable agreement, discounted by the likelihood of the 
structure producing such an agreement is greater than the benefits of a potentially desirable agreement, 
~iscounted by the likelihood of a particular institutional structure achieving it. See id. at 960. 
In response to this argument, Guzman advocates that this does not show an important ground to resist 
international cooperation for three reasons. First, as long as a pro-agreement bias exists among the negotiators 
as agents for the nations, the principals have a incentive to correct for this through a change in the negotiators. 
~econd, there are many ways to "reach a deal" without imposing important commitments on a nation under 
mternationallaw. Third, despite a bias toward some kind of agreement, the bias may be helpful rather than 
harmful in light of the overall negotiating structure of international law, under which the consent of every 
partiCipating nation is required for international agreements in accordance with the unanimity rule. See id. at 
974-975 
89 . 
As for this argument, Guzman casts doubts for two reasons. First, the negotiators are controlled by the 
executive, and thus the nation has a chance to shape the content of the agreement. Second, the legislature's 
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necessary to pennit frequent updates of existing agreements pushes negotiators toward 
delegations oflawmaking authority to international institutions.90 
Even if international cooperative efforts have been remarkably increasing over the last 
decades, there is still a concern that the international cooperation has pitfalls and should be 
approached cautiously.91 As noted, the lack of transparency, the lack of political 
accountability and the rent-seeking may impede convergence. 92 Here, it should be noted 
that there is no trend to homogeneity in world economics as asserted by globalization 
advocates the globalization thesis. Moreover, modernization and Westernization are not 
converging trends, as the underlying premise of global convergence scholarship implies.93 
With respect to the convergence thesis, some argue that states still pursue diverse policy 
choices. In this regard, one examines the hypothesis that the Keynsian welfare policies of 
decision to accept a tale-it-or-leave-it offer does not imply that it is not likely to approve a welfare-reducing 
agreement. See id. at 975-976. 
90 Id. at 961. In contrast to this concern of entrenchment by international bureaucrats, Guzman claims that the 
concern is a concern about the form of cooperation rather than its merit since many forms of cooperation can 
ffoceed without formal institutions. See id. at 975. 
Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J. 
~rT'L L. Bus. 681 (1996-1997). 
In addition, one indicates as one of the grounds the pretentious "we know better" tone of much of the 
~30nvergence advocacy. See Branson, supra note 72, at 339. 
John Gray, FALSE DAWN: THE DELUSIONS OF GLOBAL eAPIT ALISM 169-170 (1998), cited in Branson, 
S~pra note 72, at 349. It is argued that for much of the world, modernization and Westernization have become 
dIverging trends or, indeed, anathema to one another. 
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West European states will be eroded by the international financial integration and 
concludes that notwithstanding the increased exertion of capital integration over the past 
two decades, "powerful pressures for convergence in economic policies,,,94 such 
convergence has not happened, and that "the evidence on fiscal policy conflicts sharply 
with the convergence thesis. ,,95 The other argues that "the international outcome [of the 
financial integration] is solidly rooted in domestic policy dilemmas and distributional 
debates," and that "[financial] markets remained distinctively national.,,96 
Nevertheless, global convergence fueled by the process of globalization has grown 
significantly in international economic affairs. As a matter of fact, international efforts at 
regulatory cooperation have resulted in global convergence of regulatory standards. 
Notably, global convergence of financial regulatory standards propelled by the 
globalization of finance has recently attracted a considerable attention around the globe. In 
particular, it deserves noting that global convergence in banking regulation has made 
94 
See Geoffrey Garrett, Capital Mobility, Trade, and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy, 49 INT'L 
~RG. 657, 657 (1995) 
See idat 659. 
96 
Andrew C. Sobel, Domestic Choices, INTERNATIONAL MARKETS 19,143 (1994), cited in Laurence, supra 
note 73 at 652-653. 
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greater strides than in any other financial sector law and regulation. In this regard, most 
regulators and academics seem to believe that global convergence ofthe Basel Committee's 
bank supervisory standards and capital adequacy principles is desirable and more would be 
better. However, there is a strong need to examine this global, one-size-fits-all-standards 
setting process and thus to enhance the more prudential bank supervisory and regulatory 
framework in the wake of recent financial crises. 
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II. The State in the Global Era 
A. The Status of the State Under International Law and in a Globalizing 
World 
After the World War II, the realization that global problems need international 
regulatory regimes to cope with cross-border and inter-state activities has driven the 
creation of international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) that have 
international administrative jurisdictions ensuing contravention of the territorial 
sovereignties of states. Globalization has also played a key role in eroding states' 
geographical borders thanks to the rapid economic integration, and the growth of 
regionalism. The birth of European Union despite member states' national differences 
shows that the reciprocal benefit derived from the correlative restriction on another state's 
power makes the loss of one's power acceptable, and the state's boundaries insignificant. 
As mentioned, globalization has played an important role in reshaping the world order 
since the end of the Cold War. Dramatically, remarkable innovative changes in the linked 
technologies of computing and communication as a result of the information revolution, so 
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called the third industrial revolution, are influencing the nature of the state institutions, and 
increasing the role of non-state actors. 97 
The process of globalization has transformed the traditional view of intemationallaw 
for the state sovereignty that is associated with exclusive territorial jurisdiction since the 
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, ending the Thirty Years War.98 This Westphalian 
97 It deserves noting Joseph Nye's remark in the context of information revolution, although the focus is on 
the importance of soft power of the American foreign policy. According to Nye, "we can get some idea of 
where we are heading by looking back at the past. In the first industrial revolution, around the tum of the 
nineteenth century, the application of steam to mills and transportation had a powerful effect on the economy, 
society and government .... The second industrial revolution, around the tum of the twentieth century, 
introduced electricity, synthetics, and internal combustion engine and brought similar economic and social 
changes. The historical analogies help us understand some of the forces that will shape world politics in the 
twenty-first century. Economies and information networks have changed more rapidly than governments 
have, with their scale having grown much faster than that of sovereignty and authority. [T]he building blocks 
of world politics are being transformed by the new technology, and our politics will have to adjust 
accordingly. If we focus solely on the hard power of nation-states, we will miss the new reality and fail to 
advance our interests and our values." See Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's 
only Superpower can't go it alone 43-44 (2002). 
98 Since the 17th century, the modem state has been the dominant entity in domestic and international affairs 
both in terms of power and regulatory authority. See John Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing 
Modernity in International Relations, 47 INT'L ORG. 139, 174 (1993); Kalevi Holsti, Peace and War: Armed 
Conflict and International Order 1648-1989 25 (1998) (noting that [t]he Peace of Westphalia organized 
Europe on the principle of particularism. It represented a diplomatic arrangement-an order created by states, 
for states-and replaced most of the legal vestiges of hierarchy, at the pinnacle of which were the Pope and 
the Holy Roman Empire."); Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb. 1997, at 50 (arguing 
that the Westphalia thesis is not universally endorsed); Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: 
Culture, Social Identity and Institutional Rationality in International Relations 88 (1999) (pointing out that 
"[I]t was not until the middle of the nineteenth century, when a new set of constitutional value has emerged to 
justify the authority of [a] sovereign state, the fundamental institutions of multilateralism and contractual 
international law took off."); see also Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the 
Westphalian Myth, 55 Int'l Org. 250, 268 (2001) (remarking that "the prevalence of the Westphalian Myth ... 
is the result of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century historians adopting a certain standard account of 1648, 
influenced by ideas that can be traced to anti-Habsburg propaganda of the Thirty Year' War."). 
Historically, the modem state system has its origin in the medieval European feudalism. One conceives 
the state as the outcome of chance and history in that the state developed by defeating all other contesting 
fonns of authority. See Bart Driessen, A Concept of Nation in International Law 33 (1992). Since the 
Westphalia pact in 1648, the concept of state sovereignty has established the territorial state as governing 
system for a specific territory with a stable population and a functioning government, and the capacity to 
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sovereignty has been subject to critical scrutiny due to the rapid globalization in the world 
economy, the growth of regionalism around the globe, and the advent of international 
. 99 
regulatory regImes. 
In recent years, the impact of globalization on the dominance and autonomy of the state 
has increasingly been the subject of heated debate cutting across various disciplines. 
Globalization has played a significant role in eroding states' geographical boundaries 
thanks to the rapid economic integration, and the growth of regionalism. Dramatically, 
innovative changes in the linked technologies of computing and communication are 
influencing the nature of state institutions, and enhancing the role of nonstate actors. In 
this regard, some observers stress a need for relocation of authority, both to the 
international level for problems for which the state is too small to operate effectively, and 
engage in foreign relations despite the persistence of ethnic and religious identities as reaffirmed in Article 1 
of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and duties of States regarding four requirements for de 
facto status as a state. A defined territory is one characteristic of statehood, whereas an attachment to lands 
mayor may not be a feature of nationhood. Here, a state can be defined as a territory built by conquest in 
which one culture, one set of ideas and laws have been enforced over diverse nations. By contrast, a nation 
may be defined as a self-identifying people who share a common history, a common culture, language and a 
homeland, but not necessarily installed on a given territory. See Suzan D. Balz, Essay: A Country within a 
~ountry: Rewarding Borders on the post-Colonial Sovereign State, 2 Mich. J. Race & L. 537, 541 n.13 (1997). 
See Kanishka Jayasuriya, Globalization, Law, and the Transformation of Sovereignty: The Emergence of 
Global Regulatory Governance, 6 GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. J. 425, 426 (1999) (arguing that "[t]he notion of a 
single unified system of internal sovereignty has become increasingly problematic in a global political 
economy surrounded by islands of sovereignty, rather than by a single, central decisionmaking authority"). 
Jayasuriya claims that the development of this "complex sovereignty" reflects the transformation and 
reconstitution of the notion of the state sovereignty in the face of globalization in the world economy. !d. 
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to the sub-state level, for tasks for which it is too big. loO Others acknowledge the gradual 
ending of the primacy of the state. lOl This is due to "the alleged loss of functions to 
international institutions, to pressure to develop power to regional movements demanding 
autonomy or secession, and to the difficulty of effectively controlling large multinational 
enterprises, the flows of international finance and of information and ideas.,,102 
The new medievalists proclaiming the end of the state emphasizes the role of non-state 
actors with multiple allegiances and a global networkl03 while liberal internationalists 
adhere to the primacy of the state, but recognize a need for international rules and 
institutions, constituted by a legally binding treaty, with expanding powers of governance 
to solve governmental problems. 104 The adherents of new medievalism conceive the 
development of a complex and varied world order with multiple layers and actors that is 
100 
See Paul Kennedy, PREPARING THE TWENTy-FIRST CENTURY 131 (1993). 
101 See Ali. Khan, The Extinction of Nation-States: A World without Borders 193 (1996); see also Jan A. 
Scholte, Global Capitalism and the State, 73 INT'L AFFAIRS 427,444-45(1997) (noting the states' loss of 
sovereign authority in the face of independent regulatory activities by business association; arguing that the 
end of state sovereignty does not mean the end of the state; recognizing the more powerful states have 
r1etained important influence in contemporary global finance). 
02 
See Peter Ma1anczuk, Globalization and the Future Role of Sovereign State, in INTERNATIONAL 
~~ONOMIC LAW WITH A HUMAN FACE 46-47 (Friedl Weiss et al. eds., 1998). 
See Jessica T. Mathews, supra note 98 (describing a shift away from the state-up, down, and 
~~~eways-to supra-state, sub-state, and above all, nonstate actors). 
See Michael Zuern, From Independence to Globalization, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELA TrONS 235 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2000). The liberal internationalism requires a centralized ru1e-
making authority, a hierarchy of organizations, and universal membership: the United Nations is one of the 
standard or classical model of international institutions. 
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more akin to the order of medieval times. !Os In this sense, this view is construed as a back-
to-the-future model of the twenty-first century. 106 
Another view of chaos paradigm specifically addresses the decline of the state as an 
institution. 107 This view highlights the sharp rise in tribal, ethnic and religious conflict, the 
rapid increase in the activities of international criminal mafia organizations, the 
proliferation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, the increase of international 
terrorism, the problem of massive refugee flows and the appearance of acts of genocide and 
ethnic cleansing. l08 This is an anarchic and chaotic world characterized by the breakdown 
of governmental authority, the dismemberment and fragmentation of states and the 
appearance of failed states: Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, Afghanistan, and 
Yugoslavia. 109 
105 For a summary of this view, see Samuel Huntington, The Clash o/Civilizations and the Remaking 0/ 
World Order 35 (1996). 
106 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 183. 
Slaughter pointed out two central weak points of the new medievalism: fIrst, private power does not take the 
place of state power; second, "the power shift is not a zero-sum game [because] [a] gain in power by nons tate 
actors does not necessarily translate into a loss of power for the state." See id. at 184. 
107 
See Huntington, supra note 105. 
108 See Zhigniew Brzezinski, OUT OF CONTROL (1993); see also Daniel Moynihan PANDAEMONIUM: 
~rHNIClTY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, cited in Huntington, supra note 105, at 35 .. 
See generally G.B. Helman et aI., Saving Failed States, 89 FOREIGN POLICY 21(1992); for the analysis 
of failed states and illegal regimes, see also Oscar Schachter, The Erosion 0/ State Authority and its 
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At the other extreme, advocates of the realism in international relations stress the 
primacy of the states as the central actors in world affairs, that is the primary units of 
analysis in social science terms, and the states' activities in a single-minded pursuit of 
political and military security in accordance with their own self-interest. 110 This realism's 
narrow focus on power and military might have encountered challenges from other schools 
of international relations theory since the collapse of Communism and the end of the Cold 
War. As the most dominant theory of these schools, the regime theory shares a number of 
Implications for equitable Development, in International Economic Law with a Human Face 40-42 (F.W eiss 
et al. eds., 1998) at 40-42. 
Ito The perspectives of realists Hans Morganthau and George Kennan builds on the experience of World War 
II, the Cold War, and the alleged utopianism of Wilsonian internationalism in the interwar years. See Claude 
E. Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization 150-152 
(2001). Mogenthau argues that the science of international politics does not lie at the interstices of realism 
and utopianism, but in the realm of realism alone. Its dual purposes are "to detect and understand the forces 
that determine political relations among nations, and to comprehend the ways in which those forces act upon 
each other and upon international political relations and institutions." See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics 
Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 18 (6th ed. 1985). For the relationship between realism 
and utopianism, see E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939 (2nd ed. 1946). The realists consider 
the international relations anarchic and often compare to a state of war, specifically "a competition of units in 
the kind of state of nature that knows no restraints other than those which the changing necessities of the 
game and the shallow conveniences of the players impose." See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: 
Cooperations and Discord in the World Political Economy 7 (1984). Kenneth Waltz shifted the focus in 
realist theory, particularly the powerful redefinition and refinement of realism. According to Waltz's 
neorealist reformation of realist international theory based on the economic theory of the firm, the anarchical 
nature of the international system-its lack of a central authority with effective sanctioning powers--gives 
states a powerful survival motive. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory ofInternationa1 Politics (1979) preface; for 
the analysis of the Watz's theory; see also Anne-Marie Burley, International Law and International Relations 
Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 American 1. ofInt'l L. 205, 208-218 (1993). The advocates of the realist 
tradition of international economy continue to stress the primacy of the state as the central actor. In this 
context, one points out, in some cases, globalization has brought about the expansion of government authority 
and government spending rather than diminishing the state authority. See Robert Gilpin, THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1975). 
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assumptions with realism, but regime theorists often modify them substantially. Although 
like realists, the regime theorists view the state as the primary actor in the international 
affairs, they acknowledge that "internal economic, social, and political pressures buffet 
governments before they reach a unified national position."lll 
In recent years, the proponents of transgovernmentalism recognize that the information 
revolution and globalization are changing world politics, and entailing selutory effects on 
the evolution of international law, but they believe that the state is resilient and will remain 
the centerpiece of the international system, thereby continuing to exercise its power in a 
disaggregated, more flexible fashion. IIZ That is, the transgovernmentalism notes the 
frequent interaction among decentralized government agencies-global networks-all over 
the world rather than formal negotiation. This point of view argues that "[r]egular 
interaction with foreign colleagues offers new channels for spreading democratic 
III 
For the distinction between the realism and regime theory, see Claude E. Barfield, Free Trade, 
Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization, 152-153 (2001). See generally 
mtemational Regimes (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983). 
. See Slaughter, supra note 106 at 184. Slaughter asserts that "[ d]isaggregating the state permits the 
disaggregation of sovereignty as well, ensuring that specific state institutions derive strength and status from 
participation in transgovemmental order." [d. at 196. 
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accountability, governmental integrity, and the rule of law."I13 The advocate claims that 
transgovernmental networks represent "a blueprint for the international architecture of the 
21 51 century." 11 4 
Although it is beyond the scope of this study, exploring the relationship of the state and 
nation due to the increase in the nation and state conflicts is noteworthy while traditional 
international law doctrine is still based on the presumption of fictional nation-states. With 
the demise of Communism across Eastern and Central Europe that has propelled us into the 
post-Cold War era, international community has confronted the ever-increasing claims to 
autonomy and outright independence by minority nations that are seeking a greater 
recognition of their cultural and political identities within their existing states in the name 
of self-determination or national liberation. 1 15 Arguably, since current international law 
113 See id. at 186. Slaughter asserts that transgovernmenta1ism is more effective and potentially more 
accountable than any other alternatives since it leaves the control of government agencies in the hands of 
national citizens rather than supranational bureaucracies answerable to no one in the liberal internationalism. 
~laughter also argues that although new medievalism attracts states' rights enthusiasts and superanationalists, 
lit could easily reflect the worst of both worlds. Id. 
14 . 
liS See ld. at 197. 
See Ved P. Nanda, Revisiting Self-Determination as an International Law Concept: A Major Challenge in 
the post-Cold War Era, 3 Ilsa. J. Int'l & Compo L. 443, 444 (1997); see also Ravi Mahalingam, The 
Compatibility of the Principle of Nonintervention with the Right of Humanitarian Intervention, 1 UCLA J. 
Int'! L. 223, 225 (1993). For the concept of self-determination, see generally Eric Kolodner, The Future of 
the Right to Self-Determination, 10 Conn. J. Int'! L. 153, 155 (1994). 
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still excessively based on the presumption of fictional nation-states has not evolved 
sufficiently to handle this postmodern global disorder ofthe tumult of ethnicity as 
witnessed in the fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia, the paradigm of international 
legal discourse needs to be adapted to real nature of states and nations. I 16 
Arguably, a nation cannot be defined in international law while sticking to the positive, 
while ignoring the concept of morality in international society. I 17 One focuses on the 
issues of self-determination and rights of nations in international law to solve problems 
between states and nations. I 18 The past centuries saw the problem of the moral justification 
of the state-centric conception while the state system could not prevent hundreds of wars. 
It can arguably be assumed that the order or authoritative association between states has 
little moral value in itself. In short, state borders are not borders of morality, and thus the 
state system cannot be adapted to be harmonious with the nations system. I 19 In this regard, 
1i6 
1i7 See Bart Driessen, A Concept of Nation in International Law 5 (1992) 
lis See id. at 4. 
1i9 Id. at chapter 5. 
Id. at 34. 
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it is asserted that the real moral collectivity is not the state but the nation, which should be 
. d d' . 11 120 recognIze un er mternatlOna aw. 
The decolonization in 1950s has fonned numerous new states that housed different 
peoples with different cultural backgrounds between their borders. Since new sates' 
borders were often drawn arbitrarily, based on previous wars fought by the colonial powers, 
and on compromises reached between them, yet unmatured democracies were also 
anticipated to accommodate several peoples in their territory, to protect minorities against 
the majority and to build one nation out of several ones, and thus the post-Colonization era 
has witnessed a side effect of failed states. 121 
Although it is difficult to attempt a definite nonnative assessment of so complicated and 
many-sided phenomenon as that discussed above, the state will be unlikely to disappear in 
120 
Id. at chapter 4. 
I2l See Ruud Lubbers & Jolanda Koorevaar, Nation state and democracy in the globalizing world, Paper 
presented at a Tilburg University seminar (Nov. 26, 1998), at 3; see also Suzan D. Balz, A Country within a 
Country: Redrawing Borders on the Post-Colonial Sovereign State, 2 Mich. J. Race & L. 537, 561-563 (1997) 
(arguing that territory is no longer necessarily the characteristic of political entity in the international arena, 
and therefore stateless nations should be recognized as subjects of international law. The best way to achieve 
this is to make room in international law for minority nations that are self-defining in accordance with their 
own criteria to be recognized as political entities within the concept of the sovereign state, co-exist in 
arrangements with states, and further serve as members of international organizations. In order for 
ColOnialism to be ended, a room in international law for non-Western concepts should be made, and stateless 
nations should be recognized, they should be heard, and they should be allowed to contribute to its shape. 
This will strengthen the state, whose legitimacy and continued survival hinge on its representation of the 
peoples.). 
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the foreseeable future. The key issue is not the continuous existence of the sovereign state, 
but how its centrality and functions are being modified. As the past decades have 
witnessed, all the states on the globe are struggling to solve the problems that are beyond 
their control within their national boundaries-financial flow, drug trade, AIDS, terrorism, 
and so forth-. In these circumstances, the state actors and institutions need to adapt. As 
such, they modify the meaning of sovereign authority, control, and the role of private 
actors.122 In short, while the state's powers are not what they once were, the state remains 
sovereign.123 
B. The Emergence of Global Civil Society: Implications for the State 
The changing role of the state is often associated with the increased participation of 
global civil society in domestic and international affairs. Notably, the state has been 
122 
123 See Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power, supra note 97, at 56 (2002) 
See id. at 74. Observers remark that "[I]fthe state remains at the center of governance in the world, what 
has changed? In a word everything. Never have so many different nonstate actors competed for the authority 
and influence that once belonged to the state alone." See Gordon Smith et aI., Altered States: Globalization, 
Sovereignty and Governance 10 (2000). 
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increasingly challenged by the proliferation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs ).124 
The information revolution has enabled NGOs to engage in the large scale-activity across 
national borders because NGOs are particularly effective in penetrating states without 
regard to borders. 125 As a result, NGOs operating transnationally have much greater 
opportunities to organize and propagate their views in response to new demands. 126 The 
prospect of a civil society is attractive to liberals, who envisage it as enabling and 
empowering independent self-organized groups to participate politically and to counter the 
abuses of state power. 127 One notes that "the revitalization of civil society was portrayed, 
124 Thanks to the information revolution, the number ofNGOs increased from 6,000 to approximately 26,000 
during the 1990s alone. See The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society (Ann FIorini ed. 2000). 
It deserves noting the importance of in particular NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, 
the International Red Cross, Greenpeace, the World Economic Forum, Doctors without Borders, and 
Transparency International. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) playa key role in an increasingly global 
economy. At the end of2001, the gross product of all foreign affiliates ofMNEs was estimated at $3.5 trillion, 
or roughly one tenth of the world's domestic product. About two thirds of world trade is conducted by MNEs, 
and about a third takes place within MNEs. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2002: Transnational Corporations and Export Competitiveness 4-5, 
U.N. Doc. UNCTADIWIRl2002 (2002). Gross Product is defined as the total value of all goods and services 
produced by MNEs. 
125 See Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics 91(2004). 
126 In this regard, new perspectives on governance highlight the potential role of civil society. Nye notes the 
need for a diffusion of governance activities in several directions at the same time instead of centralization or 
decentralization when there is imbalance between the state's problem-solving capacity and the problems of 
life. See Nye, The Paradox of American Power, supra note 97, at 45. Nye illustrates the possible diffusion of 
activities away from central governments-vertically to other levels of government and horizontally to market 
~~d private nonrnarket actors. See id. at 45-46. 
See John Clark, Democratizing Development: The Role o/Voluntary Organizations (1991); see also 
Andrew Hurrell et aI., Globalization and Inequality, 24 Int'l Studies 447,467 (1995) ("the idea of 'civil 
society' has long been considered in liberal thought as something defmed in contradiction to the state and as 
valuable precisely as a means of checking the power of states. Confirming this view in the evidence ofNGOs 
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at least by conservatives, as a solution to the social and political side of public well-being, 
one that could make the state politically obsolete, just as global markets made the state 
economically obsolete.,,128 
Many NGOs assert to act as a global conscience representing broad public interests 
I 
beyond the domain of states, or interests that states are used to ignoring. 129 In this way, a 
large number ofNGOs have played a key role in the official institutions concerned with the 
creation of international law and legal policy, and in pressing for the implementation and 
enforcement oflaw.130 NGOs' work ranges over their broad interestsYI Some note that 
which have given voice to the weak and vulnerable and to those who are deemed to be non-members of a 
particular state or political community, or who fall between the cracks of the state system ... "). 
128 See Peter Evans, The Eclipse of the State?: Reflections on Stateness in an Era ofGlobalizations, WORLD 
POLITICS, Vol. 50, No.1 (Oct. 1997), at 78-79. Evans points out that the political triumph of the stateless 
Anglo-American world order was a crucial driving force behind the charisma of civil society. Id. at 78. 
129 See Nye, The Paradox of American Power, supra note 97, at 60. Thanks to the expansive use of the 
Internet, NGOs are able to share information with state institutions, thereby pressing governments directly, or 
indirectly by mobilizing their publics through focusing the attention of the media and governments on their 
preferred issues. In this way, they create a new type of transnational political coalitions, such as a coalition to 
ban land mines brought together NGOs, celebrities, and politicians in many countries. Meanwhile, there is a 
need to rethink about NGOs' use of the Internet to plan the disruption of the WTO summit in 1999 that 
r3~came known as the battle of Seattle. See Nye, Soft Power, supra note 125, at 90-92. 
See Oscar Schachter, The Erosion of State Authority and its Implications for Equitable Development, 
supra note 109, at 36. For a recent survey ofNGOs, see Thomas G.Weiss et aI., NGOs, the UN and Global 
~?vernance (1996). 
Multinational enterprises are also the target ofNGO activities. In short, as the technology of the cheap 
communications enable NGOs to conduct campaigns to name and shame transnational companies that pay 
low wages to laborers in poor countries. Such campaigns sometimes work since they are credibly able to 
threaten to deprive the corporations of the soft power of their valuable brand names. See Nye, Soft Power, 
SUpra note 125, at 93. Indeed, multinational enterprises (MNEs) playa key role in an increasingly global 
economy. At the end of 2001, the gross product of all foreign affiliates of MNEs was estimated at $3.5 trillion, 
Or roughly one tenth ofthe world's domestic product. About two thirds of world trade is conducted by MNEs, 
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"[NGOs] breed new ideas; advocate, protest, and mobilize public support; do legal, 
scientific, technical, and policy analysis; provide services; shape, implement, and monitor 
national and international commitments; and change institutions and norms.,,132 
Needless to say that NGOs have played a critical role in supporting human rights, 
thereby improving the status of women and environmental regulation. Despite their 
dedication to higher aims, their efforts are widely viewed as a desirable addition to 
international political and legal structures. 133 Their power in mobilizing public opinion 
and bringing pressure on government is construed as participatory democracy. 134 The 
information revolution and global communication networks have contributed to the growth 
and effectiveness of the NGOs on the international stage. As a result, NGOs are able to 
challenge states or compete with them in important areas. In this regard, governments 
and about a third takes place within MNEs. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2002: Transnational Corporations and Export Competitiveness 4-5, 
U.N. Doc. UNCTADIWIRJ2002 (2002). Gross Product is defined as the total value of all goods and services 
P3~oduced by MNEs. 
133 See Mathews, supra note 98, at 53. 
134 See Schachter, supra note 109, at 35. 
[d. at 37. 
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have to consider NGOs as both allies and adversaries because of their ability to attract 
135 followers. 
However, NGOs are barely recognized under international law, and their juridicial 
status and rights are still governed by national law constituted by the state authority. Under 
the special circumstances, they are granted privileges and immunities similar to the public 
bodies. 136 A provision of the U.N. Charter (Article 71) provides a basis for granting 
consultative status in the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to both 
international and national NGOs with regard to economic and social issues. The text of 
this provision is commonly viewed as a compromise among those who advocate NGO 
participation in the United Nations' work and those who oppose such participation. 137 A 
reading of Article 71 of the U.N. Charter may cause some doubts as to any entitlement of 
nongovernmental organizations in the context of a legal subject. 138 Nevertheless, the 
135 
136 See Nye, The Paradox of American Power, supra note 97, at 90. 
137 See Schachter, at 37 .. 
See Rainer Lagoni, Article 7 J, in The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary (Bruno Simma et al. 
eds., 1994). 
138 Arti 
. c1e 71 provides: "The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation 
With nongovernmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such 
arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national 
organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned." For the analysis of the 
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provision created the unprecedented formal relationship between interest groups and an 
intergovernmental body (ECOSOC). 
Since the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro held in 
1992, a lot of members ofNGOs served on government delegations, and they penetrated 
deeply into official decision-making in international authorities with independent 
regulatory powers. 139 The Rio Declaration itself does not mention nongovernmental 
organizations. However, Agenda 21 underlines that such organizations possess "well-
established and diverse experience, expertise and capacity infields which will be of 
particular importance to the implementation and review of environmentally sound and 
socially responsible sustainable development"(Section 27.3). It is therefore concluded that 
the role of such organizations is to be strengthened. Apart from promoting the fullest 
possible communication and co-operation between international organizations, national and 
local governments and NGOs, one specific method of enlarging the role ofNGOs is "to 
role ofNGOs, see Stephan Hobe, Global Challenges to Statehood: The Increasingly Important Role of 
~~ngovernmental Organizations, 5 INDIANA 1. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191(1997). 
See Mathews, supra note 98, at 55. 
57 
ensure the right of nongovernmental organizations to protect the public interest through 
legal action"(Section 27.13). 
Moreover, it is important to note NGOs and states' collaborating ad hoc in large-scale 
humanitarian relief operations that involve both military and civilian forces. 140 Also, it is 
noteworthy that whereas NGOs as observers of the World Bank have done, they may also 
file amicus curiae briefs in WTO dispute-settlement cases depending on the transparency of 
their own membership and finances. 141 Another group ofNGOs engage directly in 
development activities under contractual agreements with governments or international 
agencies such as the World Bank. 142 More importantly, there is an increasing role of 
NGOs to play in a hybrid network of organizations that combine governmental, 
intergovernmental, and nongovernmental representatives, such as the World Commission 
on Dam or Kofi Annan's Global Compact, the International Telecommunications Union, 
140 
141 See id. at 62-63. 
142 See Nye, The Paradox of American Power, supra note 97, at 167. 
In that way, international financial institutions have also more engaged in states' domestic affairs. 
Beyond their engagement in domestic economic and social decisionmaking, under the new policies,the World 
B~ the International Monetary Fund, and other international fmancial institutions are forced to be allied 
With bUSiness, NGOs, and civil society if they are to accomplish broad changes in target countries. In the 
pro~e~s, they have exposed themselves to the same needs they are asking their clients: broader public 
PartiCIpation and greater openness in decision-making. See Mathews, Power Shift, supra note 98, at 60. 
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and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature to enhance global 
143 
governance. 
Since a number of groups within civil society are the direct or indirect product of state 
action, and cannot be understood outside their relationship to states, the politics of 
transnational civil society mainly concerns the way of certain groups' emergence, and their 
legitimacy by governments, institutions, or other groupS.144 NGOs' environmental and 
development activities which are not operated for profit are also influenced by scientific 
and technical community oflike-minded experts acting through their associations or 
consulting companies. A benefit of these epistemic communities, in addition to their 
specialized competence, is their avoidance of defects of centralization, and the hierarchies' 
characteristic of both state and international public bodies. 145 One observer notes that 
epistemic communities bring up knowledge and consensus providing basis for effective 
143 
144 See Nye, The Paradox of American Power, supra note 97, at 167; see also Mathews, supra note 98, at 62. 
145 Andrew Hurrell & Ngaire Woods, Globalization and Inequality, 24 MILLENNIUM 447, 467-468(1995). 
See Peter. Haas, Do Regimes matter?: Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control, 43 
INT'L ORG. 377 (1989). 
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cooperation through framing issues of ozone depletion or global climate changes. 146 
Although the cross-border transmission of knowledge and ideas is often viewed as the 
diffusion of knowledge through epistemic communities, this neglects the issue of whose 
scientific knowledge becomes critical through what channels, and with what relationship to 
states and state power. 147 Arguably, there is a need to examine the links between 
influential epistemic communities, particular institutions and particular groups within 
society are often unexamined 
In the meantime, there are increasing concerns over the rise in transnational criminal 
organizations' illegal activities of drug-traffic, money laundering, terror, and so on. In 
particular, international terrorist groups have become the center of attention around the 
globe in the aftermath of 9/11 tragedy. As for the empowering terrorist groups in an 
uncritical way, there are two further problems. First, these transnational terrorist 
organizations are not necessarily representative, nor politically accountable. Second, the 
146 
Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International policy Coordination, 46 Int'l Org. 
~~Winter 1992). 
See Karen Litfm, Framing Science: Precautionary Discourse and the Ozone Treaties, 24 MILLENNIUM 
251(1995). 
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probability of demonstration for better and for worse. In this regard, the same standards of 
transparency should be applied to NGOs themselves as the increased transparency, that is 
curtailing secrecy of procedures is required for international institutions to be held 
accountable. 153 Furthermore, NGOs do not hesitate to use their soft-power resources in 
calling to storm the barricades evidenced in Seattle and Doha if the lack of political 
accountability and legitimacy came to a head. 
Despite problems of empowering NGOs, they have worked their way into the core of 
international negotiations and the operations of international institutions bringing new 
priorities and demands for procedures that give a voice to groups outside govemments.
154 
Fostering civil society does not necessarily require the demise ofthe state. That is to say, 
it is not a zero-sum relation between robustness of the state and the vibrancy of civil 
society. 155 Thus, the relationship of the state to civil society is more productively viewed 
in the context of mutual empowerment or synergy.156 Likewise, by assisting to solve 
153 See Nye, The Paradox of American Power, supra note 97, at 166-167. 
154 
See Mathews, supra note 98, at 56. 
155 
See Evans, supra note 128, at 79. 
156 S °d ee 1 . at 80 
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154 See Nye, The Paradox of American Power, supra note 97, at 166-167. 
155 See Mathews, supra note 98, at 56. 
15 See Evans, supra note 128, at 79. 
6 See id. at 80 
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problems governments cannot cope with, private sectors, NGOs, and international 
institutions may find themselves actually strengthening the state system. IS7 
C. The Reconceptnalization of State Sovereignty 
The traditional conceptions of sovereignty have been problematic due to the changing 
nature of sovereignty. Finding a workable definition of sovereignty has been an everlasting 
challenge for academics. As a result, the notion of sovereignty is meant by different 
definitions. ISS Moreover, the concept of sovereignty has been attacked as obsolete,IS9 a 
dead duckl60 or extinct,161 but has not been abandoned. 
157 One observer argues that "NGOs are no more successful now in driving outcomes than they were in the 
past. The most powerful of these organizations originated and are headquartered in Europe or the United 
States--territories that have driven international policies for at least the last fifty years. To the extent that 
these NGOs have been able to prevail in domestic processes of interest intermediation in the most powerful 
states, they have long been able to influence international negotiations and outcomes. When NGOs have not 
prevailed in powerful countries, they have sometimes tried to effect change by going around the their 
Powerful home states, prevailing instead upon weaker states to support their positions in international 
negotiations. Such strategy, however, has not reversed their fortunes in the powerful states where they were 
unable to prevail initially. The net result has been a series of recent treaties that have been limited 
effectiveness due to lack of support from powerful states-the Kyoto Protocol, the Antipersonnel Landmines 
Convention, and the Rome Statute, to name a few." See Richard H. Steinberg, Who is Sovereign?, 40 Stan. J. 
Int'l L. 329 335 (2004). 
158 ' 
Stephen Krasner conceptualizes four different dimensions of sovereignty-international legal sovereignty, 
Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty. According to Krasner, in 
particular Westphalian sovereignty refers to the exclusion of foreign actors from domestic decision-making, 
and interdependence sovereignty refers to a state's control over the cross-border movement of goods, services, 
capital, labor, and information. See Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy 9-25 (1999). 
Krasner's study was initiated to respond to observers who assert that the state sovereignty was once exclusive 




The term "sovereignty" has had a long history of the concept in philosophical and 
historical lexicons as the word's meaning changes with each passing era. The 
conceptualization of sovereignty varies with the context and objectives of the use ofthe 
word among legal scholars, political theorists, and policymakers. As remarked earlier, the 
concept of sovereignty has been defined as absolute control of territorial state since the I i h 
century, first in Europe and then elsewhere. As the term "territorial state" denotes a 
governing system for a specific territory with a stable population and a functional 
government, the rise of the territorial state was entailed by the notion that the state was 
sovereign. 162 Hence, the sovereignty of all social groupings regardless of ethnic and 
religious identities within a state's borders was legally subordinated to the sovereignty of 
the state. This was the situation at the earliest stages in the development of the concept of 
sovereignty. Thereafter, sovereignty has become a widely accepted notion as the ultimate 
authority to make policy within a state's boundaries. Therefore, sovereignty is perceived 
the rise ofNGOs. Notably, Krasner remarks that sovereignty was never absolute and always frail as a legal 
fs;mciple. See id. 
See Hans J. Morgenthau, The Intellectual and Political Functions of a Theory of International Relations, in 
~e Role of Theory in International Relations 116 (Horace V. Harrison ed., 1964). 
161 See J.P. Nettle The State as a Conceptual Variable, 20 World Politics 560 (1968). 
162 See Ali Khan, The Extinction of Nation-States 193 (1996). 
See Thomas G. Weiss et aI., The United Nations and Changing World Politics 4-9 (1997). 
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as an authority to enhance the power of peoples constituting the government that represent 
the state. 
As a legal concept, the doctrine of sovereignty and the legal fiction of the sovereign 
equality of states is the independence of states. In the doctrine of international law , state 
sovereignty itself denotes not only the power of an independent state, but the ultimate 
authority of the state, which is absolute within its territory and equal in its relations with 
other sovereigns. That is to say, the state is granted the right freely to exercise its power 
within its territory, and the right to exclude from its territory the exercise of power by any 
other state without any voluntary invitation to do so. Accordingly, the sovereign'S will is 
the only legally relevant one, and thus the power of sovereigns and their political authority 
must be respected, that is no outside rules and institutions are held to be superior to the 
state. 
The eclipse of established empires after World War I and the creation of international 
institutions following World War II posed challenges to the traditional notions of state 
Sovereignty as absolute territorial control over all people in a state. Moreover, the 
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breakdown of the communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe which led to the end 
of the Cold War has propelled the emergence of a new world order. The traditional and 
ideological conflict in politics has encountered a new stage of the world politics and global 
cooperation. In particular, the economic integration in the European Community163 
leading to the prominence of the European Union 164 has become an inspiration for the 
regional cooperation movement aiming at the growth of domestic economy. It is very 
crucial to note what the transformation of Europe means in the context of the state 
sovereignty in that the transformation makes states' boundaries insignificant. The 
European integration toward Europe as unity and Europe as community raised a question 
163 The European Community (hereinafter Ee) is opposed to the European Union (hereinafter EU), from a 
legal point of view, the European Communities in that the European Communities and their Member States 
are members of the WTO. That is because the area of trade is governed by the three Community treaties: the 
Treaty establishing the European Community (Ee), formerly the European Economic Community (EEe); the 
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSe); and the Treaty establishing the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). These treaties were amended but not replaced by the 
Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty). The tree supranational European Commnuties make up 
the fIrst of so-called three pillars on which the EU, which does not have legal personality, is founded. The 
two othr pillars-foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs-are intergovernmental EC as 
opposed to European Communities. See Sydney J. Key, Financial Services in Uruguay Round and the WTO, 
?roup of Thirty Occasional Papers 54 (1997) at 53 n.2. 
64 Thanks to the success of the 1992 initiative, followed by the Masastricht Treaty and plans for further 
integration in the near future, the European Union has come into being. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 
1992, O.J.C. 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992) [hereinafter TEU]. The TEU, also 
known as the Maastricht Treaty, offIcially adopted the name "European Union" for the former "European 
Communities." The European Coal and Steel Community, which was born during the devastation wrought by 
Bitler has come a long way to breed the prominence of the EU. As of May 1,2004, the European Union has 
grown to an organization with 25 member states and 450 million people from 6 member sates in 1951. For the 
detail, see http://www.europa.eu.int/abc-en.htm. 
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whether the reciprocal benefit derived from correlative restriction on the sovereignty of a 
state renders the surrender of the sovereignty of another state, because the EU has to 
become as much a union of citizens as it is of states. In other words, there was a concern 
over the loss of sovereignty by the EU member states because the EU accession required 
significant changes in the 10ca11egis1ation and direct infringement on the domestic control 
oftax and other matters, although it was permanent, and did not include a right of 
secession. 165 
However, the EU member states do not conceive the growing power of the EU and its 
ru1emaking commissions as a loss of sovereignty, although public suspicion of the sudden 
prominence of the EU became painfully obvious during national ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty.166 Likewise, the EU member states were expected to surrender more 
sovereignty to the EU, but even the smaller states of Europe consider the EU's progress and 
165 
See Jenik Radon, Sovereignty: A Political Emotion, not a Concept, 40 Stan. J. Int'l L. 195, 199-202 
(2004). 
166 
Notably, a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark, British parliamentary support was 
questionable, and even in traditionally pro-EC France a referendum passed by the narrowest of margins. See 
e.g., Half-Maastricht, Economist, Sept. 26,1992, at 15; The Danes say No, Economist, June 6,1992; See also 
David Arter, The Politics of European Integration in the Twentieth Century 212-216 (1993). Public suspicion 
of the creation of the EU arose due to the concern over the legitimacy ofEU institutions themselves in terms 
of the democratic deficit, and the threat the EU posed to the independence and survival of the member states. 
For the democratic deficit, see Peter Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and Administrative Character of 
Supranationalism: The Example of The European Community, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 628 (1999). 
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growth as an exercise of expansion of their sovereignty. 167 Accordingly, each EU member 
state still enjoys its dignity as a sovereign in intemationallaw. Hence, the prominence of 
the EU casts some hints on defining a contemporary concept of state sovereignty In the 
expectation of new geographic and functional entities' birth. 
With the acceptance ofthe Charter ofthe United Nations (UN), none of the original 
fifty-one member states raised the issue of UN membership as a threat to the sovereignty, 
but perceived it as a confirmation of their sovereignty. 168 However, competing 
conceptualizations of sovereignty arise even in the Charter of the United Nations. 
According to the Article 2 (7) of the Charter, "Nothing in the present Charter shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any State.,,169 By contrast, the UN Member States, in virtue of 
their acceptance of the UN Charter, have agreed to the ensuing restrictions on their 
167 
Estonia and the other Baltic States became the EU members to protect their sovereignty because they 
considered joining the Euro Zone as a means to increase sovereignty. See Askel Kirch et aI., Changes in EU-
S~nsciousness in Estonia 1995-2000: Discussion and Public Union (IES Proceedings 2002). 
See Radon, supra note 165, at 201 (remarking "the creation of the United Nations also sanctified the 
f~ncept of state sovereignty, as only recognized states could be members of this new global club"). 
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. 
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sovereignty according to the Article 2 (1) of the Charter. l7O The coexistence of human 
rights provisions in the UN Charter since 1945 has made the issue of conceptualization of 
sovereignty complicated. In particular, the NATO intervention of in Kosovo was the 
subject of hot debate among international legal experts, with asserting illegality because it 
was not explicitly authorized by the UN Security Council, and others claiming its legality 
under the evolving body of international humanitarian law. 171 The issue lies at the center 
of the justification of states' interference in the affairs of other sates. One arguably 
attributes such interferences to governments' understanding of the unavailability of no 
other alternatives to them, and fundamental threats to their security derived from conditions 
once thought to be within a state's exclusive domestic jurisdiction. 172 
170 
U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 (embedding the principle of self-determination in the mission of the UN). One 
observer argues that "[r]ecent attemps in the international legal literature to declare incompatible with state 
sovereignty, and therefore illegal, the binding decisions of the UN Security Council authorizing enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII, are flawed and simply false.". See Jost Delbruck, Prospects for a "World 
(International) Law?": Legal Developments in a Changing International System, 9 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 
401,428 (2002). Delbruck continues asserting that "the concept of sovereignty with which the UN actions are 
supposed to be incompatible is an extraneous notion revived from pre-World War I times, not the concept on 
~~ich the UN are based on according to the article 2 (1) of the Charter." See id. at 428 n.78. 
See Adam Roberts, "The So-called 'Right' of Humanitarian Intervention", Yearbook ofInternational 
N~nitarian Law, summer 2001. 
2 
See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 Stan. J. Int'l L. 283, 
84-285 (2004). 
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According to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS),173 participating in international organizations, such as the UN itself, ensues the 
participating states' acceptance of the fellow member states to intervene in their domestic 
affairs in case of their failure in their primary responsibility to protect their citizens.174 In 
December 2001, the ICISS issued a significant report, "The Responsibility to Protect," as a 
call for updating the UN Charter to incorporate a new conceptualization of sovereignty. 175 
The ICISS insists that "there is a necessary re-characterization involved: from sovereignty 
as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and external duties. 176 
That is, whereas internally, a government has an obligation to respect the dignity and 
fundamental rights of its citizens, externally, it has an obligation to respect other states' 
sovereignty. 
173 
In September 1999, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan issued a challenge to all the UN member states 
on the humanitarian area at the opening of the General Assembly to "reach consensus-not only on the 
Principle that massive and systematic violations of human rights must be checked, wherever they take place, 
but also on ways of deciding what action is necessary, and when, and by whom." In response to this 
challenge, a distinguished global group of diplomats, politicians, scholars, and nongovernmental activists 
~~tab1ished the International Commission on Intervention and state Sovereignty. See id. at 286-287. 
175 Id. at 286. 
ICIS, The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
~~OOl). See also Slaughter, supra note 172, at 287 & n. 12. 
See ICIS, supra note 175, at para. 2.14. 
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As a matter of fact, states have difficulty governing effectively as long as they are left 
h I 177 alone and they leave ot er states a one. It is arguably because governments' ability to 
accomplish their objectives through individual action has been impeded by international 
political and economic interdependence. 178 Conversely, "[ s ]tates can only govern 
effectively by actively cooperating with other states and by collectively reserving the power 
to intervene in other states' affairs.,,179 Here, a modem notion of sovereignty formed by 
the paradigms of cooperation and compliance with the international legal order needs to be 
reconceptualized. 
In the words of Chayes and Chayes , "the new sovereignty" is the right and the capacity 
to participate in the international organizations of all types that authorize their members 
cooperating with one another, to attain the objectives that could once be achieved by 
governments themselves. 180 According to Chayes and Chayes, the international system 
177 
See Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International 
Regulatory Agreements 27 (1995) (arguing that "[I]t is that for all but a few self-isolated nations, sovereignty 
no longer consists in the freedom of states to act independently, in their perceived self-interest, but in 
~embership in reasonably good standing in the regimes that make up the substance of international life."). 
See Robert o. Keohane, Sovereignty, Interdependence, and International Institutions, in Ideas and Ideals: 
~~says on Politics in Honor of Stanley Hoffmann 91,92 (Linda B. Miller et al. eds.,1993). 
180 See Slaughter, supra note 172, at 285. 
See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 177, at 4. 
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itself has moved beyond interdependence, and it has become a "tightly woven fabric of 
international agreements, organizations and institutions that shape [states'] relations with 
one another and penetrate deeply into their internal economics and politics.,,181 In this 
regard, one argues that state sovereignty does not mean the autonomy of the state any more 
as long as the background features of international system are connection rather than 
separation, interaction rather than isolation, and institutions rather than free space. 182 In 
this sense, the new sovereignty is conceived as status, membership, "connection to the rest 
of the world and the political ability to be an actor within it.,,183 
181 See id. at 26. For the relationship of globalization to interdependence, see Wolfgang Reinicke, Global 
Public Policy: Governing without Government 52-74 (1998). 
182 
See Slaughter, supra note 172, at 286. 
183 
See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 177, at 26. However, Slaughter paradoxically remarks that "the 
measure of a stae' s capacity to act as an independent unit within the international system-the condition that 
"sovereignty" purports both to grant and describe-depends on the breadth and depth of its links to other 
states." See Slaughter, supra note 172, at 286. Despite a need for the reconceptualization of the traditional 
notion of sovereignty, there is a variance in the extent to which states exercise their sovereignty. In this 
regard, some observer argues that "all states are legally sovereign, but they vary in the extent to which they 
are behaviorally sovereign." See Steinberg, supra note 157, at 329 (distinguishing legal from behavioral 
sovereignty: legal sovereignty confers each state the legal competence to participate in the international 
system on an equal footing with other states, conclude treatise on the basis of consent, exclude other states 
from interfering in its internal affairs; behavioral sovereignty is an evaluation of the extent to which states 
indeed exercise the authority granted by legal sovereignty). This variance arises because the state's capacity 
to exercise both domestic and international dimensions oflegal sovereignty is contingent. See id. at 333. 
Furthermore, states are entitled to a right to exclude other states, nonstate actors, and international 
organizations from interference in their internal affairs in international system under international law, but 
few states are able to do so in fact. As noted, the IMF's conditionality arrangements imposed on loans and 
other measures to help developing countries prevent financial disaster drive the target countries' domestic 
policy and institutional changes. See Lawrence L.c. Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening 
International Banking Supervision, 39 Va. 1. Int'l L. 1. 1,36-39 (1998) (noting that the Basel Committee's 
bank regulatory and supervisory standards have been enforced in emerging economies through considerably 
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As noted above, state sovereignty is deemed to be an evolutionary rather than a static 
concept because both the international system and state-society relations have been 
transformed by globalization and interdependence. As such, sovereignty encounters the 
transformation and evolution in its nature. Consequently, state sovereignty is redefined by 
its responsibility to protect its nationals as well as its capacity to participate in international 
regImes. 
more coercive means. Under the conditionality, the IMF has insisted on compliance with the Basel Accord 
and the Core Principles as a condition of aid.}. In contrast to the sovereign equality of states, powerful states 
actually have a dominant voice in the decision-making processes, thereby driving international rules and 
consequences of in these settings. See Articles of Agreement of the IMF, Dec. 27, 1945, art. XIL, section 5, 
60 Stat 1401, 1418-1419,2 U.N.T.S. 39, 86-88 (In the IMF, votes are weighted to reflect some measure of 
underlying power). In this sense, international environmental changes have strengthened in particular the 
behavioral sovereignty of powerful states. 
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III. Skepticism on Governing the Global Economy Through Government 
Networks 
A. Restructuring Global Governance 
The ongoing economic integration in the world economy raises significant questions 
concerning the structure of global governance l84 systems intended to safeguard markets 
where globalization entails the erosion of national boundaries. Some observers argue that 
international institutions threaten state sovereignty.185 The other advocates that traditional 
184 As David Kennedy mentions in a particularly informative discussion, governance "has emerged as a 
distinctive motto for international public order, consciously distinguished from 'government' and consciously 
identified with the group of phenomena that are thought to define the late twentieth-century international 
condition: globalization, interdependence, the demise of sovereignty, the apparent futility of further United 
Nations institution building, and the emergence of international civil society. These writers identify 
governance as a new, distinct phenomenon: either a defining characteristic of the new world order or a 
prescriptive for resolving its pragmatic challenge, or both. 'Governance' in this literature, as opposed to 
'govenunent' is the complex of more or less formalized bundles ofmles, roles, and relationships that define 
the social practices of the state and non-state actors interacting in various issue areas, rather than formal 
interstate organizations[.]" See David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and 
International Governance, 2 UTAH L.REV. 545, 548 nA (1997). 
185 See e.g., Susan George, The Problem isn't Beef, Bananas, Cultural Diversity or the Patenting of Life. The 
Problem is the WTO, The Guardian (London), November 24, 1999 (claiming that "[w]ithout the WTO has 
created an international court of "justice" that is making law and establishing case law in which existing 
national laws are all "barriers" to trade, and is sweeping aside all environmental, social or public health 
considerations."); see also Patrick Buchanan, The Great Betrayal (1998) (arguing that "the World Trade 
Organization exercises a supranational authority in conflict with our forefathers' vision of an American 
forever sovereign and independent"). Kal Raustialla classifies the conventional sovereignty-based critiques of 
international institutions into three categorizes; first, sovereign power is absolute power and thus reallocations 
of power represents a zero-sum game; second, reallocations of sovereignty, especially reallocations of 
Upwards to international institutions are presumptively bad, and the retention of sovereignty is presumptively 
good; third, sovereignty is nearly synonymous with the notion of democracy. This premise claims that power 
allocations to international institutions not simply erode sovereignty but harm democracy, because democratic 
processes work better the closer the people are to the government. As a result, international organizations are 
perceived as unaccountable and distant, thereby creating or strengthening the democratic deficits. See Kal 
Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law, 61. Int'! Econ. L. 841, 853 
(2003). 
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notions of state sovereignty are being eroded by globalization itself rather than international 
institutions. ls6 Further, one claims that international institutions at least under some 
conditions actually enhance sovereignty.IS7 The sovereignty question at international 
institutions is related to the level of political support and concerns over democracy.ISS 
In particular, the third premise represents American notions of sovereignty adopting the pre-War concept 
of sovereignty. The invocation of patriotism arisen from the association of sovereignty in the u.s. with the 
domestic democratic process, complete with checks and balances and political accountability is hard to be 
reconciled with the global interdependence other states have embraced in their efforts to accomplish 
sovereignty. Accordingly, the U.S. entrance in to the International Criminal Court (ICC) like the accession 
into the WTO was met with opposition and suspicion. The U.S. sovereigntists argues that the U.S. acceptance 
of the ICC would allow politically motivated prosecutors of Americans by nonaccountable actors without 
granting Americans their constitutional rights. In this context, Jenik Radon highlights that "[ w ]ithin the 
United States, the word "sovereignty" has found a separate and independent footing almost adrift from its 
historical origins. In effect, it has become an emotion flag. In contrast to the growing trend of interdependence 
between nations and ready acceptance of negotiated limits on sovereignty, American notions of sovereignty 
adopt the pre-War concept of sovereignty that reconciles both absolute control and popular sovereignty in its 
singular brand of democracy." See Radon, Sovereignty: A Political Emotion, not a Concept, supra note 165, at 
202-206; John R. Bolton, The United States and the International Criminal Courtfrom America's Perspective, 
64 Law & Contemp. Prob. 167, 173 (2001) (remarking several U.S. objections to the ICC); see also John H. 
Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay 
Round Results, 36 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 157, 160 (1997) (arguing that "[w]hen [sovereignty is] viewed as a 
question of allocation of power, however, the debate only begins with the "sovereignty objection; it must 
continue with an analysis demonstrating why it is better or worse for such a power shift to occur in certain 
circumstances .... [T]his is rarely done, but ought to be done if the argument is to be persuasive."). 
186 
See Andrew Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 Harv. Int'l L. J. 303, 348 (2004). For the 
sovereignty question at the WTO, Guzman asserts that "[it] can be viewed through the lens of contract. 
Domestic legal systems allow individuals to make binding agreements. These contracts limit the future 
actions of each party, but we do not criticize them as infringements on individual autonomy. In fact, we view 
them as tools to further individual autonomy, because they allow individuals to advance their interests more 
effectively than would be possible in a world without binding contracts. International agreements can be 
viewed as contracts among sovereign states. Like domestic contracts, they restrict (or seek to restrict) future 
behavior, but like contracts, they should be viewed as serving rather than undermining the interests of states." 
See id. at 346. 
187 See Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law, supra note 185, at 
843. 
188 See e.g., John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movesesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 511 
(2000). In response to the concern over democratic deficit, Raustiala point out that contemporary critiques of 
global governance often embrace the retention of state sovereignty in that sovereignty protects democratic 
processes from external influence. Further, he argues that the expansion of governance beyond the state 
strengthens sovereignty and democracy. See Raustiala, supra note 185, at 854-855. The major reactions 
responding to the conventional sovereignty-based critique of international organizations can be fallen into 
75 
Sovereignty issues emerge due to the institution's success in limiting the policy options of 
national governments and its impact on the state behavior despite no enforcement 
mechanism within the institution.189 
three categories. See generally Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Democracy, Accountability, and 
Global Governance, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (June 27, 2001), cited in Raustialla, 
supra note 185, at 855, n.52. According to Keohane and Nye, the fIrst reaction is to withdraw; to suggest that 
reliance should be curtailed as shown in the U.S. rejection of the ICC. The second reaction is to continue to 
employ international organizations but to strive to reform them through institutional design to enhance the 
accountability and legitimacy of international institutions and networks. See Nye, The Paradox of American 
Power, supra note 97, at 165. This reaction is embedded in the current practice of subsidiarity, that is all 
political issues to the lowest possible level for resolution in the EU as a response to the critique of democratic 
defIcit in global governance in European context. See Peter L. Lindseth, democratic Legitimacy and the 
Administrative Character of Supra nationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 
628 (1999). The third reaction is realist: to dismiss the whole problem as a misguided category because 
"world politics are is inherently undemocratic and there is little point in lamenting the obvious." See Keohane 
& Nye, Democracy, Accountability, and Global Governance, at 2. This reaction is closely associated with 
realist theory in international relations theory under which international institutions do not act in world 
politics directly, and states would never agree to institutions that diminish their sovereignty unless it is their 
interests to do so. See id. 
As a conceptual alternative, Raustiala presents the sovereignty-strengthening claim that views 
international institutions as a positive force for sovereignty. There are two varied ideas about this claim. The 
fIrst variant is that states declared sovereignty as autonomy in the past due to the dramatic change of the 
nature of sovereignty and international relations, but international institutions are the tools through which 
sovereignty is reasserted thanks to the increased interdependence in world affairs. The second variant based 
on public choice theory asserts that international organizations can enhance sovereignty for two related but 
distinct reasons stressing the centrality of rent-seeking by individuals and private actors. Raustiala points out 
that "[I]nternational institutions may help to circumvent domestic rent-seeking interests which have captured 
the state, or international institutions may be used as tools to preserve the sovereign power, and associated 
rents, of government offIcials whose regulatory powers are challenged by globalization." See Raustialla, 
Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in international Economic Law, supra note 185, at 856-857. For the detail, 
see id. at 857-874 
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For example, borrowing countries are required to accept the more forceful conditions, so called 
conditionality on the loan agreement imposed by the IMF. In short, due to the imbalance of power between 
the IMF and the client countries, the countries are put on strict targets. As a result, the countries' congress 
should pass pertinent laws in order to meet IMF requirements and targets by a specifIc date. As for the 
conditionality, one argues that "conditions that might weaken the economy in the short run, whatever their 
merits in the long, run the risk of exacerbating the downturn and thus making it more diffIcult for the country 
to repay the short-term IMF loans[,]" although at a minimum, every loan agreement specifIes basic conditions 
d~signed to increase the likelihood that they will be paid. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its 
~lsContents 43-44 (2002). Stiglitz notes several reasons for the failure of conditionality. See id. at 46-48. 
lIrther, Stiglitz argues that the conditionality has little to do with the welfare ofless developed country 
peoples and more to do with the concerns of powerful states. Id. at 18. 
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Moreover, the increasing interdependence among states has posed formidable 
challenges for the predominating post-War mechanism of international cooperation, so 
called liberal internationalism based on multilateral treaties, mainly creating international 
institutions. In this context, some critics assert that the traditional statist foundation of 
liberal internationalism has increasingly been waning due to globalization and the growth 
of nonstate actors. 190 As a leading alternative to liberal internationalism, the new 
medievalists assert that information revolution has driven the power shift from hierarchies 
to networks in the structure of organization with the eclipse of the state, whereas liberal 
internationalists still view international rules and institutions as crucial mechanisms to 
solve governmental problems. 191 In response to the debate, one observer argues that 
trans governmental networks can be substituting for sovereign or unitary state interaction in 
several regulatory fields due to the demise of regulator's power to implement national 
190 
191 See ~athews, supra note 98, at 50-52. 
See Id. at 52 (arguing that "[b]usiness, citizens' organizations, ethnic groups, and crime cartels have all 
readily adopted the network model [while] [g]overnments ... are quintessential hierarchies, wedded to an 
organizational form from incompatible with all that the new technologies make possible."). Some argue that 
the future is one of new-medievalism, meaning a return to the overlapping sovereignties of that era. See 
generally Philip G. Cerny, Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action, 49 Int'l Org. 595, 624 
(1995)("[G]overnment per se will essentially become privatized, losing much of its public character. The 
world will be a neo-feudal one, [w]ith overlapping and democratically unaccountable private regimes ... "). 
The term originated in a classic work of international relations by Hedley Bull. See Hedley Bull, The 




regulations within those boundaries both because of their citizens' flight for regulatory 
laxity, and financial flows are too great and sudden for one regulator to control. l92 In 
contrast, the liberal internationalist response to concerns about the erosion of state 
regulatory power is to build a larger international apparatus, such as the United Nations 
system-the paradigmatic example of liberal internationalism- constituted by a legally 
binding treaty, with expanding powers of governance to deal with governmental 
problems.193 However, these attempts to reconstruct global governance have encountered 
the limits and strains of liberal internationalism.194 
192 See Slaughter, supra note 106, at 189-192. Slaughter argues that "[a] new world order is emerging, which 
less fanfare but more substance than either the liberal internationalist or new medievalist vision." See id. at 
184. According to Slaughter, "[g]lobal governance, [from the transgovernmentalist perspective], is not a 
matter of regulating states the way states regulate their citizens, but rather of addressing the issues and 
resolving the problems that result from citizens going global-from crime to commerce to civic engagement." 
See Slaughter, A New World Order 16 (2004). 
193 See Zuern, supra note 104, at 241. Slaughter notes that "[g]lobalization thus leads to internationalization, 
or the transfer of regulatory authority from the national level to an international institution ... Liberals are 
likely to support expanding the power of international institutions to guard against the global dismantling of 
the regulatory state." See Slaughter, The Real New World Order, supra note 106, at 192-193. Although 
Slaughter acknowledge the importance of international rules and institutions described by liberal 
internationalism for the creation and maintenance of international order, she argues that "they apply to part 
only, and arguably a diminishing part, of the rules and institutions that are generated outside anyone national 
legal system but that directly regulate individuals and groups in both their domestic and foreign interactions. 
See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, in The Role of 
Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law 178 (Michael Byers ed., 
2000). 
194 See Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented States and the Dilemmas 
ofNeo-Liberalism, 17 Nw. J. Int'l 1. & Bus. 1014, 1019-1020 (1996-97). For detail, see id. at 1022-1035. 
While liberal internationalism is still robust, it faces increasing challenges. Recently, the formidable 
challenges have been posed to unaccountable and undemocratic international bureaucrats. The slow pace, 
formal procedures, and high bargaining costs of multilateral organizations may impede the negotiation of new 
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A notable response is the decline of liberal internationalism, and the disaggregation of 
the state into its component legislative, executive, administrative and judicial parts, and the 
positing of a complex of transnational connections between these component parts in 
different states. 195 This perspective asserts that contemporary international cooperation is 
being undertaken among discrete and specialized agencies of governments to coordinate 
their policies and enhance the enforcement oflaws, in a fashion which, by comparison to 
formal inter-state cooperation is fast, flexible and effective.196 That is, these constituent 
institutions are all networking with their foreign counterparts, thereby sharing information, 
ideas, resources, and policies. This new paradigm of peer-to-peer cooperation adopts the 
adaptable and decentralized network model instead of traditional international institutions 
and treaties for their enforcement. 197 However, as discussed later, some critics 
treaties and institutions. See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Governmental 
Networks and the Future ofInternational Law, 43 Va. J. Int'l L. 1, 17 (2002). 
195 See Slaughter, supra note 106, at 184, 188-189. One observer argues that "there has been a shift from 
"government" to "governance," as the central political institutions of the state have found it increasingly 
difficult to resolve social conflicts or to reconcile the diversity of social interests '" Internationally, the 
~rrangements for allocating competence between states have also tended to break down, evidenced by the 
~creased salience and frequency of inter-jurisdictional conflicts." See Picciotto, supra note 194, at 1018-1019. 
6 See id. 
197 
For the term "transgovernmental networks," see Raustiala, supra note 194, at 4 ("They are 
"transgovernmental" because they involve specialized domestic officials directly interacting with each other, 
often with minimal supervision by foreign ministries. They are "networks" because this cooperation is based 
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acknowledge the significance of networks, but hold them accountable for their role in 
reducing transparency and impeding political accountability.198 Others fear that networks 
may reinforce the dominance of the major economic powers, particularly inequalities 
between advanced industrial countries and less developed economy because of networks' 
club-like feature. 199 Nonetheless, trans governmental networks are on the rapid rise, and 
their growth is visible in regulatory cooperation.2oo 
In these circumstances, the complex issue of how to govern the global economy comes 
into question. That is to say, how states can regulate properly the global economy. Even 
on loosely-structured, peer-to-peer ties developed through frequent interaction rather than formal 
negotiation. ") 
198 See generally Robert Howse, Regulatory Cooperation and the Problem of Democracy, in 
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION 469 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000). 
199 See Stephen Toope, Emerging Patterns of Governance and International Law, in The Role of Law in 
International Politics, supra note 193, at 96-97 ("Networks, like regimes and regardless of their membership, 
are sites of power, and potentially of exclusion and inequality."); see also David Kennedy, When Renewal 
Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 335,412 (2000) (questioning whether 
exploring the "disaggregation of the state and the empowerment of diverse actors in an international civil 
society without asking who will win and who will lose by such an arrangement" is prudent). 
200 See generally Paul B. Stephan, Regulatory Cooperation and Competition: The Search for Virtue, supra 
note 198, at 202; see also Kalypso Nicolsidis, Regulatory Cooperation and Managed Mutual recognition: 
Elements of a Strategic Model, supra note 198, at 571 (rernarking that "[r]egulatory cooperation deservers 
analytical attention both in own right and a forerunner for the effect of interdependence on other policy areas 
and international governance in general."). One observer identifies three chief factors behind the recent rise 
of networks: technological innovation, the expansion of domestic rerulation, and the rise of globalization. See 
Raustialla, supra note 194, at 11-16. Moreover, Slaughter lauds that trans governmental networks are "the 
optimal form of organization for the Information Age." See Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy 
Through Government Networks, supra note 193, at 204. Needless to say, since Robert Keohane and Joseph 
Nye first observed its emergence, transgovernmentalism has rapidly become the most widespread and 
distinctive system of global governance. See Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Transgovernmental 
~elations and International Organizations, 27 World Pol. 39 (1974) (wondering "whether the common 
mterests of central bankers in a stable currency system have been implemented as fully by trangovernmental 
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if the answer is through international cooperation, there are still some concerns over 
governing the global economy through government networks. 
B. The Rise of Transgovernmental Financial Regulatory Organizations 
The growing economic interdependence has urged economic regulators to work with 
their counterparts abroad. Furthermore, burgeoning financial disturbances of the past few 
decades have called for international cooperation among domestic financial regulatory 
agencIes. As a result, networks of finance ministers and central bankers have played a 
central role in responding to domestic and regional financial turbulences. As the finance 
ministers, the G8 that is as much a network of finance ministers as of heads of state is 
taking key decisions on how to respond to calls for debt relief for the most highly indebted 
countries.20l In response to the East Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the Russian crisis in 
1998, the finance ministers and central bank governors hold separate news conferences to 
201 Since 1994 Russia has been included in the annual summit of the G7, now meeting as G8 thanks to Boris 
Yeltsin's efforts to join it as evidence that Russian was now part of the West. See Slaughter, A New World 
Order, supra note 192, at 2,37. The G7 was set up in Tokyo in May 1996 to strengthen the effective 
coordination of international economic policy. It consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. See R. Fraser & Long, The World Financial System 199 (1993). 
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announce policy.202 In order to help prevent future financial crises, the creation of a 
network of G20 was led by the Indian finance minister and consists of the finance ministers 
of twenty industrialized and underdeveloped states.203 Notably, the Financial Stability 
Forum as a networked network comprising three organizations, and other domestic and 
international authorities was established in 1999 to provide a coherent strategy to achieve 
and to maintain financial stability. 204 The key characteristic of government networks in 
202 Recent meetings of G7/G 1 0 fmance ministers and central bankers are significant in that the practical 
agenda of the regulatory fora is decided in these monthly and annual meetings. Its framework is set out by G7 
financial ministers, whereas the actual technical deliberation of financial regulation is conducted by the 
technocrats of domestic regulators. See Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, Regional Financial Institutionalization and the 
Creation ofa Zone of Law: The Content of Financial StabilitylRegulation in East Asia, 35 Int'l Law. 1627, 
1636 (2001). The GlO comprises Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. See Long, The World Financial System, supra note 201, at 31. 
203 The G20 was created by created by the G7 on September 25, 1999 in Washington D.C. The extension of 
the membership attributes to the increase in the role of the emerging economies' in banking and financial 
service markets. See George Alexander Walker, International Banking Regulation: Law, Policy and Practice 
152 (2001). Walker asserts that"[t]he importance of the G20 adds political credibility and authority arguably 
to an otherwise politically deficient process. A democratic or political deficit or gap must necessarily exist in 
the area of international policy construction .... The desire [to be involved in all immediate decision-taking 
bodies or agencies] must clearly be to make them as inclusive and credible but at the same time as 
operationally efficient and effective as possible."). See id. at.152. For the relative inclusiveness of the G20, 
Canadian Finance Minister Paul Martin remarked that "[w]hat makes [the G20] unique is the fact that it 
brings together a cross-section of national economies at different stages of economic maturity, thereby 
providing the diversity needed to address the wide range of human needs." See Notes for an address by 
Honorable Paul Martin to Royal Institute ofInternational Affairs, London, U.K., January 24,2001, on 
Department of Finance Canada. However, the G20 has certainly not replaced the G8 nor ever been invited to 
meet and consult with the G8 on a regular basis. See Salughter, A New World Order, supra note 192, at 144 
("How inclusive specific networks can be will ultimately depend in part on their particular functions."). 
204 The Financial Stability Forum was led by the finance ministers and central bankers of the G7 industrial 
countries in February 1999 preceded by a report on international occupation and coordination in the area of 
financial market supervision and surveillance by the President of the Deutsche Bundesbank. The Forum 
consists of six representatives from the Basel Committee, the International Organization of Securities 
COmmissioners (IOSCO), and the International Association ofInsurance Supervisors along with senior 
representatives from domestic authorities responsible for fmancial stability in significant international finance 
centers. Also, the Forum comprises traditional international institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, 
and the OECD. See Financial Stability Forum website, at http://www.fsforum.org. 
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particular, in financial sector is the cross-border interaction of government agencies with 
similar functions and encountering similar problems. The result of this identifying feature 
has led to the establishment of trans governmental financial regulatory organizations?05 In 
order to understand how these organizations exemplify international financial regulatory 
cooperation, it is necessary to explore how they actually work in the sense of the increasing 
economic interdependence and achieving financial stability. 
1. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee) prompted by two large 
international bank failures in 1974 was established by a simple agreement among the 
twelve central bank governors of the GlO countries, Luxembourg, and Switzerland.206 Its 
founding mandate was a press communique from the central bank governors issued through 
205 Slaughter divides government networks into three broad categories: harmonization networks, enforcement 
networks, and information networks. According to Slaughter, transgovernmental financial regulatory 
organizations are generally considered as information networks in that they exchange information, and further 
actively collect and distill information about how their members do business. The standard product of this 
~istillation is a code of best practice. For detail, see Slaughter, A New World Order, supra note 192, at 50- 64. 
06 See Walker, supra note 203, at 17-81. The Basel Committee was established in 1975 by the Group ofTen, 
which were the ten member countries of the IMF plus Luxembourg and Switzerland. 
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the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).207 As an oldest and most active committee 
under the BIS,208 the Basel Committee seeks to create common standards of banking 
supervision.209 The Basel Committee has no formal constitution or by-law, and operates 
without its own staff or facilities.2JO The charter membership of the BIS and the Basel 
Committee overlaps, but the BIS does not formally participate in the Basel Committee. 
Nevertheless, a small staff of the BIS-four professional supervisors on temporary 
207 See Joseph Norton, Trends in International Bank Supervision and the Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 48 Consumer Fin. L.Q. 415, 415 n.1 (1994). 
208 The BIS was formally created on January 30, 1930 at the Hague Convention of 1930 with the main 
purpose of processing settlements of international payments associated with Germany's reparations as part of 
the 1929 Young Plan. Convention respecting the Bank for International Settlements, Jan. 20, 1930, 104 
L.N.T.S. 441 (Hague Convention of 1930), available at http://www.bis.orgiabouticonvention.htm#P21_ 2653 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2004). As a commercial bank, the BIS holds deposits for other central banks, engages 
in capital market activities, and provides lending facilities to its central bank members. As an international 
institution with legal personality, the BIS seeks to promote international monetary cooperation by hosting 
meetings among central bank experts, conducting statistical research, and publishing some of its results 
periodically. See Mario Giovanoli, The role of the BIS in Monetary Cooperation and its Tasks Relating to the 
ECD, in Current Legal Issues Affecting Central Banks 1,39 (1994) (comparing the BIS with other fmancial 
institutions). For the profile of the BIS, see Carl Felsenfeld et aI., The Role of the Bank for International 
Settlements in Shaping the World Financial System, 25 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 945, 954-977 (2004). For 
more information about the BIS, see Bank for International Settlements, About BIS, available at http://www. 
bis.orgiaboutlindex.htm (last visited August 25, 2004). 
209 In response to two large international bank crises, such as the Herstatt, and the Franklin National's Failure 
in 1974, the Basel Committee's aim was to strengthen collaboration among domestic authorities in their 
~upervision of international banking. See C. J. Thompson, The Basle Concordat: International Collaboration 
In Banking Supervision, in 1 Current legal issues Affecting Central Banks 331, 333 (Robert C. Effrose ed., 
1992). While the bank failure in 1974 was a driving force behind the creation of the Basel Committee, other 
factors arguably contributed to the legitimacy and solidity ofthe Basel Committee. Two key events were the 
collapse of the fixed international exchange system established by the Bretton Woods agreement in 1945, 
which caused much more speculative investment and a general movement of funds in the currency markets, 
and the need for international banks to absorb and invest these funds. See Ethan B. Kapstein, Governing the 
Global Economy: International Finance and the State 30, 58 (1994). This issue will be discussed in detail in 
~~~ of systemic risk in the next chapter. 
See Joseph Norton, Devising International Bank Supervisory Standards 177 (1995) 
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secondment from member institutions, and a member of the Basel Committee--serve as the 
Basel Committee's secretariat, and the Committee meets four times per year in Base1.211 
The Basel Committee is not a public organization in that it operates informally and by 
consensus.212 The Committee operates secretly and seeks to maintain a low profile.213 
Further, membership is strictly limited to the world's most highly industrialized countries 
and will be unlikely extended.214 In 1988, capital adequacy requirements for all banks 
were adopted by the central bankers of the world's major financial powers under their 
supervision. Its members follow their own rules. Decisions are made by consensus and 
are not formally binding; however, members do implement these decisions within their own 
systems. The Basel Committee's authority is often cited as an argument for taking 
domestic action. 
211 See Charles Freeland, The Work of the Basle Committee, in 2 Current Legal Issues affecting Central 
Banks 231-232 (Robert C. Effros ed., 1994). 
212 See United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committee, International Banking: 
Strengthening the Framework for Supervising International Banks (Mar. 1994), at 37. The Committee's 
operations are characterized by an emphasis of close personal contacts, insistence, and an interactive and 
decentralized method of ensuring compliance. The Committee operates through a rotating chair and makes 
recommendations based on consensus. See Huib J. Muller, Address to the 5th International Conference of 
Bank Supervisors (May 16, 1988), cited in Tony Porter, States, Markets, and regimes in Global Finance 66 
(1993). The Committee seeks these contacts within its membership and pursued to develop others with 
~utside banking regulators. See General Accounting Office, International Banking, at 64-67. 
3 A former chairman Huib J. Muller noted that"[w]e don't like publicity. We prefer, I might say, our 
~dden secret world of the supervisory continent." See Norton, Supervisory Standards, supra note 210, at 177. 
4 See id. 
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The Basel Committee's stated objectives are too broad. The Committee describes itself 
as a "forum for ongoing cooperation among member countries on banking supervisory 
matters" that aims to "strengthen international cooperation, improve the overall quality of 
banking supervision worldwide, and ensure that no foreign banking establishment escapes 
supervision." ,215 In practice, the Committee publishes some of its recommendations 
ranging from short documents to technical, mathematical regulations used to provide 
guidance for the implementation of the promulgations. After a comment period, the 
Committee reconsiders and reissues a final version of its work, which the Central Bank 
Governors are then supposed to implement within their own national systems. Even if the 
Committee's formal authority has arisen exclusively from the support of the central bankers, 
its recommendations have been implemented by both member and nonmember countries.216 
As one observer argues, "[t]he Basel Committee's recommendation-making process 
exemplifies the distinctive nature oftransgovemmenatl regulatory cooperation.,,217 One of 
the recommendations, the Committee's 1988 Capital Accord exemplifies the Basel 
215 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Annexure C (1995), para. 3. 
~16 Nonmember banking states' adoption of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord is a good example. 
17 See Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, supra note 193, at 182. 
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Committee's infonnal procedure, and demonstrates the Committee's expansive 
understanding of consensus.218 The Accord, setting minimum capitalization standards for 
international banks regulated by the member countries, provides an instructive example to 
understand how the Committee operates as a transgovemmental network. After several 
meetings, the Basel Committee announced that agreement on a proposal had been reached. 
There was a six month comment period, during which the Committee received comments 
on its draft agreement from private bankers and other interested parties. The final version 
of the Accord was released on July 15, 1988, after which the central bankers of member 
banks implemented the agreed standards. Following frequent amendments of the Accord 
since its promulgation; the Basel Committee recently released the document, "International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, a Revised Framework" 
(widely known as Basel II) on June 26, 2004?19 
218 
219 For the detail, see Kapstein, supra note 209, at 103-128. 
The Bank for International Settlement, Implementation of Basel I: Practical Considerations, available at 
http://www.bis.orglbcbsl09.htm (last visited on August 1, 2004). Unlike most treaties or other legal 
agreements the Basel Capital Accord is intended to evolve over time. 
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As the BIS notes, the Basel Committee does not possess any formal supranational 
supervisory authority, and its conclusions do not, and were never intended to have legal 
force. 22o The use of more informal language or no legalese is not unusual in products of 
Committee agreements. 
It is a significant task to the Basel Committee itself and members to insure the 
compliance with agreements due to their informality and lack of authority. In this regard, 
the Basel Committee members view the agreements binding even if they do not resort to 
the legal status oftreaty.221 In fact, the Basel Committee's attempts to reach consensus 
among domestic regulatory authorities are part of a broader harmonization process that 
relies on national implementation of internationally agreed upon standards for insuring that 
over time and under the pressure of market forces and the desire of national regulators to 
give their institutions a competitive edge, harmonization objectives are met.222 Given the 
absence of an independent mechanism for monitoring non-compliance, the job belongs to 
220 Bank for International Settlement, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, available at http://www. 
~\s.org!bcbs/aboutbcbs.htm (describing the structure of the Basel Committee) (last visited Oct. 1. 2004) 
See Charles Freeland, The work of the Basle Committee, in 2 Current Legal Issues Affecting Central 
~~ 233 (Robert C. Effros ed., 1994). 
See Cynthia Liechtenstein" Bank for International Settlements: Committee on Banking Regulation and 
Supervisory Practices, Consultative Paper on International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards, 30 I.L.M. 967, 969 (1991). 
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the Committee themselves and their staff, with pressure from their colleagues223 . In this 
regard, specific meetings review the implementation and consistency of the agreements. 
Originally signed by the G 10 countries, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, the 1988 Accord 
has been implemented by over one hundred countries.224 In this context, one observer 
arguably attributes the result to the effectiveness of the Committee's informal 
enforcement225 despite suspicions that the resulting deceleration in bank lending intensified 
the recession of the early 1990s in the United States, and other industrialized countries. 226 
Arguably, the implementation of the Accord by national governments illustrates the degree 
of autonomy and influence over domestic governments that the Basel Committee has 
achieved.227 
Here, the effectiveness of the Committee's distinctive system needs to be examined. 
One claims that the key factor of success is seemingly the Committee's facilitation of close 
223. . 
224 See Untted States General Accountmg Office, supra note 45, at 36. 
See Patricia Jackson, Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Capital Requirements and Bank 
~ehavior: The Impact of the Basle Accord, Working Paper, No.1 (Apr. 1999) (reviewing capital adequacy 
hterature) 
225 . 
See Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, supra note ,at 183 ("In 
fact, the adoption of the capital adequacy standards has been so effective that governments did not withdraw 
~eir support of the Accord ... ). 
227 See generally Robert Litan, Nightmare in Basle, The International Economy, Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 7. 
See Slaughter, supra note 193, at 183. 
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personal contacts among the central bankers. 228 In this regard, the Committee itself 
acknowledges the significance of its role, declaring "the development of close personal 
contacts between supervisors in different countries has greatly helped in the handling and 
resolution of problems affecting individual banks ... [t]his is an important, though 
necessarily unpublicized element in the Committee's regular work.,,229 The Committee's 
efforts are still underway to pursue to organize and facilitate networking among the rest of 
the world's central bankers and other financial regulators. Among them, the Committee 
supported the establishment of the Offshore Supervisors Group, the South East Asia, New 
Zealand and Australia Forum of Banking Supervisors, and the Caribbean Banking 
Supervisors Group. As discussed below, the Basel Committee has also established links 
with other financial sector regulators through groupS.230 
Over time the Basel Committee has played a key role in international financial 
regulation on the ground that it has effectively promulgated binding international standards 
228 S 'd 
229 eel. 
Bank for International Settlements, Compendium of Document produced by the Basle Committee on 
~~nking Supervision (Apr. 1995), at 14. 
See Walker, supra note 203, at 60-68. 
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despite the expense of implementing such standards and burden for member states.231 The 
Committee's competency in developing more theoretical principles of banking supervision 
has led to its adoption of consolidated supervision derived from the Basel Concordat in 
1975, which expands the regulatory responsibilities of committee member governors 
beyond their borders as a matter of their first principle. National securities commissioners 
and insurance regulators have followed the Basle Committee's example. Moreover, the 
Committee has issued the Core Principles comprising twenty-five area of banking " ;i 
supervision in 1995. 
Needless to say the global community view the Basel Committee as a crucial player in 
international banking arena. However, the Committee is a government network with a 
variation of traditional international organization. As a result, the Committee has 
necessarily been accompanied by its strength and its weakness. 
231 
See Slaughter, Governing the Global economy Through Government Networks, supra note 193, at 184. 
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2. The International Organization of Securities 
The International Organization of Securities Commissioners (lOSCO) is a global 
network of securities regulators.232 The IOSCO consists of over 150 representatives 
from ordinary members comprising national securities commissions or self-regulatory 
organizations such as stock exchanges from countries with no official government 
regulatory agency; associate members comprising provincial or regional securities 
regulators when the national regulator is already a member; and affiliate members 
comprising international or regional organizations charged with the regulation or 
development of capital or other organizations recommended by the Executive 
Committee.233 Although the Basel Committee has limited its membership to the major 
industrialized countries, the IOSCO follows a more inclusive policy of seeking to 
attract the regulators of developing and emerging market economies.234 In some 
232 The IOSCO is a private organization originated in the Inter-American Association of Securities 
Commission and Similar Agencies in 198, when the Associations' members passed bylaws transforming it 
from a regional group to a global association of securities regulators. See Paul Guy, Regulatory 
Harmonization to Achieve Effective International Competition, in Regulating International Financial Markets: 
Issues and Policies 291 (F.R. Edwards et al. eds., 1992). 
233 For a list ofIOSCO members, see http://www.iosco.orglindex4.htrnl. 
234 The IOSCO's membership covers eighty-five percent of the world's capital markets. See IOSCO, IOSCO 
Annual Report 1994, at 26-32. 
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instances, he rosco may even offer membership to non-governmental regulators such 
as private stock exchanges.235 The rosco is not a formal international institution 
because it has no formal charter or founding treaty. It was formed through 
incorporation by a private bill of the Quebec national Assembly.236The organization's 
stated principles are "improving cooperation, and coordinating and harmonizing 
securities and futures regulations on the internationallevel.
237 
Its primary purpose is to 
solve problems affecting international securities markets by creating a consensus for the 
enactment of nationallegislation?38 That is, in a similar manner to the Basel 
Committee, the rosco seeks to achieve regulatory harmonization through consensus. 
Unlike the Basel Committee, however, and perhaps in recognition of its inability to 
achieve consensus on specific issues, the rosco defines harmonization broadly. This 
reflected in the comments of some rosco members who acknowledge that, whatever 
the merits of harmonization, "value should be attached to the possibility of giving 
235 See IOSCO Annual Report, at 4. 
236 See an Act Respecting the International Organization of Securities Commissioners, Ch. 143, 1987 S.Q. 
2437 (Can.) (incorporated under a private act as non-profit corporation). It has created and funded a 
permanent secretariat in Montreal. 
237 See Guy, supra note 232, at 295. 
238 See Geofferey Underhill, Keeping Governments Out of Politics: Transnational Securities Market, 
Regulatory Cooperation, and Political Legitimacy, 21 REv. INT'L STUD 251 (1995). 
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issuers and investors a choice between quite different rules and regulations.,,239 
Similarly, IOSCO officials have recognized that "harmonization does not necessarily 
mean that regulation must be identical.,,24o Rather, it ensures that the organization has 
adopted a cautious consensus-based approach. The IOSCO monitors whether its 
members have employed and implemented its standards through methods of self-
reporting. Although its principle and rules are not legally binding, the organization 
often seeks to ensure compliance through moral suasion applied to nonconforming 
re gulators .z41 
The IOSCO has notably contributed to the development of information-sharing and 
enforcement agreements. All reciprocal information-sharing Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOUs) were initially issued by the IOSCO in 1986 as a Resolution on 
Reciprocal Assistance,242 and has been signed by forty agencies.243 The Organization 
239 See Guy, supra note 232, at 299-301 (quoting German Stock Exchange Federation Executive Vice 
P2 resident Ruedieger von Rosen who emphasized this point). 
40 S 'd 
24\ ee 1 • at 297. 
See David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial 
~igulatory Organizations, 33 TEXAS INT'L L. 1. 281, 295 (1998). 
243 IOSCO Annual Report 1990. 
See Michael D. Mann & Lise A. Lustgarten, Internationalization ofInsider Trading Enforcement: A 
Guide to Regulation and Cooperation, 7 PLVCorp 798 (1993). 
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has also issued widely used Principles for Memoranda of Understanding as basic 
guidelines to create enforcement MOUs for securities law violations.244 In 1989, the 
IOSCO employed a set of principles for the negotiation and implementation of 
information-sharing MOUs, which was led by its resolution proposal for members to 
enter into such MOUs.245 Along with a combination of some factors, this groundwork 
has been a driving force behind a whole network of bilateral MOUs that regulate insider 
trading and information exchange.246 Its members have also entered into information-
sharing agreements on their own initiative. 
However, the IOSCO has not achieved the regulatory success of the Basel 
Committee in implementing global standards for securities regulators. Its efforts to 
develop and implement minimum capital requirements for securities firms failed in 
1992 after opposition arose from the U.S. securities regulators against the capital 
adequacy formulas that were developed by the Basel Committee and endorsed by 
244 See generally Michael Mann et aI., The Establishment of International Mechanisms for Enforcing 
Provisional Orders and Final Judgments Arising From Securities Law Violations, 55 Law & Contemporary 





See Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, supra note 193, at 189-
193. 
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European securities regulators. The IOSeO, subsequently, abandoned its efforts to 
reach a compromise on the issue. Additionally, many resolutions passed by the 
loseo are not implemented at the domestic arena. These failures highlight that 
government networks are lacking in the ability to exercise any coercive power over 
their members, and have less degree of independence from their national legislature. 247 
3. The International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
The International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), created in 1994 as an 
Illinois nonprofit corporation, is the leading transgovernmental regulatory organization for 
state agencies that supervise and regulate the insurance industry.248 The IAIS consists of 
two membership classes: (1) the charter members, who include the insurance regulators 
from sixty-seven countries and seventeen U.S. states, joined the organization by the 
completion of its first annual meeting on June 16, 1994.249; (2) the second class consists of 
new members, which can be admitted to the organization so long as they are an insurance 
----------------------247 
248 See Slaughter, supra note 193, at 185. 
249 See IAIS, 1994 Annual Report. 
See IAIS By-Laws, app. A. 
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industry supervisor or agency, or an association of the public regulatory bodies with 
jurisdiction over insurance in a country.250 Whereas one ofthe objectives of the Basel 
Committee and the IOSCO is the establishment ofunifonn standards through the work of 
the organization, the IAIS currently acts only as a forum for the exchange ofinfonnation 
and experiences by insurance supervisors around the world. As such, the organization's 
"I: 
goals include engendering awareness of common interests, and encouraging wide 
international personal and official contacts. The IAIS's eight-page long governing 
document is a set of bylaws that do not impose legal obligations on members or the 
countries or members that they represent.251 In a similar manner to the Basel Committee 
and the IOSCO, the IAIS maintains only a tiny centralized bureaucracy, and has 
subcontracted the role of its general secretariat to the American National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners. 
Yet the IAIS has the power to promote minimum standards or multinational regulations. 
However, it has approved the Recommendation Concerning Mutual Assistance, 
250 S . 
25) ee Id. pt. 2, paras. 4-5. 
See WS Annual Report, at 2. 
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Cooperation, and Sharing of Information which has been signed by fifty-one members.252 
In spite of its brevity-one-halfpage in length-it has been applauded by some insurance 
253 regulators. 
The IAIS seems to be viewed as a talking shop rather than a genuine government 
network on the ground that it does not appear to exercise any kind of power that could be 
described as governmental. 254 Its value depends on providing regular channels for 
communication and cross-fertilization among national regulators often striving to regulate 
the same entities across national lines, or simply encountering the same problems within 
their national jurisdictions. Despite the IAIS's struggling to develop standards,255 one 
argues that "the IAIS is likely to evolve in ways that will give it more influence over its 
252 See IAIS, Recommendation Concerning Mutual Assistance, Cooperation, and Sharing oflnformation, 
~eprinted in IAIS Newsletter (Summer 1995), at 5. 
53 The US insurance regulator David Walsh claims that '[the IAIS] is a very good vehicle for regulators to 
get to know one another and develop the kind of relationship where you just pick up the phone and say, 
;;Yhat's going on here?" , See IAIS News 1, Summer 1995, at 1. 
255 See Slaughter, supra note 193, at 186. 
Id. ("Within a spectrum of government networks, the Basel Committee would fall at one end and the IAIS 
at the other."). 
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member and eventually power .... it at least provides insurance regulators around the world 
with the possibility of being a 'node' in a more important network."ZS6 
4. Common Features 
The transgoevrnmental financial regulatory organizations have much in common in the 
way of their organizing themselves and the manner of their seeking to achieve their 
objectives.zs7 The membership of these organizations is composed of state regulatory 
agencies, not states. Their establishment is generally ad hoc, and they tend to have only 
minimal structural components such as founding treaties, by-laws, and staff. The founding 
documents that establish organizations emphasize the flexibility in structure and encourage 
new members who are willing to adopt their principles. The internal operations and 
deliberations of these organizations are normally not open to the public. 
Consensus among the members is a key factor behind the agreements phrased in no 
legalese, which are reached by these organizations. Significantly, the lack of legal force in 
256 Id 
257 • 
See Zaring, supra note 241, at 301-304. 
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the agreements reached is insisted by the member states' regulators of these 
organizations.258 In this regard, the resolution, MOUs, or communiques reached by these 
organizations are not viewed as treaties by the member of the organizations.259 As a result, 
the implementation on the domestic level occurs without any domestic legislation and 
ratification. 260 As an additional feature, the absence of formal mechanisms to monitor 
compliance with standards is in need of creating a formal peer view process to access 
compliance, thereby achieving ever greater consistency. 
The characteristics of their apparent ad hoc formation and self-proclaimed lack of legal 
force do not prevent the members of these organizations from regarding them as generally 
effective in performing their self-appointed functions?61 The regulatory agreements 
reached are considered pledges of good faith that are self-enforcing, in the sense that one 
258 Interview with Paul Leder, Deputy Director, Office of International Affairs (Jan. 19,1996), quoted in 
~aring, supra note 241, at 303. 
9 As for the Basel Committee's extra-legal status, one observer remarks the Basel Accord as a "gentlemen's 
agreement among central banks." See Hal Scott, The Competitive Implications of the Basle Capital Accord, 
39 St. Louis U. LJ. 885, 885 (1995). In contrast, another notes that the Committee's pronouncements, which 
~re generally enforced in twelve member states, have assumed normative standards and may be viewed as 
~ern~tional soft law. See Norton, Supervisory standards, supra note 210, at 261-262. 
WIth respect to this quasi-legality, one observer notes that "although [these organization] promulgations 
lack formal international legal authority when implemented at the domestic level, they gain at least local 
legitimacy. In this way the promulgations are legal more in a multinational, rather than an informational, 
~~lnse." See Zaring, supra note 241, at 304. 
See Slaughter, supra note 193, at 189. 
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state's ability to enforce its national law by implementing the agreement depends on other 
state's enforcement on the domestic level in the same manner?62 For this, one emphasizes 
that the strong interconnection between these organizations has led to the creation of an 
interlocking web of financial regulators.263 
It is worth noting the observation that the nationalization of international law produces 
the effectiveness ofthese organizations.264 According to one observer, the purpose of 
these organizations is not to exercise power in the international system but to help domestic 
regulators protect the interests of their citizens, or enhance the enforcement of national laws 
by working together across states' borders or promUlgating common solutions to problems 
existing in their boundaries.265 
Although the Basel Committee, the IOSCO, and the IAIS have different features, they 
possess a number of commonalities in the way in which they are organized, and in the 
262 See id. 
263 See Zaring, supra note 241, at 304. The degree of international regulatory cooperation in fmancial sector 
is intensifying through the Basel Committee, IOSCO, IAIS, and the Financial Stability Forum. See George 
Walker, A New International Architecture and the Financial Stability Forum, Studies in International Finance 
and Economic Law, No. 24 (1999). 
264 
See Slaughter, supra note 193, at 189. 
265 See id. ("The result is an international rule-making process that directly engages national officials and 
national promulgation and enforcement mechanisms, without formal translation and implementation 
mechanisms from the international to the national."). 
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manner in which they seek to achieve their objectives. All are not traditional international 
organizations per se, and therefore have no legal personality. They are informally formed, 
containing flexible internal organization and decentralized bureaucracies. These 
organizations often operate in secrecy and informality, but they manage to attain influence 
through a kind of decentralized enforcement of their agreements that utilizes their links 
with various international, regional and national financial regulators. Featuring tiny central 
bureaucracies and small annual budgets, the organizations rely on their members to enforce 
any regulations issued by the groups and to monitor the compliance of other members. 
Their regulations have no legal force, but at least in the case of the Basel Committee, have 
enjoyed full compliance. 
c. Assessing Government Networks 
1. The Advantages of Government Networks 
The adherents oftransgovernmetalism argue that trans governmental networks provide a 
new vision of global governance at the most general level: horizontal rather than vertical, 
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decentralized rather than centralized, and comprised of national government agencies rather 
than supranational bureaucrats.266 They believe that the networks build trust and create 
relationships among their participants, thereby establishing incentives to create a good 
reputation and avoid a bad one.267 That is, such peer-to-peer cooperation among the 
world's agencies is arguably self-enforcing since each agency is in a better position to 
implement its domestic mandate as a product of the network due to the predominance of 
common interests over the incentives to violate obligations.268 In this way, the networks 
arguably offer technical assistance and training to underdeveloped country members, 
assistance resulting in replication of regulatory models from developed countries.269 In the 
process, the networks arguably take advantage of soft power, that is persuasion and 
attraction rather than hard power of compulsion and coercion in that supranational entities 
need to use everything from expertise to endearments: information, persuasion, 
socialization when they have no actual means to enforce the obligations due to their formal 
266 See Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, supra note 193, at 193. 
267 See Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, supra note 172, at 290. 
268 
See, The Real New World Order, supra note 106, at 217. 
269 See Raustiala, The Architecture ofIntemational Cooperation, supra note 193, at 7. (noting that networks 
promote regulatory export from stronger to weaker states, and that this transfer of rules, and practices 
promotes policy convergence among states). 
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legal authority over its national counterparts.270 Further, the transgovemrnentalists assert 
that the networks' reliance on various fonns of soft power leads to the hard impact of soft 
I 271 aw. 
The proponents claim that the networks are potentially both more effective and 
accountable than traditional international organizations whereas the liberal internationalism 
is cumbersome, inflexible, and incapable of dealing with new challenges on the global 
agenda in that it is based on the juridicial equality and the time consuming fonnality of 
traditional international organizations.272 They advocate that the networks are adaptable to 
the technology of the Infonnation Age. The networks arguably strengthen states' power 
270 See Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, supra note 172, at 291. According to 
Nye, soft power flows from the ability to convince others that others want what you want. It is exercised 
through setting agendas and holding up examples that other nations seek to flow. "It co-opts people rather 
than coerces them." By contrast, hard power is command power that can be used to induce others to change 
their position. It works through both carrots and sticks, rewards and threats. See Nye, The Paradox of 
American Power, supra note 97, at 8-9. 
271 See Slaughter, A New World Order, supra note 192, at 178-181. Traditional international lawmaking has 
come in the form of hard law: treaties and other international agreements. By contrast, soft law provided in 
the form of international guidance and nonlegal instruments is emerging as an equally powerful form of 
regulation. See id. at 179. 
272 See id.; see also Slaughter, The Real New World Order, supra note 106, at 183; see also Raustiala, The 
Architecture ofInternational Cooperation, supra note 194, at 24. In response, critics who criticize the 
networks for being mere talking shops explain that "[t]he enormous increase in transnational activities as a 
result of globalization highlights the legislative void at the international level. The activities described ... 
respond, sometimes unconventionally, to the need to fill this gap. Traditional means of treaty making are too 
cumbersome for the tasks at hand and too time consuming. There may also not be the need for full agreement 
in all the details that a treaty requires, but simpler and more expeditious means to provide guidance may be 
sufficient." See Andre Rigo, Law Harmonization Resulting from the Policies of International Financial 
Institutions: The Case of the World Bank, Speech delivered at a conference on Globalization and the 
Evolution of Legal Systems, University of Ottawa (October 2000). 
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and provide state actors to interact with other state or any kind of nonstate actors at the 
domestic, regional and internationallevels.273 Most importantly, transgovemmentalism is 
arguably all about bringing the state back in as a significant international actor in the real 
new world order, which offers a governance alternative to both traditional international 
organizations and new medievalist networks of nonstate, regional, local, and supranational 
actors.274 
2. The Problems with Government Networks 
Yet the transgovemmentalism is unquestionably controversial. The networks are 
encountering sharp criticisms from many different perspectives. The sharpest charge 
273 See Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, supra note 193, at 193, 
204. 
274 Slaughter asserts that another major advantage of the networks is associated with the ways in which they 
can be used to strengthen individual state institutions. See id. For a proposal for the model of world order, 
Slaughter summarizes in several terms: ''The State is not the only actor in the international system, but it is a 
still the most important actor; The state is not disappearing into its component institutions, which are 
increasingly interacting principally with their foreign counterparts across borders; These institutions still 
represent distinct national or state interests, even as they also recognize common professional identities and 
substantive experience as judges, regulators, ministers, and legislators; Different states have evolved and will 
continue to evolve mechanisms for reaggregating the interests of their distinct institutions when necessary. In 
many circumstances, therefore states will still interact with one another as unitary actors in more traditional 
ways; Government networks exist alongside and sometimes within more traditional international 
organizations." See Slaughter, A New World Order, supra note 192, at 18. 
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against the networks is their lack of accountability 275in that they are networks of the 
world's technocrats. As noted, the adherents of trans governmental ism advocate that 
separate, functionally distinct disaggeregated networks are models for the next generations 
of international institutions which are more likely to look like the Basel Committee or, 
more formally the OECD276 than traditional international organizations.277 In response, 
some critics charge the proponents' oversimplification of its actual and potential impact 
resulting in the emphasis of only one artificial stratum out of a complex set of layers. 278 
275 The term accountability is illustrated as "A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A's 
(past or future) actions and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual 
misconduct." See Andreas Schedler, Conceptualizing Accountability, in the Self-Restraining State: Power, 
and Accountability in New Democracies 17 (Andreas Shedler et al. eds., 1999). Some observers note that 
"[t]he concept of accountability implies that the actors being held accountable have obligations to act in ways 
that are consistent with accepted standards of behavior and that they will be sanctioned for failures to do so." 
See Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No.1 (Feb. 2005), aU. 
276 Although the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is characterized as one 
of the international governmental organizations in the international system, it has played a critical role in 
shaping the architecture of global governance despite its feature of "low-profile institution." See James 
Salzman, Labor Rights, Globalization and Institutions: The Role and Influence of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and development, 21 Mich. 1. Int'l L. 769, 772-773 (2000). As the successor to the 
organization to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the OECD was initially established to 
strengthen the economies of it's member states, and thereafter expanded its mission to identify common 
issues and coordinate national and worldwide policies. See id. at 773. Because the OECD offers a closed 
setting for its member states through the closed-door meetings, this feature of restricted membership and 
transparency makes difference from conventional international organizations. As a result, the OECD 
provides a "restricted forum on virtually unrestricted topics." Id. at 77 6-777. 
in 
See Slaughter, The Real New World Order, supra note 106, at 196. Slaughter asserts that "[w]all street 
looks to the Basle Committee rather that the World Bank." See id. at 185. 
278 See Philip Alston, The Myopia of the Handmaiden: International Lawyers and Globalization, 3 Eur. 1. 
Int'l L. 435, 441 (1996). With respect to a question of the nature of the global agenda in a globalized world, 
Alston observes that the formulation of the trans governmental policy agenda focuses on issues that are 
essentially spillovers from the domestic policy agendas of the industrialized world, leaving out global poverty, 
malnutrition, human rights, refugees, the persecution of minority groups, and disease. See id. at 439. 
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Further, in the context that who sets and implements the global agenda, one claims that the 
trans governmental theory disregards the multiple points of interaction between decision-
makers which takes place within a variety of public, private and trans governmental fora.279 
In this context, there is still a need to examine the transgovernmentalist's argument that 
regulation by small, unaccountable, self-selected, non-transparent elite groups (which are, 
more often than not, wholly US-centeredi80 is preferable to classical international 
regulation through horizontally enforced treaties and traditional international institutions. 
In response to an argument about networks among national and international bureaucrats, 
some critics charges that the networks adopt Platonic Guardianship as a mode of 
transnational governance, an open move toward technocratic elitism.281 Others note "a 
279 See id. ("Multilateral organizations cannot be simply sifted out of the picture like lumps in flour. To 
suggest that the real action lies in the Basle rather than Washington in the case of banking, or with 
transnational litigation strategies in national courts rather than with the UN Human Rights Committee in the 
case of human rights, is to oversimplify the complex, essential and continuing interaction among different 
levels or fora that continues to characterize international relations in these areas."). 
280 See Alston, supra note 278, at 443 (1996) ("If [Slaughter'S analysis] is correct ... , [I]t implies the 
marginalization of governments as such and their replacement by special interest groups, which might 
sometimes include the relevant government bureaucrats. It suggests a defInitive move away from arenas of 
relative transparency into the back rooms, the emergence of what she terms a 'real new world order' in which 
those with power consolidate it and make the decisions which will continue to determine the fate of the 
excluded, and the bypassing of the national political arenas to which the United States and other proponents 
ffthe importance of healthy democratic institutions attach so much importance.'). 
81 See Antonio Perez, Who Killed Sovereignty? Or: Changing Norms Concerning Sovereignty, 14 Wis.lnt'l 
1. J. 463, 476 (1996). A good example ofthe alleged global technocracy is the Basel Committee's creation 
and enforcement of capital adequacy accords among its members. Whereas other members' regulators played 
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chronic lack of legitimacy plagues direct international contacts at the sub-state level among 
national officials and administrators.,,282 Critics also argue that problems with the 
undemocratic, unaccountable nature of regulation by transgovemmental bureaucrats arise 
from the proponents' hasty dismissal on the basis that forms of international regulation in 
contrast to traditional international law sources are nonbinding, that such 
transgovemmental regulation has been pre-approved by legislative processes at the 
domestic level, or that transgovemmental bureaucrats need only make their activities 
transparent via the websites.283 
In contrast to proponents' arguments,284 transgovemmentalists' interests in 
transnational regulation arise because, or to the extent that these networks are not mere 
a key role in employing the Basel Accords to protect their autonomy in the face of international competition, 
the Japanese represented a 'hands-tying strategy' that allowed "the Japanese bureaucrats ... to collude with 
bureaucrats from other countries in order to obtain more discretionary authority." See Jonathan Macey, The 
'Demand' for International Regulatory Cooperation: A Public Choice Perspective, in Transatlantic Regulatory 
Cooperation, supra note 198, at 159-160. 
282 See Picciotto, supra note 194 , at 1047. 
283 See Jose E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal Theory, 12 Eur. J. 
Int'l L. 183, 229 (2001) Alvarez claims that liberal internationalism is normatively superior because 
"democratic legitimacy often requires turning to treaty formally ratified by domestic legislative processes." 
See id. at 228; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose? Holding Government Networks 
Accountable, in Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation 521 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000). 
284 Slaughter remarks that "many governmental networks remain primarily talking shops, dedicated to the 
sharing of information .... But in giving and receiving this information, even in ways that may significantly 
affect their thinking, government officials are not exercising power in the traditional ways which polities fmd 
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talking shops but sites of power of effective norm-making among relevant policy-
makers.285 In this sense, transgovernmental networks may not be considered soft for the 
purposes of accountability nor hard vehicles for more effective and integrated modes of 
cooperation than are usually possible under traditional intemationallaw sources.286 
Other critics assert that the networks may be even less accountable than some states in 
that the form of accountability provided by the diversity of membership is not assured 
because power differentials within the network may distort negotiated solutions, and there 
is no guarantee that all relevant interests will actually have a voice within the network. 287 
Still critics accuse the networks of assuming and exaggerating to make the accountability 
it necessary to hold them accountable." See Slaughter, Governing Through Government Networks, supra 
note 193, at 195. 
285 See Alvarez, supra note 283, at 229; see also Stephen Toope, supra note 199, at 96-97 ("Networks, like 
regimes, and regardless of their membership, are sites of power, and potentially of exclusion and inequality. "). 
286 See id. ("If transnational networks such as the Basle Committee come to exercise real power, those 
affected are bound to notice eventually and to begin to ask questions about accountability strikingly similar to 
those that are now being asked of those international organizations whose regulatory effect are becoming too 
prominent to ignore. Nor can the accountability issues raised by transnational networks be deflected by 
pointing to the domestic legitimacy of executive agency power. Whatever authority US citizens might have 
delegated to their own central bank, it is not clear that such delegation was meant to extend to other central 
bankers' powers to regulate US banks."). It is also unclear how the Basle process has been pre-approved by 
citizens of states whose central bankers are among those represented on the Basle Committee. See id. at 229 
n.219. 
287 See Toope, supra note 199, at 97. Moreover, the clubby feature of networks may widen inequalities 
between North and South. See David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, supra 
note 199 (questioning whether exploring the "disaggregation of the state and the empowerment of diverse 
actors in an international civil society without asking who will win and who will lose by such an 
arrangement" is prudent); see also Steinberg, supra note 157, at 336 (arguing that "actors from the most 
powerful states dominate interactions within their network ... In this way, policymaking by transgovernmental 
actors merely replicate the capacity of powerful states to coerce weaker states into accepting particular 
international rules or norms."). 
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benefits of infonnation available via the Internet. 288 Even though those who have become 
accustomed to the exercise of power without transparency will not struggle to cede to the 
general public relevant information, it is unclear that Internet access will serve all relevant 
constituencies.289 Further, this Internet access to information without the incorporation of 
other procedures for outside input into decision-making processes leads to meeting process 
concerns.290 As critics remark, "[ w ]ithout knowing what questions to ask-what 
information among the mass that may be available is relevant-and without the ability to 
influence what these networks do, Internet access may not seriously ameliorate 
accountability concerns.,,291 
In addition, it deserves noting that the proponent borrows and incorporates the tools and 
sources of traditional international law to solve the accountability dilemmas. As traced by 
one observer, the proposals help to accountability concerns at the expense of claims that 
288 
See Alvarez, supra note 283, at 229. 
289 See id. Alvarez claims that "[t]o the extent the accountability objection relates to fear of 'neo-
colonialism' or US dominion via technocratic rule, Internet access may only aggravate these concerns given 
the wide gap between rich and poor (nations as well as between individuals) with respect to access to the web 
itself." See id. at 228-229. 
290 See id. at 230. 
291 See id. 
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trans governmental networks are distinctive tools of international law-making that remain 
outside of and are superior to the coercive structure of international law. 292 In this context, 
trangovernmentalists are not ready to declare that trans governmental regulation is more 
flexible, expeditious, more capable of deploying technical expertise, more compliant with 
domestic implementation and forms of deep cooperation than is the ordinary treaty as they 
acknowledge.293 
A relevant concern is lack of transparency resulting from the informality and 
flexibility of networks. The proponents argue that "[g]overnment networks are necessarily 
informal because separate government institutions have no formal standing in the 
international system under internationallaw.,,294 That is, these organizations do not exist 
from the lens of the law, and thereby they cannot establish organizations that do.295 As a 
292 See Alvarez, supra note 283, at 230. Proposals include bringing network decisions before legislative 
oversight committees or having them approved by legislative processes, nestling the networks or their work 
products within international organizations, having the network norms or codes enforced by private investors 
or by international organizations such as the IMF, and the World Bank, or expanding the representation of 
countries within these networks. See Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose, supra note 283, at 528-535. 
293 See Alvarez, supra note 283, at 230 ("Treaty regimes vary, coming in all shapes and styles of discourse, 
covering a multitude of subjects '" Some such agreements come in forms that are not clearly distinguishable 
from liberals' transnational networks to the extent that they establish mere mechanisms for the application of 
technical expertise ... , while others anticipate ... domestic implementation and very deep cooperation 
indeed.") 
294 
See Slaughter, A New World Order, supra note 192, at 152. 
295 See id. 
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consequence, these institutions can exist both within and alongside the formal sector of 
international organizations comprised of states interacting as unitary actors.296 Ironically, 
this claim contradicts the trans governmental theory that the networks are the most 
distinctive vehicles ofintemationallaw-making in the disaggeregated world order.297 As 
such the networks control more significant resources and values, it is natural that demands 
for transparency and more direct participation increase. Increased transparency is essential 
if the networks are to be held accountable. 
A final response to the trans governmental theory is that its claim of the 'nationalization 
of international law' that take place through the action of trans governmental regulatoy 
networks is based on a false dichotomy between the issues of traditional international law 
coping with the global commons and inter-State relations, versus the issues, such as crime, 
monopoly, securities fraud, pollution, tax evasion coped with by transgovrernmental 
296 Slaughter highlights that the reinvention, or the reconceptualization of existing international organizations 
are necessary for the coexistence of the networks and traditional international organizations. Id. 
297 
cf Slaughter, The Real New World Order, supra note 106, at 196. 
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networks.298 As one proponent argues, if the networks coexist and interact with traditional 
international agreements, and thereby cooperate on the administration of anti-trust policy, 
securities regulation, environmental policy, criminal law enforcement and banking and 
insurance supervision, much of this activities originate in the shadow of an intricate web of 
obligations ensuing from obligations assumed under treaties and traditional international 
institutions.299 Even though the subject matter of treaties and traditional international 
institutions, accompanied by the often soft products of both has been in its proliferation no 
less than trans governmental networks in the global age.300 As one argues, it is not easy to 
understand why "accurate description requires reordering the priorities of international law 
such that non-treaty sources oflaw demand more attention.,,301 
The proponents' attempt to nationalize international law is arguably missing a more 
significant point about the nature of norm-setting itself. It is very important to note that 
298 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Government Networks: The Heart of the Liberal Democratic Order, in 
Democratic Governance and International Law 217 (Gregory H. Fox et al. eds., 2000). 
299 See Alvarez, supra note 283, at 212. ("While it is true that the Basle Committee itself operates in an 
regulatory area not traditional regarded as 'international', without benefit of treaty or intergovernmental 
organization, and through the medium of non-binding recommendations, its success is very much dependent 
on other treaty regimes and the work of more traditional forms of international organization, including the 
Bretton Woods institutions .... neither its subject matter nor its style of regulation really distinguishes the 
Basle Committee from a wide number of traditional treaty regimes and institutions."). 
300 See id. 
301 See id. 
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contemporary international law cannot be distinguished in terms of subject matter, from 
domestic policy.302 Nevertheless, one oversimplifies how international norms are 
nationalized under the classic sources ofintemationallaw.303 The suggested dichotomy 
that whereas the traditional international law is coercive and top-down, transgovemmental 
regulation is soft and bottom-up fails to describe accurately either approach to norm-
making or the complex interplay between the twO.304 Indeed, there are many treaties that 
are viewed as promotional, and contain purposefully ambiguous commitments. 305 Other 
treaties even with more definitive textual commitments are hard to classify as coercive due 
to the lack of enforcement provisions or ambiguities within the enforcement schemes 
provided. In contrast to the proponent's interpretation, the UN Convention on the Law of 
302 See id. at212-2B. 
303 See Slaughter, Government Networks, supra note 298, at 217 ("Traditional international law requires 
States to implement the international obligations they incur through national law where necessary, either 
through legislation or regulation. Thus, for instance, if States agree to a twelve-mile territorial sea, they must 
change the domestic legislation concerning the interdiction of vessels in territorial waters accordingly. 
However, the subject of such legislation would be internationaL .. Bilateral and plurilateral regulatory 
cooperation does not seek to create obligations between nations and enforceable at international law. Rather, 
the agreements reached are pledges of good faith that are essentially self-enforcing, in the sense that each 
nation will be better able to enforce its national law by implementing the agreement reached if all other 
nations do likewise. The binding or coercive dimension oflaw emerges only at the national law."). 
304 See id. 
305 These commitments are not different from Slaughter's pledge of good faith. Like the soft products of 
trans governmental networks, they also become self-enforcing only when domestic laws enable reciprocal 
enforcement to be exercised or when other forms of interpretation provide them the concreteness that they 
were originally in need of. See id. Many ILO conventions and recommendations are good examples. 
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the Sea does not explicitly require changes in national law or regulations concerning the 
breadth of the territorial sea.306 As most treaties do, the agreement reached among member 
states leaves states considerable direction as to how to attain compliance with its terms.307 
D. Concluding Remarks 
The trans governmental theory is overly optimistic with respect to the prospects of the 
networks as an effective governance alternative in the international system and under 
international law. The transgovernmentalists do not look to the empowerment of 
traditional international organizations as the way for governance. Rather, they do to the 
evolving practice of formal and informal trans governmental regulatory networks as the 
most realistic hope for governing the global economy. Indeed, the direct transnational 
interaction between the diffuse states' agencies of the world's regulators has remarkably 
proliferated in the global era. The trans governmental theory based on the disaggregation 
of state sovereignty stresses the active participation of the world's independent government 
306 See id. at 213-214. 
307 Id. at 214. 
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agencies rather than supra international regimes, which reflects regulators' compliance with 
broad regulatory standards constituting international soft law instead of direct enforcement. 
In this context, transgovemmentalism highlights nationalization of international law toward 
the regulatory harmonization. However, this claim is still controversial even though 
transgovemmental regulatory organizations are on the rise in the international system. In 
order for all the undeveloped and industrialized countries to benefit from the 
transgovemmental regulatory governance, various types of realistic measures should be 
taken to reduce inequalities between North and South. Otherwise, global standards as 
international soft law will not be apparently welcome to developing and transitional 
countries. 
Furthermore, this process is still a host of hot debate due to concerns over the lack of 
accountability in the networks. The deficiencies of traditional forms of cooperation 
through regional organizations can be assessed against the scope and the goals of their 
constitutional documents, but the impact of informal arrangements is far more difficult to 
evaluate. As there is no formal acknowledgement of the role of the networks, 
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accountability still remains a concern. If transparency over the impact of such processes is 
not present, the networks may reinforce the traditional undemocratic features of 
international law by consolidating the state's position over the individual.308 In this 
perspective process, the benefits of greater plurality will disappear.309 Consequently, an 
"all-or-nothing" perspective for the analysis of desirable forum of global governance 
ignores exploring each component of it, as it is at present in the international system. In 
this sense, emphasis should be put on the cooperation between all the state and non-state 
actors in the international system and under international law. It deserves noting some 
observer's remark that "[g]lobal governance will come not at the expense of the state but 
rather as an expression of the interests that the state embodies. As the source of order and 
basis of governance, the state will remain in the future as effective, and will be essential, as 
it has ever been.,,310 
308 See Richard A. Barnes, Book Review: Democratic Governance and International Law, 8 Ind. J. Global 
Legal Stud. 281, 284 (2000). 
309 See id. 
310 See Martin Wolf, Will the Nation-State survive Globalization?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 190. 
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IV. Second Thoughts on the Inevitability and Desirability of Global 
Convergence in Banking Regulation: The Case for the Basel Bank 
Supervisory Standards and Capital Adequacy Rules 
While the prudential supervision and regulation3!! of banking and financial markets 
were not preceding the globalization of finance, the bank supervision and regulation 
remained the province of national regulatory authorities until the mid-1970s.3!2 As a result, 
some historical incidents such as bank failures and financial disruptions over the past 
decades, which are illustrated below, have drawn a considerable attention to the need for 
the global regulation of banking markets. The internationalization of bank regulatory 
standards has been essentially reactive in nature. Since no other sector than banking has 
become more global in its operations, and thus more difficult to monitor and supervise it, 
national regulatory authorities have adjusted domestic regulations to keep abreast of global 
3ll There are two approaches to distinguish regulation and supervision in terms of function and content. 
Under the distinction based on function, regulation refers to 'the body of legal rules, regulations or 
administrative requirements established by financial authorities or fmancial market participants to limit or 
control the risks assumed by financial institutions." Supervision refers to "the associated or complimentary 
process of monitoring or reviewing compliance by fmancial institutions with specific regulatory provisions or 
general standards of prudent or proper behavior in any particular market." By contrast, a distinction based on 
content or degree of control is drawn between "particular systems having regard to the degree of control or 
statutory direction imposed as against the level of discretion left to be exercised by the authorities concerned." 
See Walker, supra note 203, at 1 n.l. Walker argues that neither the Bank for International Settlements emS) 
nor the Basel Committee has ever defmed the terms. See Id. at 17 n.1. This study follows the more complete 
distinction based on function rather than content as long as both approaches impose some degree of control 
which implies a compliance or review function. 
312 Moreover, bank supervision has been traditionally "subject to no direct legal direction or, until recently 
relied upon the exercise of often uncontrolled administrative direction." See id. at 2. 
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bank regulatory standards. As such, global convergence in banking has made greater 
strides than in any other financial sector. 
However, some skepticism has run over the argument that global standards in banking 
have been established by the international financial community's concerns about the safety 
and soundness of the global financial system. Arguably, hegemony of Western powers 
began a drive to move in terms of hegemonic stability more than their concerns about a 
global banking crisis. In this context, this chapter attempts to assess the Basel 
Committee's bank supervisory standards and capital adequacy rules, and thereby rethink 
whether global convergence in banking regulation is desirable and inevitable. To that end, 
it examines how bank supervisory and regulatory standards have been internationalized 
toward global convergence in banking regulation. In this regard, this study attempts to 
address driving forces behind the creation of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
and its establishment of uniform international banking standards. In doing so, it addresses 
the question of whether systemic risk in banking has really played a key role in the 
establishment of international bank regulatory and supervisory standards. In this context, 
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this study analyzes a comprehensive view of systemic risk in the banking sector. 
Moreover, historical experiences of bank failures in terms of systemic risk are 
demonstrated. 
More importantly, this study attempts to explore the origins of the Basel Accord on 
bank capital adequacy. To do so, it largely relies on current theories on the process of 
negotiating the capital adequacy standards in the areas of political science and international 
political economy. At this point, this study takes a position as a break against the force of 
international market failure logic that has enjoyed an exceptionally positive reception 
among economists, political scientists, and legal experts. Nonetheless, it does not intend to 
freeze the international coordination and cooperation of banking regulation. Given the 
understanding of the politics behind the establishment of the Basel Accord, this study 
evaluates the Basel Accord of 1988 and the new capital adequacy framework (Basel II), 
and then moves beyond the assessment of the capital adequacy standards. In doing so, it 
attempts to draw lessons from Basel toward a just world order in the global finance. 
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A. The Internationalization of Bank Regulatory Standards 
1. The Historical and Theoretical Background 
Although international finance has a long history of involvement with foreign trade, 
shipping, and investments, the international financial markets expanded remarkably after 
the post-world War period of construction and recovery?13 In particular, the substantial 
expansion of bank overseas operation played a significant role in the growth of 
international financial markets. The creation of Eurodollar314 accounts pioneered by 
British banking has increased the amounts of liquidity to finance multinational business, 
and expanded the deposits and lending operations for many clients including corporations 
3\3 It is worth noting that European financial institutions have already conducted overseas activities for 
centuries. Italian banks dominated international fmance during the Middle Ages and Renaissance. With the 
establishments of colonial empires, British and Dutch banking have become conspicuously international by 
their worldwide presence. During the 19th century, London took the strong position as the center of 
international finance until after the World War II. Although U.S. banking began to flow abroad earlier in the 
20th century, especially during the World War I, the big involvement began after World War II. In last 
generation, U.S. multinational banking system has been rapidly created as resulting from greater affluence, 
thriving trade and commerce, foreign investment, and increasing use of multinational channels for tax 
avoidance, enhanced profits, and flight of capital to escape regulation. See William A. Lovett, BANKING AND 
FINANCIALINSTlTUTIONS LAW (3d ed. 1992) at 215,217-218: David S. Kidwell, Richard L. Peterson & David 
W. Blackwell, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS, AND MONEY 449-450 (5th ed. 1993). 
314 The term Eurodollar was initially used to refer to the lending of U.S. dollars out of London by the foreign 
branches of U.S. banks mainly located in U.K. The Eurodollar market is the foreign location of the banks that 
distinguishes Eurodollars from ordinary dollar deposits in U.S. banks. In this sense, the Eurodollar market is 
an offshore market in contrast to domestic onshore markets. See Franklin R. Root, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
AND INVESTMENT 502 (7th ed. 1994). Walker, supra note 203, at 19 n.3. The role of the dollar as a preferred 
reserve currency with less inflation than most countries to gather increasing amounts of liquidity to fmance 
multinational business had been influential between the later 1940's-late 1960's. See Lovett, supra note 313, 
at 218. 
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and even governments, drawn from around the world.315 In particular, the post-World War 
II brought up the big involvement of the U.S. banking to service the needs of American 
corporations expanding their business and activities into worldwide.
316 
Moreover, U.K. 
banking regulation and tax policy fostered the retention of earnings abroad by foreign 
clients, especially American corporations in London.317 That is because U.S. restrictions 
on leakage of capital in the 1960's, with its interest equalization tax to be imposed on the 
purchase of foreign bonds by U.S. investors stimulated the early development of the 
Eurobond markets.318 In addition, oil-rich exporters placed a large volume of their liquid 
earnings into Eurocurrency deposits with the demise of OPEC and the "petrodollar" 
recycling of 1974_75.319 In all this rapid expansion of overseas banking activities, more 
corporations and governments placed liquidity deposits in multinational banks to maximize 
. d . 320 earnmgs an tax evasIOn. 
315 See Lovett, Banking and Financial Institutions Law, supra note 313, at 218. 
316 !d. at 217-218; see also William A. Lovett, WORLD TRADE RlVALRY: TRADE EQUITY AND COMPETING 
INDUSTRIAL POLICIES (1987) at 39 (noting that ... "U.S. industrial, financial, and naval dominance was much 
like Britain's leadership after the Napoleon Wars"). 
317 !d. 
318 See Walker, supra note 203, at 2l. 
319 See Lovett, supra note 313, at 218. 
320 See id. at 219. 
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However, the internationalization of financial markets has entailed the complexity of 
financial markets and thereby posing new levels of financial risks. To begin, the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system between 1971 and 1973 put 
an end to the period of substantial growth and stability of international financial markets.321 
The collapse of Bretton Woods system forced all of the participants in international 
321 The international monetary system, known as the Bretton Woods system has existed for 25 years since the 
Agreement was signed at a conference attended by 44 countries in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July 
1944. The objective of the conference was to create a fixed exchange rate system to replace the formerly 
existed foreign exchange market under the international gold standard. The delegates to the conference 
including John M. Keynes from the U.K. and Harry D. White from the U.S were sure that only an 
unprecedented degree of international monetary cooperation could anticipate a repetition of the Global 
Depression in the 1930s. The result of their negotiations was the establishment of the International Monetary 
Fund (lMF), and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (now known as World Bank). 
The IMF was created as a mutual lending institution (facilitating short- and medium-term loans) for member 
countries, with potential to create multinational liquidity over the long run. The IMF's mandate was to assist 
in stabilizing currency relationships, as described in terms of gold-dollar exchange standard. The International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Word Bank) was designed to complete the IMF's role as a means 
for long-term lending above and beyond the support provided by private investors, international banks, 
traditional export finance, and the IMF. 
Under the circumstances, the Bretton Woods international monetary system was sustained by two 
institutions: the IMF, and the central reserve role of the U.S. dollar due to the emergence of the U.S. as the 
prime reserve nation, with the dollar increasingly taking over the function of gold as an international reserve 
asset during the 1950s. Notably, the U.S. dollar was the only currency for convertible into gold at a fixed 
price of $35 per ounce for official monetary purposes in that all IMF nations were required to maintain stable 
par values of their currencies defmed in terms of gold or the 1944 U.S. dollar under the Bretton Woods 
system. This international monetary system had both benefits, and drawbacks that brought about the 
replacement with a regime of floating exchange rates. Arguably, the poor performance of the Bretton Woods 
system in the 1960s attributes mainly to three interconnected causes: (1) the problem of international liquidity 
formation centered on the dollar, (2) delays in balance of payments adjustments, and (3) dis equilibrating 
short-term capital movements. In response to widespread concern over the adequacy of international liquidity, 
agreement was reached in the late 1960s on facilities to create a new international reserve asset, the special 
drawing right (SDRs) which was first activated in the beginning of the 1970s. More significantly, in the early 
1970s, serious complexity of dollar devaluation, currency realignment, and major commodity price inflation 
inspired the international monetary crisis of 1971, which forced the U.S. to suspend the gold convertibility of 
the dollar on August 15 and thereby brought the closure of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in 
March 1973. As a consequence, the floating exchange rate system has been accepted as the basis for valuing 
currencies. The basic difference from the Bretton Woods system is the floatation of the U.S. dollar against 
other key currencies. See Lovett, World Trade Rivalry, supra note 316, at 37-49; see also Root, supra note 
314, at 456-485. 
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financial markets to expose to new levels of currency and interest rate risk. 322 Most of the 
financial institutions had never experiences in managing currency risk before and thereby 
suffered a considerable amount of losses either in direct trading foreign currency or by 
failing to hedge against foreign currency exposures. The losses are attributable to the 
provision of forward cover by banks for existing clients and reckless trading to cover 
existing losses.323 In short, the elimination of fixed exchange rate parity with gold led the 
privatization, which created the pressure to release the restraints on cross-border capital 
movements, and the further deregulation in financial markets. 324 The privatization of 
financial risk in the post-Bretton Woods age intensified the pressure on governments to 
liberalize their national restriction on transborder capital flows so that financial 
322 See Walker, supra note 203, at 25. Currency risk is associated with currency value changes and exchange 
controls. Since many world currencies do not have well-established foreign currency markets, international 
loans cannot always be hedged to reduce the risk if the currency in which the loan is made loses the values 
against the dollar during the course of the loan. The exchange risk may occur due to difficulties in 
convertibility into dollars for repayment. Some form of exchange control may be established by a country in 
case of its large balance-of-payments deficit and its inability to make current payments of its sizable 
international loans. Interest risk concerns the risk of fluctuations in a bond's price or reinvestment caused by 
changes in market interest rates. The volatile interest rate environment of the late 1970s and early 1980s 
caused the failure of many savings and loans association industry (S&Ls) because of the faster increase in 
interest rates of their payment on deposits (liabilities) than the decline in yields of earnings on their mortgage 
loans (assets). See Kidwell, Peterson & Blackwell, supra note 313, at 124-126, 344,467. 
323 See E. P. Davis, DEBT, FINANCIAL FRAGILITY AND SYSTEMIC RISK (1992) at 154, cited in Walker, supra 
note 203, at 26. 
324 See Kern Alexander, The Need ForEfficient International Financial Regulation and the Role of a Global 
Supervisor, in REGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 273-274 
(Eilis Ferran et al. eds., 2001). 
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organizations could spread their risks to foreign assts and transactions. As a consequence, 
the remarkable increase in short-term cross-border portfolio investment has posed systemic 
risk due to the volatility of cross-border capital flows in many capital-importing 
countries. 325 In these circumstances, the stability of financial markets has become a 
serious concern in the era of volatility since historical bank failures and financial 
disruptions. Unquestionably, national regulatory authorities began to recognize the 
necessity to promote sound banking systems through the efficient management of systemic 
risks in domestic markets. 
Meanwhile, the extraordinarily large budget and trade deficit since 1981 transformed 
the United States from the world's largest creditor in 1980 to the world's largest debtor in 
1988.326 As the U.S. suffered from the increasing trade deficit, Japan emerged as an 
significant creditor country thanks to the growing strength of the yen, and the nation's 
325 Id. at 274. 
326 See Kidwell et aI., supra note 313, at 332 (noting the purely fmancial impact of this phenomenon 
that "[f]irst, since corporate capital spending actually rose as the budget and trade deficits mushroomed, the 
United States had to borrow money from foreigners on a scale never imagined, [ which] caused the world's 
most sophisticated financial system become even larger, more efficient, more innovative[;] .... [second,] [a]s 
the national debt zoomed past $2 trillion, a truly global bond market (for U.S. Treasury securities) of immense 
size and liquidity came into being[;] [t]hird, foreigners accumulated massive holdings of U.S. dollars, which 
they either invested in dollar-dominated financial assets or repatriated to the United States as direct 
investment"). 
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burgeoning foreign reserves.327 Notably, Japanese banks and securities firms became a 
driving force in international financial markets as a result of the liquidity provided by the 
huge foreign currency accumulations along with a high national savings rate and a slowing 
domestic economic growth.328 That is, the relatively lower Japanese interest rates than 
those of other industrial nations enabled the financial firms to bid aggressively for 
multinational financing business, and dominate in financial commodity markets.329 
In these circumstances, the prosperity enjoyed by industrialized globe during the 1980s 
promoted the internationalization?30 Meanwhile, a major industrial countries' argument 
about their competitive disadvantages due to the discrepancies in the bank capital adequacy 
regulations posed the pressure to establish a set of common regulatory standards, 
eliminating disparities, creating a level playing field in international finance. Furthermore, 
the Third World debt-overload crisis of 1982-84, and financial disruptions over the past two 
327 
See Scott & Wellons, supra note 5, at 491. 
328 The ten largest banks in the world were Japanese by the mid-1980s. They held almost 40% of international 
bank assets. See id. 
329 See Kidwell et aI., supra note 313, at 333. 
330 See id (noting that international capital flows were propelled by the need for companies expanding their 
multinational operations to fund expansion in efficient capital markets, and the explosive growth in valuation 
and trading volume in stock markets around world during the 1980s as investors pursued diversification 
objectives, and corporations pursued low-cost fmancing). 
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decades around the glove have called an attention to the need for global regulation of 
financial markets. The major underlying factors of the internationalization of bank 
regulatory standards will be demonstrated below. 
2. The Impetus for the Internationalization of Bank Regulatory 
Standards: Systemic Risk 
Notably, the internationalization of regulatory standards in banking has made greater 
strides than in any other financial sectors. The greater headway with which international 
standards converged in banking law lies in the concerns over the uniqueness in the financial 
services industry such as worldwide spillover problems in financial markets, and fears 
about entailing political, economic and social disruption as shown in financial crises over 
the decades since the collapse of Bretton Woods system.331 Historically, it was not until 
the banking collapses due to the privatization of financial risks in the 1970s that 
international community has paid attention to the need for the global banking supervision 
331 See Patricia A. McCoy, Musings an the Seeming Inevitability a/Global Convergence in Banking Law, 7 
CONNECTICUT INSURANCE L. J. 433, 436 (2001). 
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and regulation.332 In short, the major banking collapse at U.K., West Germany, and the 
U.S.A. in the post-Bretton Woods era has led national regulatory authorities to improve the 
supervision of financial institutions, and promote safe and sound financial systems through 
the taking of the increased risk of systemic financial destabilization.333 
As a matter of fact, the increased cross-border linkages among the financial markets 
have brought a remarkable expansion in financial activities and efficiency to capital 
markets around the globe. However, the increasing complexity in financial activities of 
financial institutions has caused systemic and other financial risks at the same time. 
Especially, systemic risk is critical issues in the bank regulation because of the capital 
structure and mutual interdependence ofbanks.334 That is to say, banks are special due to 
the characteristics of bank funds comprised of debt in the form of demand deposits, and 
banks' short-term borrowing and long-term lending resulting in a fundamental mismatch in 
332 See Kern Alexander, supra note 324, at 276. 
333 [d. at 274. 
334 See McCoy, supra note 331, at 442. 
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the maturities of their assets and liabilities.335 Upon borrowing, a bank invests in riskier 
and safer assets, that is, a bank has an incentive to take on excessive risks in making loans 
or investments, or to operate with insufficient capital, because accepting those risks may 
greatly reward the bank's owners and managers, while the possible adverse consequences 
may be borne by depositors, other lenders, and government guarantees and bailouts such as 
deposit insurance. 336 
Moreover, banks' choice of industry in which they undertake riskier investments 
determines the correlation of their portfolio returns. When banks prefer to lend to similar 
industries in equilibrium, systemic risk occurs as an endogenous consequence. 337 Namely, 
the severe deterioration in bank balance sheets may lead to bank panics in case of multiple 
335 Id. Traditionally, banking business involves borrowing short and lending long, that is, taking deposits 
which can be withdrawn on demand or certificates of deposit that can be withdrawn in a matter of months, 
and making loans that will be repaid over periods of years. As such, the assets of a bank have typically longer 
duration than its liabilities. 
336 Here is a crucial issue of "moral hazard," meaning that loss may arise from a person's character, habits, 
and circumstances, a sin of omission. In short, all but the largest depositors tend to indifferent to the safety 
and soundness of their banks because the government guarantees their deposits, and their funds are not really 
at risk. Major sources of moral hazard in banking are leverage and deposit insurance. Some notes the moral 
hazard arising from government guarantees as a justification for bank regulation. See Stephen C. Cecchetti, 
The Future of Financial Intermediation and Regulation: An Overview, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Vol. 5 No.8 (May 1999) at 3-4. 
337 See Viral A. Acharya, A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation 2 (January 9, 
2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm'?/abstract=236401 (last visited Jan. 10,2003). 
Acharya notes that in practice, joint failure risk of banks may be determined by a more complicated pattern of 
inter-bank loans, derivatives, and other transactions. See id. at 2 n.2. 
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and simultaneous failures of banking institutions. In this context, systemic risk arises 
arguably from a high interconnection of returns on the asset side of their balance sheets. 338 
In addition, the linkages of banks to one another through the payments system and inter-
banking lending may cause a ripple effect throughout the banking system.339 Since deposit 
contract is not explicitly subject to bank characteristics, the depositor losses due to bank 
failures are not internalized by the bankowners.34o As such, bank failures and panics are 
considered to involve huge externalities. That is, individual bank failures produce harmful 
effects on other bankS.341 The aggregate investment may be reduced due to a decrease in 
the aggregate supply of deposits. As a result, a recessionary spillover (a negative 
338 See id. at 5-11. 
339 See McCoy, supra note 331, at 443. 
340 See Acharya, supra note 337, at 2. 
341 Acharya notes two conflicting effects of individual bank failures on other banks. According to Acharya, in 
contrast to a negative externality, surviving banks have a strategic benefit (a positive externality) from other 
bank's failure because of an increase in scale or an expansion caused by the migration of depositors from the 
failed banks to the surviving banks, or due to a reduction of operation cost resulting from acquisition of the 
failed bank's lending facilities. Meanwhile, if the negative externality effect is greater than the positive 
externality effect, banking institutions recognize it optimal to increase the probability of surviving together, 
and hence failing together by choosing asset portfolios with greater correlation of returns. This phenomenon 
would arise where (i) the decrease in aggregate investment is substantial on a bank's failure, for example, 
banks are large; or (ii) depositors of the failed bank's depositors do not migrate to the surviving banks, for 
example, banks are essential; or (iii) other banks cannot benefit from the acquisition of the failed banks' 
business facilities, for example, banks are unique, or such acquisitions are prohibited by anti-trust regulations. 
This preference occurs as a joint outcome of the limited liability of the banks' equityholders and the nature of 
the externalities. Acharya calls this equilibrium characterization behavior of systemic risk as "systemic risk-
shifting." In this context, bank regulator attempts to reduce systemic and individual risk-shifting incentives of 
bankowners through its design of bank closure policy and capital requirements. However, these regulatory 
mechanisms based only on a bank's own risk fail to minimize aggregate risk-shifting incentives, and thus 
accentuating systemic risk. See id. 
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externality) spreads to the surviving banks because of an increase in scale or an expansion, 
and hence reducing the profitability of banks. More importantly, as long as banks are 
levers of monetary policy, ensuing bank panic can have negative macroeconomic effects 
resulting in the decrease in the money supply, and an economic downturn. 342 As such, 
systemic risk causes a negative externality of banks, since failed banks and their owners 
(shareholders) do not have to pay for systemic harms they posed to other banks and other 
economies.343 In the global context, the domestic repercussions of cross-border banking 
crises that national bank regulators cannot individually control have brought up concerns 
over the danger of contagion stemming from the risk of systemic crisis. Accordingly, most 
banking systems around the globe are heavily regulated, because bank regulators are 
concerned about the social and economic costs of systemic risk. 344 In this regard, the 
342 See McCoy, supra note 331, at 443. Since the losses to both depositors and the economies from a joint 
bank failure exceed those from individual bank failures, different banks undertake investments in assets with 
lower correlation of returns, and thereby resulting in a greater decrease in aggregate investment. See id. at 3. 
343 See id. 
344 Nevertheless, there is still no consensus on whether bank regulation is necessary, and if so, how banks 
should be regulated. One notes this is partly caused by the lack of consensus on the nature of the market 
failure that makes free banking not optimal. See George Benston & George Kaufman, The Appropriate Role 
o/Bank Regulation, ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Vol. 106, No.4, at 688-697, cited in Joao A C Santos, BANK 
CAPITAL REGULA nON IN CONTEMPORARY BANKING THEORY: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE, BIS Working 
Paper No. 90 (Sept. 2000), at 5. For the rationale of banking regulation, see Charles Goodhart et aI., 
FINANCIAL REGULA nON: WHY, How AND WHERE Now? 10-12 (1998) (outlining the traditional rational bank 
regulation on the basis of four main considerations: (i) the critical status of banks in the financial system, 
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objective of prudential bank regulation is considered to ensure the stability and soundness 
of the financial system as a whole. Consequently, systemic risk has been one of the most 
powerful forces behind the internationalization of bank regulatory standards as it is one of 
the critical justifications for bank regulation. In these circumstances, deep skepticism is 
running over the efficiency of the current bank regulatory mechanism to prevent or retard 
systemic risk. In this context, it is worth analyzing the concept of systemic risk. 
a. Concepts of Systemic Risk 
In general, systemic risk is not a phenomenon limited to economics and the financial 
system. Historically, the concept has been well illustrated in the field of health and 
epidemic diseases. That is, Black Death of the Great Plague in the Middle Age, which 
broke out in 1348-50, and beset Europe until the 1730s, was immediately fatal and spread 
rapidly from southern to northern Europe resulting in by 1400 a remarkable decrease in the 
population to about a half or two-thirds of its total a century before. Most recently, the 
particularly in clearing and payments systems; (ii) the potential systemic dangers resulting from bank runs; 
(iii) the nature of bank contracts; (iv) moral hazard associated with the lender-of-last-resort role and other 
safety net arrangements that apply to banks. 
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outbreak ofSARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) in China in November 2002 has 
rapidly brought about a devastating infectious disease around the globe. Systemic risk is 
arguably a particular characteristic of financial system in the area of economics. Whereas 
contamination (contagion) effects may also take place in other sectors of the economy, the 
probability and danger is accounted as considerably higher.
345 An entire systemic crisis in 
the financial system may have strong adverse impacts on the real economy and general 
economic welfare.346 
Systemic risk is defined as "the risk or probability of breakdowns (losses) in an entire 
system as opposed to breakdowns in individual parts or components and is evidenced by 
comovements (correlation) among most or all parts.,,347 Systemic risk in banking sector is 
proved by a high correlation and ensuing of bank failures in a nation, in a number of 
345 However, some challenges the existence of systemic risk in the fmancial system. See G. Sheldon & M. 
Mauer, Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk: An Empirical Analysis of for Switzerland, SWISS JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, Vol. 134, No.2 (1998), at 685 (asserting that "[s]ystemic risks are for financial 
market participants what Nessie, the monster of Loch Ness, is for the Scots (and not only for them): Everyone 
knows and is aware of the danger. Evereyone can accurately describe the threat Nessie, like systemic risk, is 
omnipresent, but nobody knows when and where it might strike. There is no proof that anyone has really 
encountered it, but there is no doubt that it exists"). 
346 See Olivier De Bandt & Philipp Hartman, SYSTEMIC RISK: A SURVEY, European Bank Working Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. 35 (November 2000,) at 10. 
347 See George G. Kaufman, Banking and Currency Crises and Systemic Risk: Lessons from Recent Events, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives (3rd Quarter 2000) at 9, 14. 
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nations, or all over the globe. In this sense, systemic risk may arise either or both in the 
domestic dimension andlor in the transnational arena.348 
Meanwhile, systemic risk is meant by different description, especially with respect to its 
causation.349 The first refers to a macro shock that causes near simultaneous adverse effects 
on the most or all the domestic economy. In other words, systemic "refers to an event 
having effects on the entire banking, financial, or economic system, rather than just one or a 
348 See id. Systemic risk is also evidenced in the other financial sectors. In particular, the size of big securities 
firms is now so great as to cause genuine systemic concerns in case of a market failure. Since the dramatic 
collapse of Barings pIc in 1995, the understanding to cope with systemic risk has been widely spread to 
securities regulators and supervisors because of the negative effect on fmancial systems resulting from the 
simultaneous decline in the prices of a number of securities in single or several markets in a nation or across 
nations. For an analysis of the Barings Collapse, see generally Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive, 
Globalization of Financial Risks and International Supervision of Banks and Securities Firms: Lessons from 
the Barings Debacle, 30 INT'L LAW. 301 (1996). 
349 For the review of various description of systemic risk, see Kaufman, supra note 347, at 14-15; see also De 
Bandt & Hartman, supra note 346, at 10-13. De Bandt and Hartman specified some concepts to define 
systemic risk. They refer to "a systemic event in the narrow sense as an event, where the release of "bad 
news" about a fmancial institution, or even its future, or the crash of a financial market leads in a sequential 
fashion to considerable adverse effects on one or several other fmancial institutions or markets ... Essential is 
the "domino effect" from one institution to the other or from one market to the other emanating from a limited 
("idiosyncratic") shock." According to them, a systemic risk in the broad sense includes both the event 
defmed above and "simultaneous adverse effects on a large number of institutions or markets as a 
consequence of severe and widespread ("systematic") shocks." They also describe a systemic crisis in the 
narrow and broad sense as a systemic event that produces effects on a considerable number of institutions and 
markets in a strong sense, thus "severely impairing the general well-functioning ... of the financial system 
relatin[g] to the effectiveness and efficiency with which savings are channeled into the real investments 
promising the highest returns. They assert that the distinction between the distinction between the narrow and 
the broad concept of systemic events is significant because "crisis management measures, tackling the source 
of the problem, might be different in the case of an idiosyncratic shock that risks causing contagion compared 
to the case of a systematic shock that might have a broad simultaneous destabilization effect." As for systemic 
risk, they describe it as 'the risk of experiencing systemic events in the strong sense ... the spectrum of 
systemic risk ranges from the second-round effect on a single institution or market ... to the risk of having a 
crisis affecting most of the financial system at the upper extreme ... " 
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few institutions.,,35o Arguably, this definition does not clarify how the effects transmit 
from a macro shock to individual units.351 
Two other definitions emphasize potential spillover from one unit to others. One refers 
to systemic risk as the "probability that cumulative losses will accrue from an event that 
sets in motion a series of successive losses along a chain of institutions or markets 
comprising a system '" That is, systemic risk is the risk of a chain reaction of falling 
interconnected dominos.,,352 This definition focuses on "causation as well as correlation 
(correlation with causation) and requires strong direct interconnections or linkages among 
350 See Philip F. Bartholomew & Gary W. Whalen, Fundamentals of Systemic Risk, in RESEARCH IN 
FINANCIAL SERVICES: BANKING, FINANCIAL MARKETS, AND SYSTEMIC RISK, Vol. 7, at 4 (George G. Kaufman 
ed., 1995). See also Frederic S. Mishkin, Comment on Systemic Risk, in RESEARCH IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: 
BANKING, FINANCIAL MARKETS, AND SYSTEMIC RISK, Vol. 7, at 32 (George G. Kaufman ed., 1995) (defming 
systemic risk as "the likelihood of a sudden, usually unexpected, even that disrupts information in financial 
markets, making them unable to effectively channel funds to those parties with the most productive 
investment opportunities"). 
351 See Kaufman, supra note 347, at 14. 
352 See George G. Kaufman, Comment on Systemic Risk, supra note 350, at 47; see also Bank for 
International Settlements, 64th ANNUAL REpORT (June 1994), at 177 (defming systemic risk as "the risk that 
the failure of a participant to meet its contractual obligations may in tum cause other participants to default 
with a chain reaction leading to broader fmancial difficulties"). This domino phenomenon is remarkable in 
banking sector. Since banks have claims on each other through the payment system and the interbank market, 
financial difficulties of an individual bank can spread to others as it defaults on its obligation. See Stephen R. 
Gallen, Regulating the Modern Financial Firm: Implications of Disintermediation and Conglomeration, 
University of St. Gallen Discussion Paper No. 2000-21 (September 2000) at 5. Recently, some study and 
research have dealt with this type of financial contagion. See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Interbank 
Lending and Systemic Risk, JOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Vol. 28, No.4 (1996) at733-762 
(developing a model of the interbank market where interbank lending produces a trade-off between increased 
peer monitoring and higher systemic risk resulting from larger interbank linkages); see also Franklin Allen & 
Douglas Gale, Financial Contagion, JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 108, No. 1 (2000) at 1-33 
(analyzing the completeness of the interbank deposit market affects the extent to which individual shocks 
spread throughout the system). Meanwhile, this perspective emphasizes some type of government 
intervention either through guarantees or last resort lending. However, there are still many significant issues 
in dealing with contagion left. 
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institutions and markets, sectors, or countries involved, ... when the first domino falls, it 
falls on others causing them to fall and in tum knock down others in a chain of "knock-on" 
t · ,,353 reac IOn. 
A third definition of systemic risk also emphasizes spillover from an initial shock.354 
[B]ut, [it] does not involve direct causation, and depends on weaker and more indirect 
interconnections. It focuses on similarities in third-party risk exposures among the units 
involved. When one unit experiences an adverse shock generating severe losses, 
uncertainty is produced about the values of other units potentially subject to same shock. 
To minimize additional losses, market participants will examine other units, such as banks, 
in which they have economic interests to see whether and to what extent they are at risk. 
The more similar the risk exposure profile with that of the initial unit economically, 
politically, or otherwise, the greater is the probability ofloss and the participants to 
withdraw funds as soon as possible. The response may cause liquidity and even more 
fundamental solvency problems. This may be defined as a "common shock" or 
353 
See Kaufman, supra note 352, at 47. 
354 Kaufman, supra note 347, at 14. 
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"reassessment shock" effect, and represents correlation without direct causation (indirect 
causation). 
In the periods of uncertainty due to the asymmetric information problems, market 
participants need time and resources to sort out the other units at risk and the magnitudes of 
any potential losses, and increasingly tend to make their portfolio adjustments in quantities 
(runs) rather than prices (interest rates).355 As a consequence, there seems to be "an 
immediate flight or run to quality away from all units that appear potentially at risk, 
regardless of whether further analysis would identify them as ex-post as having similar 
exposures that actually put them at risk (guilty) or not (innocent).,,356 
The runs are likely to put a strong downward pressure on the prices (upward pressure 
on interest rates) of the securities of financially affected institutions and markets. 
Simultaneously, many of the affected countries are likely to increase their interest rates up 
355 ld. at 15. 
356 See !d. Since runs are concurrent and widespread in this period, where common shock contagion appears 
indiscriminate, potentially affecting the entire universe and reflecting a general loss of confidence in all units, 
such behavior by investors is referred to as "herding" behavior. This defInition of systemic risk does not 
differentiate between innocent parties and guilty parties. !d. 
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to diminish additional capital outflows and encourage inflows. 357 Thus, any resulting 
liquidity problems are likely to temporarily spill over to units indirectly affected by the 
initial shock.358 That is, the initial domino falls indirectly on other dominos, however, its 
fall forces market participants to examine nearby dominos until they can see if they are 
subject to the same destabilizing forces as forced to falL359 
In addition, systemic risk is often distinguished between rational or information-based 
systemic risk and irrational, noninformation-based random, or pure contagious systemic 
risk.360 According to this distinction, rational contagion assumes that investors 
(depositors) can differentiate among market participants based on their fundamentals. 361 
Random contagion, on the basis of the actions of uniformed agents, is considered more 
dangerous as it does not differentiate among participants, affecting and spilling over to both 
357 See id. 
358 See George Kaufman & Kenneth Scott, Does Bank Regulation Retard or Contribute to Systemic Risk?, 
Stanford Law School John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 211 (December 
2000) at 3-4, available at http:papers.ssm.com!paper.taf?abstact-id=257927 (last visited Jan. 15,2004). 
359 ld. at 4. 
360 /d. Under common shock contagion systemic risk, innocent parties are likely to be affected immediately 
during the sorting out period, however, in time will be sorted out by investors (depositors) from guilty parties. 
As a consequence, the empirical borderline between rational and irrational contagion is unclear and depends 
partially on the time horizon applied. Likewise, the distinction between "innocent" and "guilty" is not always 
clear even though innocent parties may be referred to as units that are widely perceived to be economically 
well-behaved, and guilty parties as economically insolvent, near-insolvent, or excessively leveraged units. See 
id. at 6. 
361 ld. at 5. 
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guilty and innocent parties, and thus seems to be broader and more difficult to contain.362 
Although random contagious systemic risk is relatively easy to discriminate between the 
innocent and the guilty ex-post the crisis, it is practically difficult to distinguish the one 
from the other ex-ante a crisis, because ex-ante information is frequently insufficiently 
available, timely, or reliable to make the distinction with confidence.363 
h. The Financial Fragility Proposition 
It is worthwhile to reexamine why systemic risk poses a special concern to the financial 
system. As noted briefly above, in a broad sense there are three interrelated characteristics 
of financial system for the driving forces behind the financial fragility proposition. That is, 
the features are the structure of banks, the interconnection of financial organizations 
through direct exposures and settlement systems, and the information intensity of financial 
contracts and related credibility problems.364 
362 ld. 
363 
364 See id. at 7. 
See De Bandt & Hartman, supra note 346, at 13-14. 
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First, as financial intennediaries banks engage in deposit-taking and loan-extension at 
the same time.365 Traditionally, banks take fixed-value deposits that can be 
unconditionally withdrawn at any time with a very short notice, and lend long tenn to 
industrial finns. 366 Since banks provide liquidity services, and act as a delegated monitors 
for depositors, a bank collects demand deposits, invests in illiquid long-tenn projects, and 
provides liquidity insurance to consumers facing uncertainty about the exact timing of their 
consumption.367 As a consequence, projects are illiquid because they can earn higher 
returns only if they remain funded until maturity, whereas premature liquidation reduces 
their value substantially. 368 In this way, banks add value since they allow depositors to 
pool their resources, and indirectly invest in high yield investment projects.369 However, 
in transfonning short-maturity liabilities to long-maturity assets, banks become susceptible 
365 There has always been a need for some mechanism for channeling the savings of households into the 
investments of industrial companies. From the viewpoint of financial markets, businesses demand capital, and 
will supply assets to the market to get this capital. Households are the final holders of these assets either 
directly or via engaging in various types of investments pools, and thus provide ultimate demand. In this way, 
a bank as the financial intermediary distributes resources between these two units of businesses and 
households. This is the fundamental role of a financial intermediary. 
366 See Douglas Diamond & Philip Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity, JOURNAL OF 





See Gallen, supra note 352, at 4. 
69 Id. 
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to runs, during which all depositors lose confidence and withdraw their funds prematurely. 
That is to say, only a small fraction of assets are required to be held in liquid reserves to 
encounter deposit withdrawals, thereby leading to illiquidity and even default when 
exceptionally high withdrawals occur and long term loans cannot be liquidated. 370 In short, 
this feature shows that the health and soundness of bank is both subject to the confidence of 
depositors in the value of the loan book, and their confidence that other depositors will not 
run the banks as well as to its success in picking profitable investment projects for 
lending. 371 This special characteristic has brought up a shift from a good equilibrium with 
bank intermediation to a bad bank run equilibrium, which has justified banking 
regulation.372 
Second feature is a complex network of exposures among banks and other financial 
intermediaries through the interbank money market, the large-value (wholesale) payments 
370 
See De Bandt & Hartman, supra note 346, at 13. 
371 See id. 
372 See Gallen, supra note 352, at 4. This special feature of banks is not applicable to other financial 
intermediaries, such as insurance companies and securities corporations unless banks and other intermediaries 
belong to the same financial conglomerate. See Goodhart et aI., supra note 344, at 1-37. 
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and security settlement systems.373 That is, systemic risk arises from inter-locking 
exposures among financial institutions, whether through equity, debt or participation in a 
common payments system. Since these exposures may be very large to banks at certain 
points during the business day, the financial difficulties at one bank may spread to other 
banks as they default on their payment obligations. As long as bank deposits are part of 
narrow money, banks create money.374 In this context, widespread bank failures have the 
potential to affect the money supply if depositors rather withdraw their funds in order to 
hold cash than shift their funds from one bank to another.375 This type of externality 
through the money supply emphasizes the specific nature of bank liabilities in serving as a 
method of payment. 376 Banks playa key role in wholesale and retail payment, and 
373 
See De Bandt & Hartman, supra note 346, at 14. 
374 When the bank makes a loan to a customer, the bank can supply the funds by giving the customer cash 
from the vault or a check on another bank, or by selling investment securities and giving the customer the 
proceeds. Any of these actions simply changes one kind of asset into another kind, cash for example, into a 
loan. The totals on the bank's balance sheet (its "footings") remain the same. Much more often, however, a 
bank makes a loan by crediting the amount of the loan to the customer's checking account. On the bank's 
books, this increases both assets and deposits, and consequently both assets and liabilities. The initial increase 
affects only the bank making the loan, but ultimately it affects the banking system as a whole. If we accept the 
fact that checkable deposits are money, or money substitutes, it is clear that banks, and banking system create 
money. 
375 
See Kaufman, supra note 352, at 6. 
376 See id. 
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settlement, thereby arising relevant externalities on the rest of economy. 377 No doubt 
securities or insurance subsidiaries can playa role in the tight network of financial linkages 
among institutions to the extent financial conglomerates encompass banks and other 
financial intermediaries as was discovered in the case ofBarings debac1e378 In short, the 
failure of one institution may have "knock-on" effects on the balance sheet of other 
institutions.379 
377 Immediate negative externalities throughout the economy, which bank failures may generate, are one of 
the main concerns about the possible effects of the millennium bug or Y2K problem. 
378 Since many deposit-taking institutions are major players in the securities market, their soundness can be 
affected by securities losses. That is, the failure of big securities fum encompassing banks and other financial 
intermediaries may bring about the disruption in the payment system resulting in a chain reaction of liquidity 
problems at other institutions. The collapse ofBarings in early 1995 provides an illustration of such 
intragroup contagion. The Barings failure due to rapidly accumulated trading losses in exchange-traded 
derivatives called attention the need to recast the form of external regulation dealing with risks associated 
with derivatives trading. Namely, the greater use of derivatives fro fmancial management and speculation has 
attracted considerable attention on their risks and led to several initiatives regarding regulation and 
Supervision, fums' internal controls, and reporting and disclosure. See Andrew Cornford, Risks and 
Derivatives Markets: Selected Issues, UNCTAD REVIEW 1995, at 189-212; see also Goodhart, et aI., supra 
note 344, at 39-43. Various risk management techniques used in securities and derivative markets, such as 
margin requirements and portfolio insurance, which are intended to limit ex ante risk, put an emphasis on 
large and immediate payments demands by banks and other fmancial intermediaries ex post, that is at times of 
big asset price changes, thereby applying usually to limit the potential of contagion in payment and settlement 
systems. See De Bandt & Hartman, supra note 346, at 32-36 for the fmancial intermediaries' interconnection 
through payment and settlement systems. 
379 See David Humphrey, Payments Finality and Risk of Settlement Failure, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS: SECURITIES, FUTURES AND BANKING 97-120 (Anthony Saunders & 
Lawrence White eds., 1986). 
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The third character is asymmetric information and control intensity of incomplete 
financial contracts.380 According to the information economics, there would be little role 
for financial markets and financial market regulation if information were perfect and 
markets were complete.381 The asymmetries of information-the differences in information, 
which are pervasive in all economies, between the lender and the borrower, the insurance 
company and the insured have shown the foundations for realistic theory of financial 
markets, explaining why those most in need of credit often cannot get the credit-
rationing. 382 Generally speaking, financial decisions aiming at the intertemporal allocation 
of purchasing power for consumption are derived from expectations on what the value of 
380 According to the free market ideology based on the economic theory attributed to Adam Smith, market 
forces-the profit motive-arguably drive the economy to efficient outcomes as ifby an invisible hand. However, 
recent crucial researches do not agree with Adam Smith's idea that markets by themselves lead to efficient 
outcomes asserted in his book, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS written in 1776. That is, whenever information is 
perfect or markets are incomplete, the invisible hand works most imperfectly and competitive equilibrium 
(constrained Pareto) is not efficient. Here come desirable government interventions, which improve in 
principle on the efficiency of the markets so that main activities of government can account for responses to 
the market failures. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, supra note 189, at 73-74,254 n. 2. 
381 See id at 74. 
382 Id at xi. With regard to the evaluation of various systemic events, the information and intensity of 
financial contracts highlight the significance of the distribution of information among the agents playing in 
the fmancial sector. In short, general uncertainty and agents' awareness of potential asymmetries of 
information stress the fact that the occurrence or nonoccurrence of systemic events are based on expectations. 
In this context, some distinguish three potential causes of narrow systemic events related to asymmetric 
information and expectations: (i) the full revelation of new information about the health offmancial 
institutions to the public; (ii) the release of a noisy signal (imperfect information) from outside sources about 
the health of financial institutions to the public; (iii) the occurrence of an imperfect signal which coordinates 
the expectations of the public without being actually related to the health of financial institutions. See D. Cass 
& K. Shell, Do Sunspots Matter?, JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 91 (1983) at 193-227; see also De 
Bandt & Hartman, supra note 131, at 14-15. 
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respective assets will be in the future or whether the future cash flows guaranteed in a 
financial contract would be satisfied. As a consequence, the increasing uncertainty or lack 
of credibility of financial commitments may cause market expectations, investment and 
divestment decisions to shift substantially and individually rationally in short periods of 
time.383 Furthermore, the asymmetric information problems can demonstrate how 
financial problems arise over an extended period of time before an efficient or inefficient 
cnsls occurs. Namely, the systemic event is just the effect of a more fundamental 
underlying problem, which has been unrevealed from policymakers or the general public 
for some time. 
As noted above, these three characters can be referred to as the major factors behind 
higher vulnerability of financial systems to systemic risk than other sectors in the economy. 
Furthermore, the increased linkages across markets and volatility in capital flows on the 
international platform may create rapid intermarket contagion and systemic events around 
383 This may result in large asset price fluctuations, whose sizes and directions cannot sometimes virtually 
explain through fundamental analysis alone, which attempts to predict asset price changes driven by the 
factors influencing the intrinsic values of assets, such as corporations' earnings influencing shares, and 
inflation rates influencing exchange rates. See R. Shiller, MARKET VOLATILITY, (1986), cited in De Bandt & 
Hartman, supra note 131, at 14, n.16. 
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the globe. In this context, one argues that bank regulators need to address four principal 
non-traditional areas of potential systemic risk present in the international financial system 
today?84 First, there is the threat of occurrence of a second sovereign debt crisis due to 
developing countries default on securitized debt obligations.385 Second, there is the threat 
that the remarkably increased exposure to foreign exchange and settlement risk as shown in 
the collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt in 1974. The concerns over this type of systemic risk 
arise from the fact that the current multicurrency clearing systems are not subject to 
regulatory oversight. 386 Third, the money laundering contagion can pose a systemic risk to 
the international financial system when financial institutions or communities are influenced 
by laundered funds of international criminal syndicates.387 Fourth, there is non-sovereign-
384 See Joseph J. Norton, International Financial Law, " An International Important Component of 
International Economic Law": A Tribute of Professor John H. Jackson, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 133, 142 (1999) 
(asserting that "[t]hese risks can only be addressed appropriately by financial institutions and international 
regulators working together in quasi-symbiotic "partnerships" ... ). 
385 These concerns are arguably aggravated by the widely disseminated holdings of these obligations among 
institutional investors and by the fact that the terms and conditions on instruments such as Brady Bonds do 
not benefit sovereign debt reschedulings or restructurings. See generally Philip R. Power, Sovereign Debt: 
The Rise of the Secondary Market and its Implications, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2701 (1996). 
386 See Norton, supra note 384, at 142. The collapse ofBankhaus Herstatt in 1974, known as "Herstatt Risk" 
i~ analyzed below. 
7 See id. 
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related cross-border financial crises contagion risk as evidenced by the East Asian financial 
crises in 1997.388 
Along with addressing the threat of systemic risk, there is a need for further research to 
identify whether historical bank failures and financial crises reflect systemic risk. In short, 
the evidence on systemic risk and historical experience should be addressed prior to 
searching for mechanisms dealing with systemic risk in terms of ex ante (preemptive) 
measures, such as prudential supervision and regulation to prevent inefficient and negative 
systemic events from arising and ex post policies in the form of crisis management as well. 
c. The Evidence on Systemic Risk 
Historically, there have been concerns that an individual bank run can trigger other 
banks' runs through depositors' reassessment of their bank's soundness and withdrawal of 
their funds. That is to say, do bank failures reflect systemic risk? In this context, there is 
a strong need to make an empirical analysis of systemic risk resulting from the classical 
388 Id. 
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bank run models and extensions of these models of single banks' fragility to models of 
multiple bank systems leading to the modem bank contagion in different countries and on 
the international platform.389 
To begin with, classical bank runs are not currently viewed as a major threat to the 
financial system in the industrialized country. This accrues from the adoption of deposit 
insurance schemes reducing incentive for depositors to withdraw their funds, and the fact 
that non-bank financial intermediation and financing through the capital markets give a 
reason for an increasing portion of the financial system.390 As a consequence, the risk of 
contagious bank failures may be considered as the classical case of systemic risk. Here is 
an introduction of econometric papers attempting to identify contagion effects although the 
full analysis of this issue is outside the scope of this study.391 A first approach tries to link 
bank failures with subsequent other bank failures directly by autocorrelation in terms of 
389 Some argues that the empirical evidence of contagious systemic risk depends on the definition as used. 
When systemic risk is defined as a broad big shock, systemic risk is observed more frequently. However, this 
definition is silent on the transmission of contagion. See Kaufman & Scott, supra note 358, at 8. 
390 See Kaufman, supra note 138, at 16. Nonetheless, the modern version of bank runs still poses a threat to 
the fmancial system since panics resulting from adverse events such as a default or failure are likely to occur 
in the wholesale markets and may cause solvency-threatening liquidity crises. See id. 
391 For the review of papers, see De Bandt & Hartman, supra note 436, at 36-42. 
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intertemporal correlation of bank failures. 392 A second group tests whether the survival 
time of banks decrease during historically identified episodes of panics or through other 
banks' failures with the application of a macroeconomic duration model in which bank 
survival is explained by a host of economic fundamentals such as individual bank balance 
sheet items, regional and national macroeconomic variables.393 Third, a most popular 
approach appraises the relationship between bank failures or news and other banks' stock 
market value in terms of event studies of bank stock price reactions in response to bad news. 
394 A fourth group focuses on the link between news or failures and deposit withdrawals at 
392 Some provide more evidence of intertemporal failure clustering in free banking markets through applying 
an analysis to data from the US Free Banking Era (1837 through 1863). See I. Hassan & G. Dwyer, Bank 
Runs in the Free Banking Period, JOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT, AND BANKING, Vol. 26 (1994), at 271-288. 
However, it is argued that this approach has some disadvantages: flrst, the negligence of macroeconomic 
factors exhibiting autocorrelation would discredit any evidence of contagion; second, the intertemporal 
contagion cannot be detected at shorter time intervals but only at the frequencies of macroeconomic data 
through this approach. See de Bandt & Hartman, supra note 346, at 37. 
393 Calomiris and Mason estimates the average survival time of thousand Fed member banks between January 
1930 and March 1933 during the Great Depression through an application of a macroeconomic duration 
model in which bank survival is explained by a host of economic fundamentals and some proxies of contagion, 
panics, or liquidity crises. See C. W. Calomiris & lR. Mason, Causes of u.s. Bank Distress During the 
Depression, NBER Working Paper, No. 7919 (2000). Although this approach could indicate the presence of 
some bank contagion effects in speciflc episodes during the Great Depression, most of these episodes have 
been contained remaining limited to a speciflc region of the U.S., and some of the reductions in survival 
duration this study observed might still be related to some unobservable regional or national fundamentals. 
See de Bandt & Hartman, supra note 346, at 38. 
394 According to this approach, contagion effects are identifled by comparing the normal return of a bank 
stock, as proclaimed by a standard capital market equilibrium model estimated with historical data, to the 
actually observed returns at the announcement date or during a window around this date. Bad news (such as 
the announcement of an unexpected increase in loan-loss reserves or the failure of a commercial bank or a 
country to serve its debt) for a bank leading to signiflcantly negative abnormal returns of another bank can be 
interpreted as evidence of contagious systemic risk. See de Bant & Hartman, supra note 346, at 38. 
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other banks, thereby keeping track of and analyzing deposit flows. 395 A fifth approach 
analyzes the effect of news or failures on the probability of other banks' defaults as 
perceived by market participants and reflected in risk premiums in interbank lending in the 
context of examinations of bank debt risk premiums.396 A final approach measures the 
Aharony and Swary addresses the effects of three largest bank failures in the U.S. before 1980: United 
States National Bank of San Diego in 1973, Franklin National bank of New York in 1974, and the Hamilton 
National Bank of Chattanooga in 1976. These three failures might arise from an idiosyncratic nature related to 
in-house fraud, illegal real-estate loans, or foreign exchange losses after the switch to floating exchange rates. 
This study shows that the Franklin National case, the failure of the 12th largest US bank at the time, brought 
about substantial negative abnormal returns in money-center, medium-size, and small banks while no external 
effects of the smaller two other cases occurred. See J. Aharony & 1. Swary, Contagion Effects of Failures: 
Evidence from Capital Markets, JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, Vol. 56, No.3 (1983), at 305-317. 
The results of adverse external stock market reactions to bad news have been subject to critical scrutiny. 
Some argues that this results can be interpreted as evidence of pure contagion effects, whereas others claim 
that they rather reflect rational investor choices in response to the revelation of new information. The general 
outcome of this hot debate is that abnormal returns varied in proportion as banks exposed to problem 
countries, which is consistent with the hypothesis of rational investor choice. Since most of these results are 
obtained through US data, they cannot apply to other financial systems. Moreover, the concept this study 
developed indicates weak systemic events, because stock price fluctuations do not imply failures. Although 
this approach may be efficient in proportion to actual exposures, it shows systemic repercussions in the broad 
sense. See De Bandt & Hartman, supra note 131, at 39-40. 
395 According to this approach, there is a contagion of bank run, if depositors withdraw funds from another 
bank in response to financial difficulties of a bank or a group of banks. Saunders addresses whether two key 
anoouncements regarding the shape of Continental Illinois Bank in A~ril and May 1984 had any noticeable 
effect on other banks' US or overseas deposits. Whereas the April 18 announcement of a US$400 million 
increase in the Continenetal's problem loans did not affect US depositors noticeably, the May 10th denial of 
rumors by the US Office of Comptroller Currency have seemingly triggered flight to quality (such as shifts to 
safer banks and more secure deposits) by big banks but not a general run. See A. Saunders, The Inter-bank 
Market, Contagion Effects and International Financial Crises, in THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
STABILITY 196-232 (R. Portes et al. eds., 1987). However, this approach can only address the occurrence of 
narrow systemic events in the weak sense. 
396 Carron shows that the Franklin National failure in New York in mid-1974 caused an increase in the 
quarterly average spread between US certificates of deposits (CDs) and three-month Treasury bills by a factor 
of at least six, which is consistent with systemic events via risk premiums. See A.S. Carron, Financial Crises: 
Recent Experience in u.s. and International Markets, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, No.2 
(1982), at 395-418. Jayanti and Whyte estimate statistically significant increase in the average certificate of 
deposit (CD) rates for both UK and Canadian banks after the Continental Illinois failure in May 1984. They 
show that the result is consistent with the international contagion effect visible in equity returns. See S.V. 
Jayanti & A.M. Whyte, Global Contagion Effects of the Continental Illinois Failure, JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS AND MONEY, Vol. 6, No.1, at 87-99 (1996).According 
to Saunders, the Continental Illinois failure did not lead to a decrease in the total of non-sterling deposits at 
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physical exposures among operating banks (or between those and banks which have been 
bailed out by the government) to assess whether a default would render other banks 
. I t 397 mso ven. 
According to the empirical studies on banking crises in the United States, there seems 
little empirical evidence of contagious systemic risk that renders economically solvent 
banks economically or legally insolvent either before or after the presence of federal 
government guarantees and deposit insurance schemes?98 The evidence shows that 
either American, Japanese or other overseas abnks in London in April or May, but an increase in risk 
premiums on the deposits generally. Saunders also concedes that the average spread between 3-month Euro-
dollar deposits and T -bills doubled during the Continental Illinois failure in April and May 1984, which is 
consistent with international systemic risk in the weak sense. See Saunders, supra note 395. 
As a test for contagion effects, this approach is similar to the application to equity returns in that it applies 
to risk premiums in debt rates. As a consequence, this study cannot usually address the occurrence of systemic 
events in the strong sense. Also, it does not occasionally clarify whether the effects measured originate in an 
aggregate shock (potentially revealed by a specific event) or are a reflection of a successive transmission. See 
De Bandt & Hartman, supra note 346, at 42. 
397 This approach measures directly whether exposures to certain (potentially or effectively failing) banks are 
larger than capital. Very Large exposures may occur temporarily vis-a-vis core institutions (large clearing 
banks), whereas in principle, banks are not permitted to lend more than a small share of their capital to a 
single borrower in accordance with prudential rules restricting large exposures. Kaufinan fmds some results 
from the US inquiry into the Continental Illinois case, one of the core institutions at the time. Notably, 65 
financial institutions had uninsured exposures larger than their capital to the bank shortly before the 
Continental Illinois failure. The Congressional study estimated that if the Continental's losses would have 
been 60 per cent, then 27 banks would have been legally insolvent, and 56 banks would have suffered to 
below 5 per cent, so that none of its correspondents suffered solvency-threatening losses. See George G. 
Kaufinan, Bank Contagion: A Review of the Theory and Evidence, JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 
RESEARCH, Vol. 7 (1994), at 123-150. 
This approach is strongly linked to empirical research on the impact of failures in payment and settlement 
systems. However, it cannot address the actual occurrence of systemic events, and it can just shows the ex 
ante risks as potential events in the future. See de Bandt & Hartman, supra note 346, at 42. 
398 See id. Some review a number of non-quantitative studies on the banking crises in US history between 
1873 and 1933, as well as quote a number of contemporaneous observers (arguing that "systemwide 
contagious bank runs were not a frequent occurrence in US history (probably occurring at most only in 1878, 
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financial difficulties at one bank or a group of banks spread to other banks, but they spill 
over almost exclusively only to banks with the same or similar portfolio risk exposures and 
subject to same shock.399 That is to say, there seems little empirical evidence on the 
insolvency of a bank which directly leads to the insolvency of other economically solvent 
banks, or deposit withdrawals at economically insolvent banks resulting in bank runs and 
the insolvency ofthe banks.4oO 
Even though the empirical assessment of the systemic risk potential on the international 
platform is undoubtedly essential in shaping and evaluating the future supervisory and 
regulatory framework, there is the lack of appropriate data, and empirical studies on 
systemic risk in other countries and financial systems. Furthermore, even bank equity 
1893,1908, and 1931-1933 and doing major damage probably only in 1893 and 1931-1933), and that fear of 
widespread ripple effects did not appear to be of major concern to most students of U.S. banking 
before1932"). See George J. Benston et aI., PERSPECTNES ON SAFE AND SOUND BANKING: PAST, PRESENT, 
AND FUTURE 70 (1986). For fmal comments, they concluded in asserting that "U.S. history suggests that runs 
on individual banks or groups of banks only rarely spread to other banks that are not subject to the same 
conditions that started the runs, and that most banks runs have been contained by appropriate action, with only 
minimal or short-lived effects on national fmancial stability and economic activity. Generally, the instability 
of individual banks or groups of banks has not translated into instability in the banking system as a whole. 
The major exception was the run on all banks in late 1932 through early 1933, which caused the banking 
system to grind to almost a complete halt and substantially reinforced the economic crisis at the time. 
Although an exception, this event was so traumatic that it has colored analysis of bank runs and failures ever 
since." See id. at 77. With respect to the bank runs in Chicago, in June 1932 during the Great Depression, 
Benston et ai. asserted that "these failures occurred primarily because of adverse local business conditions 
rather than because of spillover from other failed banks outside their market areas." /d. at 62. 
399 See Kaufman, supra note 347 at 8. 
400 [d. 
152 
returns, debt risk premiums, deposit flows or physical exposures for European, Japanese or 
emerging market countries have not been studied thoroughly. In the circumstances, there 
seems little empirical evidence on the potential for systemic risk in Europe. This may 
account for the fact that the appropriate data such as interbank lending for Europe is rare or 
virtually absent. Recent studies attempt to evaluate the threat of systemic risk in European 
banking employing correlations between stock returns of European banks and bank stock 
indexes, respectively, as interdependencies between banks.401 Arguably, the results of 
these empirical studies show that the systemic risk potential has increased at the European 
arena, and that there exists a threat of systemic risk in European countries.402 Nonetheless, 
to support this argument, further empirical and theoretical studies are needed. 
401 See Martin. Schueler, The Threat of Risk in Banking-Evidence for Europe, ZEW Discussion Paper, No. 
02-21 (2002) (calculating rolling-window correlations between bank stock returns of the 60 largest European 
banks, after controlling for national influences in bank stock returns); see also M. Schroeder & M. Schueler, 
Systemic Risk in European Banking-Evidencefrom Bivariate GARCH Models ZEW Discussion Paper (2003) 
(estimating bivariate GARCH models between excess returns of bank stock indexes of 13 European countries: 
ftrst, testing for structural banks in 1994, as a consequence of the second banking directive, and the 
introduction of the euro in 1999, second, testing for the signiftcance of a trend variable in the covariance 
equation ofthe GARCH model). 
402 See Martin Schueler, How do Banking Supervisors Deal with Europe-wide Systemic Risk?, ZEW 
Discussion Paper, No. 03-03, at 5 (July 21,2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlabstact id=412460 (last 
visited Feb. 1,2004). 
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As noted above, the results of existing econometric tests for bank contagion effects are 
still limited to data for the United States. . Thus, there is a need for more empirical research 
on other financial systems to identify the significance and character of bank contagion in 
terms of systemic risks, but this agenda may encounter any challenges on account of the 
adoption of safety nets in a number of countries. Historical experiences of bank failures in 
terms of systemic risk are demonstrated below. 
d. Historical Experiences 
i. The Collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt in 1974 
In 1974, the world economy experienced a traumatic distress due to a catastrophic 
combination of the sharp increase in oil price, a sharp rise in interest rates on the sovereign 
loans, a global recession, and exchange rate volatility. In particular, the new regime of 
floating exchange rates brought about a new problem: exchange or currency risk.403 Since 
403 See Kapstein, GOVERNING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND THE STATE, supra note 
209, at 38 (noting that "[i]ndeed, it is somewhat ironic that flexible exchange rates increased [the] mutual 
sensitivity to bank failures ... "). That is to say, economists and central bankers expected that the new regime 
did the opposite when it came to macroeconomic policy: under fixed rates, central bankers had little 
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the early 1970s and the collapse of Bretton Woods, banks and all other players in the 
international financial market have been exposed to new levels of exchange rate or 
currency risk.404 That is, all the entities participating in the international financial markets 
have been necessitated to catch up with the probability of unforeseen changes in exchange 
rates such as sharp changes in the value of domestic and foreign money in the foreign 
exchange markets. In particular, bank traders sometimes responded to unanticipated 
exchange-rate changes by taking further positions in the hope of recouping losses. 
Moreover, the creation of innovative financial instruments has driven international financial 
markets toward the direction of a tremendous foreign currency movement. In order to 
satisfy the worldwide currency needs of their clients facilitating their international trade and 
business transactions, banks borrowed needed funds from other banks, both foreign and 
autonomy; their policies had to be formulated with respect to those being set abroad, in order to maintain the 
value of the currency; By contrast, under floating rates, it appeared that economic policies could be set 
independently, as long as the government and central bank were willing to accept the change rate 
consequences. In this context, one argues that interdependence has crucial implications for both 
macroeconomic and banking policy. See generally Robert M. Dunn Jr., The Many Disappointments of 
Flexible Exchange Rates, Princeton Essays in International Finance (1983). 
404 Kapstein notes that foreign exchange trading paused two risks to banks: credit risk and currency risk. The 
former arises when a purchaser of foreign exchange contract, usually a bank would not pay after receiving 
foreign exchange, as shown in the collapse of the Herstatt Bank of Germany in 1974. The latter arises from 
unhedged currency movements. That is, a bank suffers tremendous losses when it is in an unhedged position 
in a currency with a bad bet as was the Franklin National Franklin Bank in 1974. See Ethan B. Kapstein, 
Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma: International Coordination of Banking Regulations, INT'L ORG. Vol. 43, 
No.2 (Spring 1989), at 334. 
155 
domestic through interbank market because they kept little foreign exchange in their 
vaults.405 In this context, the growth of foreign exchange trading has propelled the 
international interdependence of banking industry. 406 
Whereas banks recognized the potential profits in the sharp currency movement, 
thereby playing a more speculative game with a bad bet, a number of banks and financial 
institutions suffered tremendous losses by failing to hedge against foreign exchange 
exposures or in direct foreign currency tradings due to their inexperience to manage 
currency risk. As a result, bank failures at the domestic level would spread overseas and 
led to the financial problems at the regional and international arenas, because bank 
supervisors and regulators were not aware of the remedies coping with this type ofrisks.407 
405 See Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy, supra note 209, at 38. 
406 See id. 
407 In dealing with this unprecedented risk, three types of controls were implemented by responsible 
management of a bank to restrict the excessive speculation of its foreign exchange department and to ensure 
its fulfillment of careful analysis of borrowers. Firstly, establishing definite limits on the bank's position in 
various foreign currencies; secondly, internal controls to ensure such limits were honored; finally, a credit 
analysis system to ensure borrowers' repayment of their foreign exchange loans. However, these seemingly 
simple measures to design in theory were not successfully executed in practice. This was due to the facts that 
bank managers could not but respect account officers' efforts to increase their foreign exchange limits to 
satisfy the demands of clients, and that during the early 1970s, bank managers could not get real-time data on 
the institution's foreign exchange position under the internal accounting and operating systems of banks. 
Furthermore, banks could not easily protect themselves from fraudulent attempts by some account officers 
and traders to benefit from the bank's foreign exchange book. See Kapstein, supra note 209, at 38-39. 
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It took only one year to draw global attention to focus on the need to deal with a bank 
failure driven by this risk after the adoption of floating exchange rate system. 
The collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt in Cologne, Germany in June 1974 due to the severe 
changes in foreign exchange trading conditions had the most significant impact on the rest 
of world, whereas a number of banks suffered the heavy foreign exchange losses.408 
Herstatt, a medium-sized commercial bank in Cologne, West Germany, was founded in 
1955, and had over 50,000 customers and assets over DM2 billion after less than 20 years. 
As a major player in the foreign exchange market, Herstatt had been notorious for 
overtrading, taking foreign exchange trades that were very large relative to its capital. In 
particular, Herstatt had been wildly speculating on the direction of a currency movement in 
the foreign exchange markets, borrowing in different currencies from banks around the 
globe, and it had lost the speculative game. As a consequence, Herstatt had suffered 
tremendous losses in foreign exchange tradings, which the bank's foreign exchange 
408 See John Cooper, THE MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION OF BANKS 6,23,241 (1984); see also Richard 
Dale, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 156-157(1984}. 
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department had concealed with its fraudulent bookkeeping.409 In short, Herstatt's fraud, 
and incompetence to deal with the risks it took in the foreign exchange market led to the 
huge losses that expedited its collapse. 
Upon discovering Herstatt's fraudulent concealing of exchange losses410 exceeding half 
the book value of its assets, and its insolvency, the Gennan Banking authorities abruptly 
revoked Herstatt's license, stopped clearing payments for Herstatt's accounts, and closed 
the bank on June 26, 1974 at the close of business (4:00 PM). The timing of the closure 
left uncompleted a large number of payment commitments in the amount of millions of 
dollars of spot foreign exchange transactions, which had been entered into two days 
earlier,411 thereby taking several months to unravel the ensuing tangle.412 By the time the 
409 See id. 
410 Herr Daniel Dattel, the Chief Foreign Exchange Dealer at Herstatt was responsible for the exchange losses 
that exceeded $200 million at the time of the closure. See Outrageous Consequences of Bundesbank's Over-
hasty Reaction, International Currency Review, Vol. 6, No.4 (July-August 1974), at 21. 
411 Herstatt's capital losses were estimated to be in excess ofDM 1.2 billion as a consequence of excessive 
uncovered foreign exchange conditions and bad debts. See H.J. Muller, The Concordat: A Model for 
International Cooperation, Paper presented for the International Conference of Banking Supervisors (London, 
JUly 5-6, 1979), at 65. 
412 Due to the lack of clarity in several legal issues, the number of parties involved, and the complexity of the 
transactions, it took approximately 11 months of negotiations among all the pertinent creditors to reach an 
agreement and distribute available funds. Notably, all the pertinent parties sought an out-of-court settlement 
although legal actions also aimed at the establishment of who owed to what to whom, and thereby disbursing 
ofHerstatt funds held in New York. Interestingly, authority to close a bank in West Germany rests with the 
Bundesbankaufsichtsampt fuer das Kreditwesen rather than the Bundesbank, the Gernan central bank. Even 
though the Bundesbank did not apparently played any role in the Herstatt's debacle, it was the target of 
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bank was closed in Gennany, it was still during business hours in New York (10:00 AM), 
and London (3:00 PM). Herstatt's global correspondents had paid Deutschemarks to 
Herstatt to fulfill maturing foreign exchange contracts at the end of Gennan business day in 
the expectation that they would receive US dollars later that day at the close of business in 
New York. When Chase Manhattan, Herstatt's New York correspondent received a notice 
ofthe closure, Herstatt declined to honor $620 million in payment orders and checks drawn 
on its account. The Gennan banking authorities' abrupt closure ofthe bank aborted the 
settlement of millions of dollars offoreign exchange contracts caused the New York's 
counterparties' exposure to the full value ofDM deliveries made, and thereby leading to the 
collapse of the United States clearing and international banking systems.413 As it is known 
litigation on charges negligence for clearing for Herstatt during the few hours between the closure of 
negotiations between Herstatt and the Bundesbankaufsichtsampt fuer das Kreditwesen and the actual 
revocation of the bank's license. The litigation was not successful since the Bundesbank owed no particular 
duty to the plaintiffs. All creditors, including depositors with accounts over $7,500 lost money as a result of 
the collapse, since the deposit insurance scheme did not exist in Germany at this time. See E. Gerald Corrigan, 
The Statement Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (May 3, 1990), at 
17-18,20-21. 
413 The international financial community experienced payment problems. The problems are dislocations in 
the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS), which is the most significant large dollar clearing 
system had to be shut down while Herstatt's settlemt debts were declined to cover by German authorities. 
That is, New York's corresponding banks, for their own or customers' accounts, would decline to make 
payments until they received confirmation that countervalues had been received. As a result, large balances 
held in New York's correspondents were not covered. Since large international payments are made through 
the mechanism of the CHIPS in New York, the incompletion of payments led to in a chain of reaction of 
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as "Herstatt Risk"-the time lapse between payment of foreign currencies and the receipt 
of US dollars in foreign exchange transactions: cross-border settlement risks for banks-, 
the corresponding dollar payments were left unsettled in New York, while the DM portion 
of these transactions had been transferred to Herstatt. 
Also, the Herstatt failure triggered the crucial tiering of interbank interest rates, with 
premiums as high as 200 basis points charged to even the largest banks and less credit-
worthy borrowers excluded from the market effectively. As a consequence, the 
international liquidity was reduced sharply due to the mobility of funds from the 
Euromarket to domestic markets and lenders discriminated against borrowers. Moreover, 
the global economy encountered dislocations in the international interbank sector of the 
Eurocurrency market because of the lack of information about the allocation of spot 
transaction losses and the expectation of prospective losses on forward transactions with 
Herstatt. This credit crisis caused by the absence of reliable information regarding the 
exact nature and extent oflosses incurred to Herstatt and the counterparties triggered 
nonpayment under a tightly linked system. The daily clearing drop was estimated to be $24 billion from the 
usual $60 billion to average $36 billion over the three days after the collapse. 
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market participants' withdrawal of credit lines from banks that could sustain counterparty 
losses involved whether they had dealt with Herstatt directly or not. A number of banks 
had to pay far above the current London Interbank Offer Rate whereas others could not 
borrow at all.414 
In the meantime, the German banking authorities faced harsh criticism in the wake of 
the Herstatt debacle.41s The controversies ran over the negligence of the German 
regulatory authorities. It is argued that the German central bank, the Deutche Bundesbank 
should have honored Herstatt's debts, and intervened in the foreign exchange markets in 
order to support less credit-worthy banks, which had been shut out. That is to say, if the 
German authorities had waited to the closure of business in New York before closing the 
Herstatt, the counterparty losses would have been greatly reduced. Thus, the counterparty 
losses arose from the asynchronous exchange in payment systems due to differences in time 
zones rather than Herstatt's exchange losses.416 It deserves noting "much ofthe spillover 
form the Herstatt Bank to other banks from these transactions represents more of a 
414 See Herring & Litan, supra note 64, at 96. 
415 See Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy, supra note 209, at 40. 
416 See Kaufman, supra note 347, at 10. 
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government risk than a market risk.,,417 In this respect, there was arguably no other bank's 
failure as a consequence ofthe Herstatt collapse.418 In response to the critics, the German 
authorities justified their actions by stating their intent to give a lesson to both bank dealing 
with speculators and speculators.419 Ironically, the Germans established subsequently a 
new set of regulations coping with foreign exchange trading, which reflected some self-
criticism on the part of the German banking authorities.42o 
The Herstatt failure highlighted the need for bank regulators and supervisors cooperative 
efforts toward keeping pace with the expansion of international banking and the growing 
interdependence of financial markets. In this regard, the Herstatt collapse compelled 
banking supervisors in different countries to regularly correspond with one another, and 
share necessary information, which would soon become the formalized process by the 
417 See id. at 11. Notably, in a number of countries, evidence of contagious systemic risk in banking is 
frequently confused with crises arising from the freezing, confiscation or devaluation of deposits (either in 
domestic or foreign currency) or the defaulting on bank held govermnent securities by govermnents. That is to 
say, the bank problems frequently arise from the use of the banks by the govermnents to pursue their 
nonbanking policies rather than from the actions of the banks themselves in their banking activities. These 
crises may be referred to as govermnent created crises rather than bank created crises. See Kaufman & Scott, 
supra note 358, at 14. As shown in the recent Russian crisis, the crises almost always reflect notorious abuses 
that were permitted if not endorsed by govermnent, and the govermnent's incompetence to resolve banks' 
insolvency in a timely and efficient manner. See Mark Whitehouse, Frustration soars for Russian bank 
depositors., Wall Street Journal, April 8, 1999, at A14. 
418 See id. 
419 See E. P. Davis, Instability in the Euromarkets and the Economic Theory of Financial Crisis, Bank of 
England Discussion Papers 43 (October 1983), at 3. 
420 See Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy, supra note 209, at 40. 
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Group ofTen central bank govemors.421 The aftermath of the foreign exchange related 
losses suffered by the Herstatt debacle and the closure of Franklin National in New York in 
1974422 triggered the establishment of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.423 
That is, it is widely recognized that the establishment of the Basel Committee resulted from 
421 See id. at 41. In spite of banking crises of the Herstatt failure and the Frankilin National's collapse, and the 
growing interdependence of financial markets, the Group ofTen central bank governors' meeting in July 
1974 at the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) could not answer the troubling question of whether 
emergency liquidity assistance would be available to banks active in the international interbank market. The 
meeting could not reach an agreement on which central bank would provide lender-oflast-resort assistance to 
banks, in what amount, and under what condition. By contrast with the United States, the Germans would not 
explicitly state for some reasons: firstly, the Deutsche Bundesbank did not have the formallender-of-Iast-
resort powers, which were authorized by a Liquidity Consortium Bank established in response to the Herstatt 
failure; secondly the Bundesbank declined any commitments to providing emergency liquidity assistance to 
failed banks due to illegal or highly risky activities because it considered central bankers' making explicit 
commitments as moral hazard. See Joan Spero, THE FAILURE OF THE FRANKLIN NATIONAL BANK 154 (1980). 
Under the circumstances, the uncertainty over whether the lender of last resort would operate can also 
destabilize and precipitate the systemic crisis, whereas it may intensify market discipline over some banks. 
Otherwise, market discipline is weakened in proportion with market participants' expectation of the central 
banks to come to the rescue. Shortly, the vagueness cannot accomplish the two apparently designed 
objectives: ensuring market discipline and reducing systemic risk. See Herring & Litan, supra note 64, at 97-
98. Despite the disagreement on emergency liquidity assistance for international banks, the central bank 
governors recognized the growing interdependence of fmancial markets, the necessity of cooperation among 
bank regulators and supervisors around the globe. 
422 On May 10, 1974, the twentieth largest bank in the Unites States, the Franklin National suffered a series 
of deposit runs following substantial losses in foreign exchange trading entailed by its book-keeping 
malpractices. Owing to the bank's aggressive expansion, the bank encountered a number of difficulties 
including excessive gearing, aggressive maturity mismatching, and bond trading, speculation on interest rate 
movements, poor asset quality, over-dependence on purchase funds and foreign exchange losses. The Federal 
Reserve authorities' fear that the failure of the Franklin National could drive a nationwide depositor run, and 
an international banking crisis led to support the ailing institution. However, the bank was closed on October 
8, 1974 although as lender of last resort the Fed provided the bank with more than $1.7 billion in funds. The 
Fed took over the bank's foreign exchange operations under the guarantee that the Franklin National would 
not leave its foreign creditors unpaid as did the Herstatt. The Federal Reserve also acted to prop up the bank's 
London branch, extending the lender-of-Iast-resort provision overseas. In the meantime, it must be noted that 
the bank was already in big trouble as to its domestic and international operations. At the domestic level, the 
Franklin National had suffered from weak management, a weak loan portfolio, poor investments and heavy 
reliance on short-term funding. At the international level, the bank faced a remarkable decrease in its earnings, 
and a massive liquidity problem resulting from the heavy foreign exchange losses. See Kapstein, supra note 
209, at 41-42; see also Walker, supra note 203, at 26-28. 
423 See Kapstein, supra note 209, at 44-48; Herring & Litan, supra note 64, at 98-101; see also Walker, supra 
note 203, at 35-39, 155-156. 
163 
the aftereffect ofthe Herstatt and Franklin National's fraud, and incompetence to deal with 
foreign exchange risk and the fear of contagious systemic risk leading to a global banking 
cnsls. However, as pointed out in the next sub-chapter, the crucial point to note is that the 
creation ofthe Basel Committee arguably resulted more from hegemony of the most highly 
industrialized countries in terms of hegemonic stability than from their concerns over 
systemic risk leading to a global banking crisis. 
ii. The Failure of Continental Illinois Bank in 1984 
The collapse ofthe Continental Illinois Bank, the seventh biggest bank in the United 
States, with total assets in excess of $40 billion in May 1984 provides a model case of a 
bank that had combined high leverage with a risky portfolio in its reckless pursuit of market 
share, and also provides some measures ofthe potential for financial knock-on effects.424 
Prior to the failure, 2,299 banks had credit exposures to the Continental Illinois, the largest 
correspondent bank in the country. The bank management's failure in its job of asset and 
424 See Kapstein, supra note 209, at 108-109. 
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liability management brought about rumors about asset quality leading to institutional 
investors' withdrawals of their deposits.425 Despite the emergency infusion of Federal 
Reserve cash in response to the bank's request for a $6 billion injection of the Fed funds to 
meet its immediate obligations, the bank collapsed, and a federal bailout followed.426 
Since the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) fully protected the creditors at 
the time, no bank suffered any 10sses.427 Even though all creditors had not been fully 
425 See id. at 109. Public announcements of millions of dollars of losses due to bad domestic oil loans 
triggered depositors and creditors into a run on the bank. That is to say, the Continental Illinois' problems 
were traceable to large anticipated loan losses in the bank's loan portfolios for energy, agriculture, and heavy 
industry. What is worse, a senior loan officer had purchased many bad loan participations from Penn Square 
Bank after receiving a large personal loan from that bank. As a consequence, rumors about the bank's 
problems started to circulate within the financial community, which caused the bank to lose $4billion in 
deposits in three days. See Kidwell et. aI., supra note 313, at 379, 493. 
426 See Kapstein, supra note 209, at 109. In the aftermath of the Continental Illinois debacle, the Federal 
Reserve wanted the banks to make their every effort to strengthen their balance sheets though the financial 
markets before any of them had to ask for the federal government's assistance. One source of the Continental 
Illinois problems at this time is that the off-balance-sheet items accumulating in big institutions were not 
considered under the fixed capital-to-asset ratio scheme which required banks to hold $5.50 of capital 
(defmed as shareholders' equity and the loan-loss reserve) for every 100 of assets regardless of the asset 
quality or the type of asset held. As a consequence, U.S. bank regulators and supervisors began to search for a 
new capital adequacy standard as illustrated in detail in the next chapter. See id. at 110. Also, the debacle led 
to a wide scale reexamination of the management practices of large money-center banks. See Kidwell at. aI., 
supra note 313, at 379. 
427 See Kaufman & Scott, supra note 358, at 10. Bank regulators responded promptly to the problems: firstly, 
the Federal Reserve provided the bank with discount-window loans. Next, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Cooperation (FDIC) guaranteed all the deposits of the bank's depositors and creditors (not just those with 
deposits up to $100.000). Thirdly, $1.5 billion was added to the bank's declining capital base by the FDIC. As 
the bank's subsequent bailout, the FDIC provided open bank assistance with a full protection of all the bank's 
creditors and depositors, but left the original stockholders with practically nothing. However, deep criticism 
has run on these regulatory measures. In short, the FDIC seemingly preferred the arrangement of purchase 
and assumption transactions at the time of a large bank's failure to liquidate it for many years. Then, at the 
time of the Continental Illinois debacle in 1984, the "too big to fail" policy produced a two-tiered banking 
system. Thus, federal regulators guaranteed 100 percent of deposits of all the bank's depositors to be paid 
irrespective of how large the deposit size was or how poorly the bank performed. This policy to resolve the 
Continental Illinois failure was also implemented in conjunction with other large banks' failures. See Kidwell 
et. aI., supra note 313, at 486, 493-494. 
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protected, the losses would not have been very much. 428 That is, some 1,325 banks 
exposed to less than $100,000, and were thus fully insured by the FDIC. In spite of the 
remainder's exposure to some risk, according to a study of the staff of the House Banking 
Committee, only 27 banks would have suffered losses in excess of their reported capital 
and insolvent, if the Continental Illinois' loss had been as large as 60 cents on the dollar (a 
recovery rate on assets of only 40 percent), which was more than ten times either the 
estimated loss or the actual loss as of the time of its resolution.429 These losses would have 
been just $137 million. Another 56 banks would have suffered losses equal to between 50 . 
and 99 percent of their total capital in an amount totaling $237 million. According to the 
study, no bank would have suffered a loss greater than its capital, and only two banks 
would have suffered losses in excess of 50 percent of their capital, if the Continental 
Illinois' loss had been as large as 10 cents on the dollar, more than twice the actualloss.43o 
This study shows that banks had apparently acted for the protection of themselves through 
428 See id. 
429 See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Supervision, 
Regulation, and Insurance, Hearing (1984), Inquiry into the Continental Illinois Corp. and Continental Illinois 
National Bank (98-11), 98th Congo 2nd Sess., September 18-19. 
430 See id. 
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limiting their uninsured exposures to their capital and monitoring their positions 
carefully.431 Moreover, it seemed that no bank with insured deposits at the Continental 
Illinois would have collapsed if these deposits had been uninsured.432 Arguably, with 
regard to banks, at least in the United States, there is little evidence of contagious systemic 
risk that causes economically solvent banks to become economically or legally insolvent, 
either before or after the introduction of federal government guarantees and insurance.433 
431 See Kaufman & Scott, supra note 358, at 10. 
432 /d. The Continental Illinois case required regulators to note more strict regulations for two reasons: Firstly, 
as a result of the bank failures of the 1970s and early 1980s, Congress was losing confidence in their 
supervisory capacities, given their recent track record, and would demand new regulations; secondly, 
otherwise, an undesirable message might be transmitted throughout the banking community. The regulators 
did not want bankers to misunderstand that the Federal Reserve's saving the seventh-largest bank would be 
extended to save any large institution irrespective of the quality of its management and the standard qf its loan 
portfolio. Moreover, they did not want observers to infer that the United States was now willing to provide 
emergency liquidity assistance for the banks out oftheir third world debts without any satisfactory adjustment 
on the part of banks because they were apparently concerned about the moral hazard problem. See Kapstein, 
supra note 209, at 109. 
433 See Kaufman & Scott, supra note 358, at 8. According to Kaufinan and Scott, the evidence strongly 
suggests that "in the absence of de-jure deposit insurance, depositors and other bank creditors take sufficient 
protective action on their own to greatly reduce the probability both of losses to themselves and of spillover to 
other banks. The externality of contagion appears to be price by the market. This conclusion holds even when 
there appears to be some positive probability that some or all the effected claimants may be ex-post partially 
or totally protected de-facto. It is also likely that the event stronger protective actions would have been taken 
by most bank stakeholders in the absence of regulations or other regulatory actions that project a perception of 
safety." See id. at 14. In this context, it should be noted that the fmancial safety net usually exists de facto, if 
not de jure, even in countries with no formal deposit insurance scheme in place nor an official discount 
window facility at the central bank. Under the protection of a government safety net, a number of countries 
have adopted deposit insurance schemes to protect depositors from losses resulting from bank failures. 
Furthermore, central banks operate as a lender of last resort either by giving liquidity assistance to an 
individual bank or by maintaining liquidity to the system as a whole. Some highlight that the safety net has its 
reason for being in reducing the likelihood of bank runs. See Douglas Diamond & Philip Dybvig, Bank Runs, 
Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 91, No.3 (1994), at 401-419. 
However, the scheme has a negative side-effect because of its creation of incentives for excessive risk taking 
by bank managers. Meanwhile, it should be note the difference between deposit insurance and bank bailout 
policies on a bank's risk-taking incentives. Under the deposit insurance scheme, a bank failure causes loss of 
shareholders' entire investment and managers' jobs. By contrast, a bank bailout with taxpayers' funds or 
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The Continental Illinois debacle is a significant case in both the international banking 
regulation and bank management practices in that a new regulatory approach with regard to 
bank capital was forming within the U.S. Federal Reserve system, whereas the debate over 
international banking supervision continued. In that context, some argue that" ... an 
international agenda to strengthen the banking system emerged in 1983-84, not as 
collective solution to the third world debt crisis on the part of central-bank governors, but 
as an outcome of domestic politics in the United States.,,434 At the time, bank capital was 
subject to critical scrutiny as a domestic political issue in the United States. In particular, 
the issue of bank capital had been an ongoing agenda item for the U.S. Congress as it 
through a last-Iender-of-resort facility causes managers and shareholders to lose their stake in the bank only to 
the extent that this is required as a part of the rescue package (through management package or 
recapitalization). As a consequence, the point to note is that both deposit insurance and bank bailouts protect 
depositors, thereby eliminating their incentives to monitor and impose discipline on the bank, whereas 
expected rescues may provide bank mangers with incentives for risk-taking. Namely, bank managers will tend 
to take more risk than the creditors would accept if they were uninsured, because banks do not encounter the 
outcomes of investing in projects with highly expected returns other than high risks. Asa consequence, the 
safety net can be a source of moral hazard. See George Berger, Reforming Insurance and the Regulatory 
System: the Failure of the Middle Way, THE CATO JOURNAL, Vol. 14, No.2 (Fall 1994). Most governments 
are inclined to rescue a troubled bank, because the political pressure for the rescue is usually very strong. In 
this respect, the moral hazard tends to exist even without an official safety net scheme. Although limiting the 
size and scope of the safety net can reduce moral hazard problem in banking, moral hazard appears almost 
inherent to banking unless governments are expected to commit not to bailout failed banks despite the scheme. 
Moreover, some note that a positive level of moral hazard resulting from safety net schemes might be 
unavoidable or optimal to contain the systemic costs or monetary disturbances associated with financial crises. 
See Charles Goodhart & H. Huang, A Model of the Lender of Last Resort, L.S.E. Financial Markets Group 
Discussion Paper, No. 313 (1999), cited in De Bandt & Hartmann, supra note 346, at 25. 
434 See Ethan B. Kapstein, Supervising International Banks: Origin and Implications of the Basle Accord, 
Princeton Essays in International Finance, No. 185 (December 1991) at 12. 
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debated what to do about increasing the International Monetary Fund's quota since the debt 
crisis in 1982.435 In the circumstances, the failure of Continental Illinois compelled 
American regulators to recognize the inadequacy of existing prudential regulations in the 
context of the myriad risks that banks encountered, and brought them the urgent attention 
on the need for a more comprehensive capital adequacy framework.436 As discussed below, 
it must be noted that the U.S. Congress' concern over the competitiveness in response to 
u.s. commercial banks' argument oftheir loss in a relative competitiveness in relation both 
to foreign banks and nonblank financial institutions rather than their concern about the 
safety and soundness ofthe international financial system drove the internationalization of 
bank regulatory standards, particularly capital adequacy standards. 
435 See id. at 14. 
436 See Glenn Tobin, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL ADEQUACY NEGOTIATION: A CASE STUDY (1989), cited in 
Ethan Kapstein, Between Power and Purpose: Central Bankers and the Politics of Regulatory Convergence, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, Vol. 46, No.1 (Winter 1992) at 277. 
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B. The Movement Toward Global Standards in Banking 
As noted above, in the aftennath of financial disruption in international currency and 
banking markets suffered by the failure of the Bankhaus Herstatt and the closure of the 
Franklin National Bank in 1974, concerns over the need for unifonnity in global banking 
standards began to spread among industrialized countries' bank regulators in the mid-1970s. 
The rationale for the standardization of unitary global banking standards was that even 
though banks were increasingly multinational and deregulated, monitoring and regulating 
cross-border banking practices remained the province of national regulatory and 
supervisory authorities. That is to say, it is widely recognized that a dramatic expansion 
and diversification of global banking activities posed challenges to national authorities in 
dealing with systemic risk, and maintaining the stability and soundness of banks 
incorporated in their home countries through domestic bank regulation, and thereby drove a 
movement toward unifonn global standards in banking. 
However, the significant point to note is that hegemony of the Western powers began a 
( 
drive to move for the internationalization of bank regulatory standards in tenns of 
170 
hegemonic stability more than their concerns about systemic risk leading to a global 
banking crisis. That is, the United Kingdom's concern over how to supervise a number of 
foreign banks active on her territory in the early 1970s was the most powerful driving force 
behind the uniformity of standards in banking. As a matter of fact, by the early 1970s, 
London had become a host to a group of multinational banks in search of regulatory refuge, 
particularly from the United States, thereby reestablishing itself as a hub of global finance, 
partly thanks to the financial deregulation that attracted foreign banks' activities with 
branches and subsidiaries in the city.437 The presence of over two hundred foreign banks 
with branches in London raised a host of supervisory issue concerning who would become 
a lender oflast resort in the event of financial disturbances.438 Namely, the Bank of 
England wanted to make sure that these branches active in London would be rescued by 
their home country's central bank when the one of these branches failed. Furthermore, 
London confronted the increasing challenges from other financial centers for fresh 
437 See Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma, supra note 404, at 329; Kapstein, Supervising 
International Banks, supra note 434, at 5; see also Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy, supra note 209, 
at 44. 
438 See id. 
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investment from other banks in reestablishing itself as an offshore financial center, and 
unilateral regulation would have eroded this effort.439 
In the circumstances, the United Kingdom as one of the international financial market 
powers played a key role in initiating a drive to move for the unitary global bank regulatory 
standards.440 
1. The Creation of the Basel Committee 
The aftereffect of banking crises of 1974 fueled the United Kingdom's drive to search 
for the regulatory and supervisory mechanism monitoring and regulating the complex 
cross-border lending and borrowing activities of multinational banks. That is, at that time 
the Bank of England's first concern was to address problems with the current domestic 
439 See Kapstein, supra note 404 at 329, n.l6. 
440 The Bank of England had already witnessed fmancial disturbances of the fringe banking crisis in Britain 
resulting from a number of virtually umegulated regional banks' borrowing hot money (short-term funds with 
floating interest rates) and long-term lending at fixed rates to support various real estate projects. See Kapstein, 
supra note 209, at 42, 44. 
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bank regulation that could not cope with the regulatory avoidance and evasion by foreign 
bank branches and subsidiaries.441 
At the same time, capital-exporting countries were concerned about the potential threat 
to international financial systems in the aftermath of financial disturbances in 1974. In this 
regard, the central bank Governors of the Group ofTen industrialized countries undertook 
two courses of corrective action. The Governors initially issued a support Communique to 
attempt to stabilize the markets while a separate standing committee on regulatory and 
supervisory practices was formed to report to the Governors on the development of possible 
preventive measures against the repercussion of similar crises in the future. The 
Governors at their meeting in July 1974 at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in 
Basel raised concerns about the stability of foreign exchanges and Euro dollar markets, and 
441 With respect to the allocation of supervisory responsibility, the position of the United Kingdom was that 
the Bank of England was concerned with its unaccountability for the costs of having to extend support 
operations to all foreign banks operating out of London or elsewhere within the United Kingdom, whereas the 
Bank of England was prepared to support the UK banks' activities at home and overseas despite limited 
resources. By 1974, the Bank of England adopted an express policy of parent undertaking and parent country 
responsibility, which applied both to the branches of overseas banks operating within the United Kingdom 
and to wholly owned subsidiaries and consortia. With the presence of a number of foreign banks in London, 
the Bank was concerned to ensure that the parent undertakings and parent authorities assumed a certain 
degree of responsibility in connection with the overseas operations of their banks, and that the Bank did not 
have to bear sole responsibility for the financial support of such institutions in the event of difficulties. Due to 
the lack of a cost allocation mechanism, the Bank had to attempt to develop this combined parent undertaking 
and parent country control argument in that it could not assume an unlimited liability associated with the 
foreign banks to which it was host in the event of a number of large foreign operations in the UK. See Walker, 
supra note 203, at 33-34, 94-97. 
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bank liquidity. However, the disagreement between the United States and West Germany 
over central banks' provision oflender-of-last-resort to troubled banks caused smaller 
banks and consortia banks to lose access to funds in the interbank market. In response to 
the national market operators' pressure on them for a stronger support commitment, the 
Governors declared their commitment to maintaining the stability of the markets in order to 
recover the market order and prevent further bank failures in the Communique of 
September 1974.442 Although the statement did not expressly mention the establishment of 
new international lender of last resort facility, it seemed that the Governors acknowledged 
the effect.443 In that context, one observer highlights the coordinated action among states 
for the effective and stable operation of the new financial markets.444 
442 The content of the Communique is as follows: "At their regular meeting in Basel on September 9th, the 
central bank governors from the countries of the Group ofTen and Switzerland discussed the working of the 
international banking system. They took stock of the existing mechanisms for supervision and regulation and 
noted recent improvements in these fields in a number of major countries. They agreed to intensify the 
exchange of information between central banks on the activities of banks operating in the international 
markets and, where appropriate, to tighten further the regulations governing exchange positions. The 
Governors also had an exchange of views on the problems oflender-of-Iast-resort in the Euro markets. They 
recognized that it would not be practical to lay down in advance detailed rules and procedures for the 
provision of temporary liquidity. But they were satisfied that means are available for that purpose and will be 
used if and when necessary." See Joan Spero, THE FAILURE OF THE FRANKLIN NATIONAL BANK 154 (1980); S. 
Solomon, THE CONFIDENCE GAME: How UNELCTED CENTRAL BANKERS ARE GOVERNING THE CHANGED 
WORLD ECONOMY 117 ( 1995). 
443 See E. P. Davis, Instability in the Euromarkets and the Economic Theory of Financial Crisis, Bank of 
England Discussion Papers 43 (October 1989) at 19 (noting that this move did not guarantee the automatic 
lender oflast resort intervention but indicated the central bankers' willingness of intervention in a crisis). See 
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In addition to the issuance of the September 1974 Communique, the GI0 governors 
reached an agreement to form a working group of supervisors to develop appropriate rule 
and guidelines for the supervision of international banking markets. 445 As a matter of fact, 
the establishment ofthe new working group was initiated by the Governor of the Bank of 
England Gordon Richardson who recognized the need for greater cooperation among bank 
supervisors and the Bank's requirement for more information from horne country 
supervisors as to the activities of foreign banks with branches and subsidiaries in 
London.446 Richardson's idea of establishing the Standing Committee on Banking 
Regulation and Supervisory Practices, now known as "the Basel Committee" which was 
comprised of representatives from G 10 countries along with Luxembourg and Switzerland 
also Kapstein, supra note 209, at 43 (arguing that "[y]et it is by no means clear that all the central bankers 
present had agreed to provide what their connnercial bankers saw as a lender-of-Iast-resort facilities"). 
444 See Walker, supra note 203, at 33 (noting that "[a]s this was a carefully drafted compromise statement of 
no specific intent, it could not be regarded as representing the conclusion of any clear agreement between all 
of the parties concerned. It did, however, confirm that countries could no longer act in isolation with regard to 
such matters and that, in future, more considered and co-ordinated action would be required in such an 
important area of national and international concern as the effective and stable operation of the new fmancial 
markets which had emerged during the 1960s and 1970s"). 
445 Understandably, the Governors agreed as follows: "The Governors of the Group ofTen at their December 
Meeting at the BIS, discussed the problem of assuring the solvency and liquidity of banks, basing themselves 
on a summary report prepared by the BIS ... To carry further the work in this field, and to prepare for future 
discussions among themselves, the Governors decided to establish a new Committee to be made up of two 
experts from each country, one from the supervisory and one from the foreign exchange side. The Committee 
will take as its starting point the BIS Summary Report and will give particular attention to the need for an 
early warning system. It was noted that from this point of view the quality of supervision is at least as 
important as the regulations themselves." See id. at 35-36 n.82. 
446 At that time, bank supervisors in any country had difficulty assessing a bank as a whole because banks did 
not provide the consolidated statements of their activities. See Kapstein, supra note 209, at 44. 
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was accepted by the GI0 bank central governors at their meeting in December 1974.447 
That is, the initiative for the creation ofthe Basel Committee had arisen from the city of 
London. As a consequence, the Bank of England took the lead role in arranging the 
secretariat for the Committee, and providing senior officials of the Bank for the first two 
Chairman of the Committee (George Blunden 1974-76, Peter Cooke 1977_88).448 
As noted above, since London's financial system had been dominated by international 
banks, particularly the US banks by the early 1970s, British regulatory and supervisory had 
good reasons to be concerned about systemic risk in the aftermath of banking crises in 1974. 
Moreover, any unilateral regulatory attempt to cope with international banks would plunder 
London of its reputation as a good place for banking activities.449 As one observer notes, 
London's two apparently irreconcilable objectives had to be accomplished: first, the 
maintenance of London's reputation for regulatory flexibility and the competitive 
447 See id. It deserves noting George Blunden's statement that the Basel Committee "was established in 1974 
by the Governors of Group ofTen, shortly after they had agreed that it was the duty of central banks to 
provide lender-of-Iast-resort facilities to their national banks to support their euro-currency operations." See 
George Blunden, International Co-operation in Banking Supervision, Bank of England Quarterly (Sep. 1977), 
at 326. 
448 See Kapstein, supra note 404, at 329 (noting the Bank of England's lead role in formation of the Standing 
Committee in terms of hegemonic stability). 
449 See id. 
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advantages arising from that, second, the reduction of systemic risk.450 As a result, "[t]he 
solution lay in a multilaterally coordinated approach that could produce a set of standards 
all could live with.'.451 In the circumstances, the bank of England was concerned to ensure 
the allocation of responsibility in the market support operations and appropriate division of 
supervisory and regulatory liabilities. Without any formal allocation rule, the Bank would 
have been responsible for the supervision of all domestic and foreign banks' activities in 
the United Kingdom and the costs of any necessary support operations as well. In this 
regard, it is noteworthy the efforts toward the agreement on allocation rules for supervisory 
responsibility and lender of last resort liability. A basic principle of shared responsibility 
based on the principle of parent country control with an enhanced role for the host 
authorities was adopted instead ofthe espousal of a pure home or host country control.452 
As reviewed below, the Basel Committee formulated its first major initiative known as the 
Basel Cocordat of 1975, concerning guidelines for consolidated supervision by home 
450 See John Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULA nON 104 (2000). 
451 See id. 
452 See Walker, supra note 203, at 84-136. As pointed out below, under the original 1975 Basel provisions, 
the host rather than the parent country was to be responsible for the solvency of a subsidiary although this was 
subsequently reversed in 1983. See id. at 86-109. 
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countries and host countries ofthe foreign activities of banks in response to the Herstatt 
Collapse.453 
Indeed, by the early 1970s, the G 10 central bank governors developed a highly 
sophisticated but essentially personal network of consultation and cooperation. However, 
this had been traditionally based on contact related to purely monetary and economic 
matters.454 Furthermore, the Governors meetings did not pay heed to national bank 
supervision whereas national regulatory and supervisory authorities considered 
developments unfolding in international financial markets to be irrelevant.455 In this 
context, arguably, not until the establishment of the Basel Committee in 1974, would bank 
regulatory and supervisory issues be emerging as the issue of national and international 
issue.456 
453 See id. at 86-100. Walker stresses the evidence of coordinated activity secured in relation to the 
management of the Franklin National failure although the major catalyst for establishing the Basel Committee 
was the collapse of the Bankhaus Herstatt and the Committee's supervisory model, the European Community 
Contact Group (the Contact Group). At the time of the National Franklin's difficulties, the Western financial 
community has already coordinated on an ad hoc basis between particular national agencies and through the 
meetings of the Governors of G 1 0 countries in Basel with regard to the coordination of monetary and 
economic matters. See id. at 38. 
454 See id. 
455 Id. 
456 See id. 
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2. The Establishment of Bank Supervisory Standards 
a. The Basel Concordat 
Following the Herstatt collapse in 1974 and the Franklin National failure of 1975, the 
Basel Committee issued a paper, subsequently known as the Basel Concordat outlining 
some principles in the form of recommended guidelines of best practice regarding the 
supervision of banks operating internationally through branches, subsidiaries, and joint 
ventures.457 The Committee's aim was that no international banking establishment should 
escape adequate supervision. The Concordat specifieses five basic principles458 
457 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel Concordat on Principles for the Supervision of 
Bank's Foreign Establishments. The original Basel Concordat was not released to the public until March 
1981. It was reproduced by the IMF as an Annex ("Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments") to 
William and Johnson's paper, "International capital Markets: Recent developments and Short-term 
prospects." See IMF Occasional Paper No.7 (1981); see also R. C. William & G. G. Johnson, International 
Capital Markets: Recent Developments and Short-Term Prospects 29-32 (Aug. 1981). The Basel Concordat 
was a set of guidelines on bank supervision reached by consensus among the banking regulators of the 
Committee's member states. The Basel Committee titled the document a 'concordat' to indicate the 
agreement had no legal force of the treaty. See id. 
458 The Basel Concordat of 1975 provided five basic principles to bank regulatory authorities for international 
banking supervision: 
(1) The supervision of foreign banking establishments should be the joint responsibility of host and parent 
(home) authorities; (2) No foreign banking establishment should escape supervision, each country should 
ensure that foreign banking establishments are supervised, and supervision should be adequate as judged by 
both host and parent authorities; (3) The supervision of liquidity should be the primary responsibility of host 
authorities since foreign establishments generally have to conform to local practices for their liquidity 
management and must comply with local regulations; (4) The supervision of solvency offoreign branches 
should be essentially a matter for the parent authority. In the case of subsidiaries, while primary 
responsibility lies with the host authority, parent authorities should take account of the exposure of their 
domestic banks' moral commitment in this regard; and (5) Practical cooperation would be facilitated by 
transfers of information between host and parent authorities and by the granting of permission for inspections 
by or on behalf of parent authorities on the territory of the host authority. Every effort should be made to 
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delineating the supervisory responsibilities of home and host countries' bank regulators in 
overseeing banking institutions that operate on a transnational basis. It emphasized that all 
banks operating in host countries should be supervised by both the home country's and host 
country's supervisory authorities.459 The Concordat mainly concerns liquidity, solvency, 
and foreign exchange positions. That is, it recommended that the host country's authority 
is primarily responsible for the adequacy ofthe foreign bank's liquidity.46o In tum, the 
home country's supervisory authority should take primary responsibility for the solvency of 
home country's bank operating in a foreign country.461 Under the Concordat foreign 
subsidiaries were to be primarily subject to the host authorities whereas foreign braches 
were considered as indistinguishable from a parent bank as a whole.462 Its final principle 
emphasizes the need for cooperation between home and host country regulatory authorities 
in removing existing legal restrictions on the transfer of confidential information for 
remove any legal restraints (particularly in the field of professional secrecy or national sovereignty) which 
might hinder these forms of cooperation. See id. 
459 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Report to the Governors on the Supervision of Bank's 
Foreign Establishments (September 1995). 
460 See id. 
461 Id. 
462 See id. 
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effective supervision.463 Despite its making a positive step toward international 
cooperation of banking supervision, the Concordat failed in keeping up with various 
international banking activities, thereby being revised in 1983. 
b. 1983 Revised Concordat 
In response to financial crises arisen from the Latin American sovereign Debt Crisis 
and the Banco Ambrosiano failure,464 the Basel Committee issued a revision ofthe 1975 
Concordat in 1983 for the purpose of promoting consolidated supervision on a transnational 
basis. The 1983 Revised Concordat adopted new principles for the allocation of bank 
regulatory responsibilities between home and host authorities provided in the Principles for 
463 Id. 
464 In 1983 Italy's largest private bank, Banco Ambrosiano SpA failed. As Ambrosiano was on the verge of a 
liquidity crisis, the parent regulatory authority (the Bank ofItaly) initially honored the Ambrosianos's 
financial difficulties with the support of the state's largest commercial banks. However, the bank's illegal 
activities spurred the authority to move to close the bank due to the authority's inability to control loss of 
confidence. The problem arose because the 1975 Concordat applied only to 'banks'. Indeed, Ambrosiano 
had a financial holding company called Banco Ambrosiano Holdings SA that was incorporated in 
Luxembourg. Even if the holding company conducted the business of banking, it was beyond the reach of 
Luxembourg's banking regulations, because it was not considered as banks. To make matters complicated, 
Luxembourg's secrecy laws veiled Banco Ambrosiano Holdings' operation from the Bank ofItlaly. For the 
detail, see Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy, supra note 209, at 53-57. 
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the Supervision of Bank's Foreign Establishments.465 The Revised Concordat focused on 
ensuring that no bank operating in a foreign country could escape adequate supervision, 
thereby developing the approaches of 'consolidated supervision,466 and 'dual key' 467 
supervIsIOn. Consolidated supervision expands the responsibilities of the home country's 
regulatory authority by requiring the home country's regulatory authority to monitor the 
total risk exposure and capital adequacy of the home country's bank.468 The home country 
regulator is able to do so by reviewing the bank's total operations.469 
When a host country sees a home country's supervision inadequate, the revised 
Concordat proposes two options. First, the host country could deny entry approval to an 
organization from a country that does not adequately supervise its own organizations.47o 
Alternatively, it could impose specific conditions governing the conduct of the business of 
465 Basel Committee, Principles for the Supervision of Bank's Foreign Establishments (May 1983), reprinted 
in (1993) 22 ILM 900, 901. 
466 'Consolidated supervision' represents monitoring the risk exposure (including the concentration of risk, 
the quality of assets, and the capital adequacy) of the banking groups for which the home country authority 
takes responsibility on the basis of the totality of the business carried on. See id. at 905. 
467 'Dual key' supervision represents that the regulatory authority of each country concurrently evaluate the 
ability of other national authorities to supervise and carry out their respective responsibilities. See id. 
468 See id. at 905. 
469 Id.904. 
470 Under the Revised Concordat the Basel Committee's key aim is to examine the totality of each bank's 
world-wide business on the basis of consolidated supervision. See Revised Concordat, 22 ILM 901. 
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foreign banks to operate in the host jurisdiction.471 Where a host country does not have an 
adequate supervision, the Revised Concordat urges the home country's regulatory 
authorities to discourage the home country's bank from expanding its operations into the 
proposed host country.472 The rationale behind the dual key approach is to prevent 
countries from lowering supervisory practices in order to attract foreign investment and 
foreign capita1.473 Additionally, the Revised Concordat seeks to prevent structural features 
of international banking groups, such as holding companies from facilitating the evasion of 
supervision through lenient regulatory arrangements.474 In response to the Ambrosiano 
failure, the Revised Concordat recommended that "where host authority supervision 
(Luxembourg) is inadequate, the parent authority (Bank of Italy) should either extend its 
supervision ... or it should be prepared to discourage the parent bank (Banco Ambrosiano 
SpA) from continuing to operate the establishment (Baco Ambrosiano Holdings SA) in 
471 See id. 
472 Id. 
473 See Duncan E. Alford, Basle Connnittee Minimum Standards, International Regulatory Response to the 
Failure ofBCCI, 26 Geo. Wash. 1. Int'l L. & Econ. 241, 253 (1992). 
474 Id. at 904. 
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question.,,475 In 1990, the Basel Committee issued a supplementary document called 
Information Flows between banking Supervisory Authorities (Supplement) dealing with the 
practical aspects of implementing the 1975 Concordat, such as its authorization, 
information flows, bank secrecy, and external audit.476 
c. The Response to BCeI: Minimum Standards for International 
Banking Groups and Their Crossborder Establishments 
Although the Revised Concordat and the 1990 Supplement contributed to improving 
the bank supervisory standards that were initially set forth in the Basel Concordat of 1975, 
the existing significant gaps in the allocation of supervisory responsibilities led to the 
collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI)477 in July 1991. The 
475 See Basel Committee, Principles for the Supervision of Bank's Foreign Establishments 3 (May 1983). In 
this regard, the 1983 revisions to the Basel Concordat of 1975 appeared to be fueled by the Ambrosiano 
collapse. See Herring & Litan, supra note 64, at 103. 
476 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Information Flows between Banking Supervisory 
Authorities 1 (April 1990). 
477 In 1972 BCCI was founded with a view to financing trade with the third world. BCCI was incorporated in 
Luxembourg, and its headquarters were in London. Through widespread fraud, deception and money 
laundering, BCCI was able to conceal its insolvency for decades, thereby evading supervision and eluding 
regulatory authorities for a number of years by incorporating a holding company in Luxembourg. As a result, 
the BCCI conglomerate held two parent (home) banks: BCCI SA, incorporated in Luxembourg, and BCCI 
Overseas, incorporated in Cayman Islands. Each of these banks had subsidiaries in foreign countries, such as 
the United Kingdom. This complex corporate structure enabled BCCI to evade consolidated supervision. 
Although BCCI had two parent banks for which two countries held overall regulatory responsibilities, neither 
of the parent banks carried on its primary operations in those countries. Consequently, the lack of 
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Bccr collapse resulted, in part, from BCCI's ability to evade supervision by both home 
and host countries, and demonstrated the difficulties of adequately supervising banks which 
operate in more than one jurisdiction.478 The BCCr case raised significant issues over the 
regulation of financial institutions established across states' territorial borders. The BCCr 
story also shows that the smart money had long left BCCr by the time BCCr went under 
because the financial elites of the West were well wired into the work and concerns of the 
Basel Committee.479 Those who lost were thousands of poorly informed investors from 
developing countries. One ofBCCI's legacies was to wipe out the social security fund of 
Gabon.48o While BCCr was a tragedy for Gabon, it never posed any systemic risk to the 
financial centers of industrialized countries which under other conditions it might have 
done. 
comprehensive regulation over much of BCCl's operations and the secrecy laws in Cayman Islands and 
Luxembourg prevented earlier diagnosis and led to the insolvency of a $20 billion bank with sustained losses 
estimated at $10 billion. See Peter Truell & Larry Gurwin, False Profits: The Inside Story ofBCCI, The 
World's Most Corrupt Financial Empire 31-35 (1992). 
478 See id. at 67-94. 
479 The BCCI story shows that the existence of the Basel Committee serves as a warning system for those 
who move in elite fmancial circles. During the early 1980s the Basel Committee noticed BCCl's evasion of 
consolidated supervision. See Herring & Litan, supra note 64, at 103. 
480 Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability 222 (1993). 
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As the BCCr case shows, under the Basel Committee's guidelines no one supervisory 
authority was able to put BCCr under the lens of consolidated supervision. The BCCr 
crisis urged the Basel Committee to issue the 1992 Report on Minimum Standards for the 
Supervision of International Banking Groups and their Crossborder Establishments 
(Minimum Standards).481 The Minimum Standards represent no departure from the prior 
agreements in terms of consolidated supervision, dual key supervision and communications 
between supervisory authorities except the guidelines for the implementation of these 
principles. In response to the increased need for consolidated supervision, the Minimum 
Standards recommend that the host country regulatory authorities make sure that the home 
country receives consolidated financial statements of the bank's global operations. 
Furthermore, the Minimum Standards advise that the home country's regulatory authorities 
have the means to satisfy themselves concerning the completeness and validity of all 
481 The Basel Committee's 1992 Report on Minimum Standards for the Supervision ofInternational Banking 
Groups and their Crossborder Establishment were summarized by the Basel Committee in its own terms: 
(1) all international banking groups and international banks should be supervised by a home-country authority 
that capably performs consolidated supervision; (2) the creation of a crossborder banking establishment 
should receive the prior consent of both the host country supervisory authority and the bank's, and if different, 
the banking group's home country supervisor; (3) if a host country authority determines that anyone of the 
foregoing minimum standards has not been met to its satisfaction, that authority could impose restrictive 
measures necessary to satisfy its prudential concerns with these minimum standards, including the prohibition 
of the creation of banking establishment. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Minimum Standards 
for the supervision of International banking Groups and Their Crossborder Establishment 3-7 (July 1992). 
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financial reports.482 The Minimum Standards also recommend that the host country make 
sure that the home country's supervisory authorities have consented to the establishment of 
foreign banks.483 Additionally, the host country's regulatory authorities should assure 
themselves that the home country's regulators have the authority to prevent banks under 
their jurisdiction from establishing organizational structures that circumvent supervision.484 
d. The Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
In 1997, the Basel Committee issued the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision (Core Principles), which comprises twenty-five key areas of banking 
supervision.485 The Core Principles were designed to present the essential elements of a 
regulatory banking structure that will stimulate confidence in the international banking 
market. Its purpose is to serve as a basic reference for the world's supervisory authorities 
in supervision of all banks within their jurisdictions. The Core Principles cover the 
482 See id. 
483 Id. at 6. 
484 Id. 
485 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (Sept. 
1997) at 1. 
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significant preconditions for effective banking supervision, licensing of banking institutions, 
capital standards, and other prudential guidelines for risk management and internal control, 
methods of ongoing banking supervision, information requirements, formal powers of 
supervision and crossborder banking.486 In response to the Asian financial crisis, the IMF 
and the World Bank have engaged in technical assistance work to improve the quality of 
banking regulation in the emerging and transition markets by using the Core Principles as a 
guideline. This technical assistance work involves to design incentive compatible deposit 
insurance schemes, and to set forth provision for the orderly exit of unsound banking 
organizations. Each feature of a regulatory regime is evaluated under the Core Principles. 
In this context, one argues that important motivations for encouraging adoption of the Core 
Principles benefit both those countries in helping make a serious banking crisis unlikely 
and other market economies through preventing the danger of spillover into others.487 In 
486 See id. In order to harmonize international banking supervision, the Basel Committee also worked with 
non-Basel representatives from Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Mexico, Russia, and Thailand. 
Eight other countries--Brazil, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Poland, and Singapore--were 
also closely associated with the work of the Basel Committee. Id. 
487 See Michael Taylor, International Financial Standards and the Transition Economies, in Y. B. Int'} Fin.& 
Econ. L. 348 (1999) (arguing that increased interlinkages between banks urge bank regulators to make sure 
the compliance of all countries' bank regulators and supervisors with a set of common standards under the 
Core Principles). 
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October 1999, the Basel Committee, in cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank, 
produced a follow-up document called the Core Principles Methodology (Methodology).488 
This report was initiated to respond to requests from a number of countries for additional 
guidance on how to interpret and implement the Core Principles.489 The Methodology 
document covers specific criteria for assessing and implementing each Core Principle.49o 
While one set of criteria focus on issues viewed essential for the minimum implementation 
of the Core Principles, the other focuses on those issues deemed to represent best 
practice.491 Currently, the IMF and the World Bank use the methodology to evaluate the 
banking sectors in individual countries.492 
Nonetheless, the Core Principles have faced criticisms from various directions for 
failing to pay sufficient attention to the varying conditions of emerging markets compared 
488 See The Basel Committee, Core Principles Methodology (Oct. 1999). 
489 See id. Notably, some observer has compared the Core Principles to the United States Constitution, and 
argues that the Core Principles can only be applied to the circumstances of individual countries through the 
interpretative efforts of numerous experts and advisers. See Bill McDonough, Interview, 3 The Financial 
Regulator 3,32 (1998). 
490 Id. 
491 William J. McDonough, Remaks before the Eleventh International Conference of Banking Supervisors 
(Sept. 2000). 
492 The methodology can be used in multiple contexts: (1) self-assessment performed by bank supervisors 
themselves; (2) peer review conducted for instance within regional groupings of bank supervisors; (3) revies 
conducted by private third parties such as consulting ftrms; or (4) reviews performed in the context of the 
IMF surveillance or Wodd Bank lending operations. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Core 
Principles Methodology (Oct. 1999), at 5. 
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with the developed markets.493 The more important issue is that the Core Principles 
presume an infrastructure of regulation that is usually shared in common in the developed 
economies but is often lacking from emerging markets and transition economies.494 Even 
though the Basel Committee, in cooperation with a number of emerging market regulators 
formulated the Core Principles, it remained a predominantly developed world grouping.495 
Hence, if a set of basic principles needs to be recognized as global standards, the document 
is required to balance the desire to set high standards for supervisory practices with the 
pragmatic recognition that specific supervisory arrangements, practices and techniques vary 
from country to country depending on differences in culture, financial system structure and 
internal political realities. In addition, the Basel Committee needs to consult particularly 
with supervisors from emerging market states in order to produce a document with the 
legitimacy unless the Committee's membership is expected to expand in the near future. 
Here, a point to note is the anti-globalization argument that the process of establishment 
493 See Morris Goldstein, Towards an International Banking Standards, 2 The Financial Regulator 2 (1997). 
494 See Taylor, International Financial Standards, supra note 487, at 354. 
495 See id. at 354-355. Taylor notes that "[the Basel Committee] has tended to make assumptions which 
reflect the conditions in the developed markets, especially concerning the availability of adequate and 
accurate accounting information and the existence of a legal system through which regulators can enforce 
their decisions." Id. at 355. 
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and implementation of global standards are under the Western industrial states' dominance, 
and represents the transgovemmentalism that threaten undeveloped countries' state 
sovereignty and takes away their freedom of action as sovereign states.496 In this context, 
it deserves noting the emphasis of a democratization of the legislative process by which 
global standards as international soft law are established, a flexibility in implementation of 
the standards reflecting local legal tradition and practice, a full incorporation of the 
majority of states into the legislative process concerning the development of the standards, 
and a priortization of the implementation of global standards on a country-by-country 
basis.497 Undeveloped countries will apparently resist in complying with global standards 
unless they have a realistic chance to absorb and accept the standards. In this sense, the 
development of new standards needs to be treated as an evolutionary and educational 
process.498 
496 For the detail, see Herbert Morais, The Quest for International Standards: Global Governance vs. 
Sovereignty, 50 U. KAN. L. REv. 779,779-780 (2002). 
497 See id. at 806-820. 
498 Id. at 820. 
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3. The Establishment of Capital Adequacy Standards 
Following the Latin American sovereign debt crisis499 of the 1980s, bank regulatory 
authorities in the major industrialized countries were concerned about the decline in the 
capital strength of their banks and the exposure of several large international banks to the 
underdeveloped countries. In response to the deterioration in the levels of bank capital,500 
particularly the U.S. regulators' efforts to strengthen their capital adequacy framework 
encountered a sharp industry resistance on competition grounds, and thus shifted to the 
establishment of capital adequacy guidelines by the Basel Committee. In July 1988, the 
Basel Committee issued unifonn risk- based capital adequacy standards for internationally 
499 The debt crisis for the developed countries was incurred by too many loans too few high-risk borrowers. 
By 1982, Mexico alone owed U.S. banks $23 billion, estimated to be approximately 46 percent of the capital 
of America's seventeen largest banks. Once Brazilian and Argentinean loans are added, the nine largest U.S. 
banks had lent more than 140 percent of their capital to these three countries, all of which subsequently 
became incapable of servicing their loans. See Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Banking, Politics and Global Politics: 
American Commercial Banks and Regulatory Change, 1980-1990, 142 (1995). The dozen largest American 
banks lent between 83 percent and 263 percent of their capital to five heavily indebted Latin American 
countries that later announced they were not able to service their debts. Due to the lack of prudential 
oversight by American regulatory authorities, U.S. commercial banks were able to conduct unsound lending 
practices, and thus they were in trouble to the extent that the stability of U.S. fmancial system was threatened. 
See Thomas Oatley & Robert Nabros, Redistributive Cooperation: Market Failure, Wealth Transfers, and the 
Basel Accord, 52 Int'l Org. 35,42 (1998). 
500 The deterioration of the level of capital in international banks arises because bank capital serves as a 
cushion to absorb unexpected losses that cannot be paid with current earnings, and because capital also give 
depositors confidence in the safety and soundness of the bank. See Ethan B. Kapstein, Resolving the 
Regulator'S Dilemma, supra note 404, at 335. In the United States, the average level of capital in money 
center banks in 1980 had dropped to a postwar low of 4.5 percent of assets that was deemed inadequate in 
light of the risks encountering domestic and international loan portfolio. See International Monetary Fund, 
International Capital Markets (Dec. 1986) at 42; see also Andrew S. Caron, Financial Crises: Recent 
Experience in U.S. and International Markets, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No.2 (1982), at 395-
419. 
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active banks (Basel Accord).501 Under the Basel Accord all banks that actively engaged in 
international transactions are required to hold capital equal to at least 8 percent of their risk-
weighted assets plus off-balance-sheet commitments.502 
Basel Accord aims two goals: first, to require banks to maintain higher levels of capital 
reserves by maintaining capital-to-asset ratios that are risk-based, and thus improve the 
safety and soundness ofbanks;503 and second, to establish a level playing field by requiring 
uniform regulation so that a bank based in one country would not receive a competitive 
advantage by enjoying a lower capital adequacy requirement than a bank based in another 
country. 504 Although the Basel Accord has no legal force, the G-l 0 countries have 
501 The guidelines are reprinted in Bank for International Settlements: Committee on Banking Regulations 
and Supervisory Practices, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, 
reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 980-1008 (1991) (with introductory note by Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, 30 I.L.M. 967 
(1991». 
502 Bank capital (equity) is traditionally referred to as assets (loans) minus liabilities (de~osits). See Peter R. 
Krugman & Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and Policy 659-667 (5 ed.2000). The 
Basel Accords divides capital into two tiers: Tier 1, defmed as paid-up share capital/common stock and 
published reserves from post-tax retained earnings, must comprise at least 5 percent of a bank's capital base; 
Tier 2, defmed as undisclosed reserves, asset revaluation reserves, general provisions/generalloan-Ioss-
reserves, hybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments, and subordinated debt, is limited to 10 percent of Tier 1 and 
combined with Tier 1 must comprise 8 percent of the risk-weighted assets. See Basel Accord, supra note 501, 
Annex 17. On-balance sheet assets are assigned to one of four risk buckets as part of the risk-weighting 
procedure. 
503 See Hal S. Scott & Shinsaku Iwahara, In Search of a Level Playing Field: The Implementation of the 
Basel Capital Accord in Japan and the United States 2 (1994). 
504 See id. at 3. 
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incorporated it into their national banking regulations.505 Unlike other studies focusing on 
its implementation and compliance with Basel Accord, this study mainly explores the 
origins of the Basel Accord. That is, it seeks to examine when and how national regulatory 
authorities pursue international regulatory harmonization or convergence as shown by the 
case of Basel Accord. 
a. International Regulatory Harmonization 
The globalization of financial markets has attracted a considerable amount of attention 
to the prudential regulation of financial institutions. Under the market volatility and 
competitive pressure, regulatory authorities from the industrialized countries initiated their 
efforts toward the harmonization of their prudential regulation. 506 In particular, bank 
505 A number of non-G 10 countries have implemented the Basel Accord into their national banking laws: 
Australia, Austria, Finland, Hong Kong, Israel, Korea, Mexico, and Taiwan. See Klaus P. Follak, 
International Harmonization of Regulatory and Supervisory Frameworks, in International Monetary Law: 
Issues for the New Millennium 307 (Mario Giovanoli ed. 2000). One views the Basel Accord as a 
gentleman's agreement among central banks from the Basel Committee member states. See Hal S. Scott, The 
Competitive Implications of the Basel Capital Accord, supra note 259, at 885. By contrast, the Basel Accord 
is deemed as international soft law. See Mario Giovanoli, A New Architecture for the Global Financial 
Market: Legal Aspects ofInternational Financial Standard Setting in International Monetary Law, in 
International Monetary Law: Issues for the New Millennium 33-44 (2000). 
506 One refers this situation to as the regulator'S dilemma. See Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma, 
supra note 404. 
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regulators from these countries recognized a need for the creation of international standards 
for the stability of banking organizations. To that end, the regulators negotiated to 
harmonize their prudential regulations, thereby establishing an international agreement on 
international banking regulation. In this context, some observers recognize the Basel 
Accord as an effective response to international market failure arisen from international 
financial integration. 507 That is, arguably global economic integration in the international 
financial markets, which caused a market failure as evidenced by the debt crisis508 through 
raising systemic risk and impeding regulators to ensure the safety and soundness of national 
banking systems has led to international financial regulation.509 This view argues that the 
Basel Accord was established as a result of regulators' consensus knowledge of the 
507 See Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy, supra note 209, Ch. 5. 
508 Some observers note that its shocks lead to a crisis of confidence in a state's regulatory environment. See 
David A. Singer, Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics ofIntemational Regulatory Harmonization, 58 Int'l 
Org. 531, 531 (2004). 
509 See id. Kapstein remarks policy challenges posed by the debt crisis to all the actors involved-the banks, 
the creditor states' regulators, and the relevant international institutions, and the debtors themselves. In short, 
the crisis threatened the payment system in two ways: (1) it threatened to bring trade, investment, and 
financial flows between the developed and developing countries, choking the world economy; (2) it 
threatened the solvency of the banks, which did not have sufficient capital to absorb the losses from unpaid 
debts. If their depositors became aware of this shortfall, a run on the banks would begin. See Kapstein, 
Supervising International Banks, supra note 434, at 9. 
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systemic risks of undercapitalized bankS.51 0 As bank's capital levels deteriorated 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, they became more vulnerable to losses from loan defaults 
and exogenous shocks. This argument, which has enjoyed an extraordinarily positive 
reception among economists and political scientists, is that the adoption of minimum 
capital standards by the G-l 0 countries provided that the global public good of financial 
stability to regulators' collective interests.511 Beyond the application of this perspective to 
the Basel Accord, this view implies that harmonization will take place whenever an 
international regulatory standard is necessary for addressing systemic risk including 
financial instability.512 
In response, others charge this functionalist logic by claiming that the Basel Accord is 
an example of redistributive cooperation: "the creation of an international instituion that 
510 See Kapstein, Resolving the regulator's Dilemmas, supra note 404, at 341-342.(remarking the Basel 
Accord from a public goods perspective whereby leadership of the U.K. and u.S. learned from the 1982 debt 
crisis). 
511 See Frederic S. Mishkin, Prudential Supervision: Why is it Important and What are the Issues?, in 
Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't 1-30 (Frederie S. Mishkin ed., 2001); Herring & 
Litan, supra note 414; see also Tony Porte, States, Markets, and Regimes in Banking: The Policy Issues 
(1983). On the global public good, see Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Global Public Policy: Governing Without 
Government, supra note 181. From the lens of this perspective, Kapstein assumes that regulatory authorities 
is playing the most significant role in mitigating global systemic risk. See Kapstein, Resolving the 
Regulator'S Dilemmas, supra note 404. 
512 See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 
supra note 110. 
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internationally reduces at least one other government's welfare compared to the status 
,,513 h d h quo. T eya vocate that t e U.S. Congress legislated stricter capital adequacy 
requirements domestically in 1983,514 and urged U.S. regulators to impose these regulations 
on foreign competitors, especially the Japanese through an international agreement.S1S In 
contrast to functionalists, they assert that legislators lead the international regulatory 
harmonization process, that is, electoral incentives drive politicians to shift the costs of 
their policies to other states. Thus, international regulatory harmonization represents the 
special interests of a state's legislators to satisfy competing interest group and voter 
pressures rather than a jointly provided public good. This view implies that regulators are 
significant simply in that they carry out the directives ofthe legislature. 
5i3 See Oatley & Nabros, Redistributive Cooperation, supra note 499, at 36 (arguing that the u.s. proposals 
for capital adequacy regulation emerged from the U.S. congressional efforts to reconcile competing demands 
from their commercial banks and voters rather than an optimal response to international market failure). 
514 In 1983 the u.s. Congress acted the International Lending Supervision Act (lLSA), which provides the 
regulators to "establish examination and supervisory procedures to assure that factors such as foreign 
currency exposure and transfer risk are taken into account in evaluating the adequacy of the capital of banking 
institutions." 12 U.S.C. 3903 (b). Additionally, the act required the regulators to encourage the regulators 
from other major banking countries to cooperate toward maintaining and strengthening the capital bases of 
banks involved in international lending. 12 U.S.C. 3903 (b) (3) (c). 
515 The U.S. banks argued that relatively high capital requirements in they had been placed at a competitive 
disadvantage to the Japanese and French banks and nonbanking financial institutions. See Kapstein, 
Supervising International Banks, supra note 434, at 13. 
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For a more general model of the politics of international regulatory harmonization, a 
study examines the process of regulatory harmonization in four financial areas, but uses a 
country's incentives to emulate as an independent variable rather than specifying 
systemically what those incentives are and how they vary.516 It deserves noting this 
study's explanation that the circumstances under which financial regulatory authorities will 
seek to harmonize with their foreign counterparts or, to explain precisely what the 
incentives are leading a regulator to press for harmonization.517 
A more recent study proposes an analytical framework that satisfies the competing 
domestic pressures on regulatory authorities, and the role of international regulatory 
harmonization in addressing these pressures.518 To that end, this framework assumes a 
516 See Beth A. Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market 
Regulation, 55 Int'l Org. 589, 601-615 (2001). 
517 See id. Applying Simmon's framework to the transgovemmental theory, Raustiala argues that for the case 
of the Basel Accord, transgovemmental "networks become a vehicle for cooperation alongside some weak 
forms of liberal internationalism by facilitating information flow and technical assistance among 
jurisdictions." See id. at 601-605; see also Raustiala, The Architecture ofInternational Cooperation, supra 
note 194, at 74. Raustiala claims that the "incentives to create networks or to negotiate treatise vary across the 
spectrum of regulatory power, and in tum appear to interact with liberal internationalism differently. When 
regulatory power is highly asymmetric, as in securities law, liberal internationalism tends to be shunned and 
networks primarily fill gaps in cooperation. Conversely, when regulatory power is diffuse, and therefore 
treaties are an essential cooperative tool, the domestic capacity building that networks promote may increase 
compliance with, and the effectiveness of, treaty law. When regulatory power is moderately concentrated, 
networks may help smooth the path to a liberal internationlist solution by promoting convergence in 
regulatory approach." See id. at 73. 
518 See Singer, supra note 508, at 532. 
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principal-agent relationship between a legislature and a regulator in order to analyze 
regulator behavior.519 Put simply, the legislature, as the principal, delegates the 
responsibility for implementing financial regulations to a regulatory agency, and prescribes 
limits on that agency's policymaking by the threat of legislative intervention.52o In such 
circumstances, the framework predicts that regulatory authorities are more likely to seek 
international regulatory harmonization as a means of increasing the size of its win-set and 
safeguarding its autonomy where confidence in the stability of financial institutions is 
deteriorating, and where competitive pressures are increasing from foreign firms 
confronting less strict regulations.521 In short, the regulatory authority's domestic political 
environment spurs an international solution.522 As this view argues, this "confidence-
competitiveness" framework synthesizes elements of both of functionalist and 
519 See id. 
520 As Singer notes, in this process the legislature maximizes a combination of campaign contributions and 
aggregate welfare, while the regulatory authority is only concerned with maintaining its decision-making 
autonomy. Also, the legislature enjoys a range of policy options at its disposal, but the regulator is limited to 
a single policy tool of regulatory stringency. According to Singer, the regulatory authority chooses a degree 
of regulatory strictness that falls within its "win-set"-the range of policy choices that do not result in 
legislative intervention. Furthermore, exogenous shocks to international competitiveness or voter confidence 
in fmancial stability can lead to the decrease in the size of the win-set and make intervention more likely. Id. 
at 532-533. For the analysis of the analytical framework, see id. at 535-544. 
521 See id. at 533. 
522 Id. 
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redistributive logics, but seek to offer an explanation of regulator preferences. 523 In similar 
manner to the functionalists, this view incorporates regulators as important actors in 
international regulatory harmonization in that they have considerable discretion in 
coordinating with their foreign counterparts.524 Here, a significant note is the functionalist 
and confidence-competitiveness frameworks, and transgovemmentalism are in agreement 
with on the significance of regulators in the process of international regulatory 
harmonization. 525 Similarly to the transgovemmental theory, they highlight regulators as 
key actors in all the modes of international regulatory harmonization. In contrast, they 
incorporate the focus of redistributive logic on legislatures and domestic politics more 
523 See id. at 534. Singer argues that "[u]nderstanding preferences is the fIrst step in a more theoretically 
complete analysis of circumstances under which regulators will create international standards. Once one 
understands who wants what and why, one is in a much better position to explain harmonization outcomes 
using variables such as market power and international institutions." See id. at 544. Kapstein, Oatley and 
Nabors are in accord with on the signifIcance of market power in explaining the emergence of a multilateral 
agreement for bank capital adequacy. See Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma, supra note 404, at 
338; Oatley & Nabors, Redistributive Cooperation, supra note 499, at 49-52. On the role of international 
institutions in the process of harmonization, see Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization, supra 
note 516. 
524 Id. at 534-535. 
525 Like the transgovemmentalists, they emphasizes that unlike traditional international agreements, such as 
treaties, regulatory agreements are usually not ratifIed by legislatures, nor have they legal force on signatories, 
and that these agreements are important, and thus under market forces and pressure from international 
organizations, which correspond to transgovemmental regulatory networks, help to ensure compliance with 
global regulatory standards. See Singer, supra note 508, at 535. On market pressures, see Kapstein, 
Governing the Global Economy, supra note 209. On compliance with the Basel Accord, see David Ho, 
Compliance and International Soft Law: Why do Countries Implement the Basel Accord?, 5 J. Int'l Econ. L. 
647 (2002). 
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generally. 526 In this sense, both theories and liberal internationalism are in accord with on 
the importance of legislatures in the process of international harmonization. In this context, 
one stresses an integrative approach considering the incentives of both regulators and 
legislatures for a complete analysis of international regulatory harmonization.527 
As noted, there is still a need to reevaluate the views introduced above in the context of 
the Basel Accord To that end, this study moves on to the examination ofthe perspectives 
in pursuit of a more adequate framework responding to the demands for international 
regulatory harmonization. 
b. The Establishment of the Basel Accord 
i. Capital Regulation 
As financial intermediaries, banks take many specific risks. Upon lending money to 
customers, banks incur credit risk that a borrower will default on a loan.528 On a bank's 
526 See Singer, supra note 508, at 535. 
527 Id. 
528 "Credit risk is most simply defined as the potential that a bank borrower or counterparty will fail to meet 
its obligations in accordance with agreed terms." See The Basel Committee, Principles for the Management of 
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balance sheet, a loan appears as assets because it represents an entitlement of the bank to 
receive a certain amount of money (Plus periodic interest payments) on a specified date 
from a borrower. The major liabilities on a bank's balance sheet are its deposits, or 
obligations to reimburse savers either on demand or at a time agreed. The amount of net 
assets (assets minus liabilities) is thus the bank's capital. Capital provides a cushion 
against losses resulting from borrower default or changes in asset prices.529 Banks view 
capital reserves as necessary for their prosperity and stability. 530 In the event of severe 
trouble, bank regulators' goal is to enable the bank to survive trouble, thereby protecting 
depositors' funds and public confidence in banking system. Capital levels are required to 
be sufficient to absorb losses and enable the bank to continue as a going concern. It is 
important to note that capital requirements are designed to prevent insolvency and default 
for banks. In this context, one points to the significance of the capital requirements for 
Credit Risk (Sept. 2000), available at http://www.bis.org/publlindex.htm (last visited Jan. 10,2003). When 
the bank makes a loan to a customer the bank could supply the funds by giving the customer cash from the 
vault or a check on another bank, or by selling investment securities and giving the customer the ;proceeds. 
Any of these actions simply changes one kind of asset into another kind, cash for example, into a loan. The 
totals on the bank's balance sheet remain the same. 
529 See Singer, supra note 508, at 544. 
530 See Gray Haberman, Capital Requirements of Commercial and Investment Banks : Constraints in 
Regulation, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review, Vol. 12 (Autumn 1987) at 1-10. 
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three reasons.53 ! First, capital requirements influence the price and availability of credit, 
and thereby affect the efficiency ofthe financial system in all economies. Second, capital 
is a key determinant ofthe strength and competitiveness ofthe banking system. "Too little 
capital, and crises become uncomfortably frequent. Too much, and the financial 
intermediation moves away from banks and into other, less regulated channels." Third, 
capital regulation influences the fairness of the international playing field. "Banks is a 
global business, one in which some institutions may have an unjustified advantage through 
their treatment by national regulators." 
ii. The Backdrop 
As some observers note, initially, capital adequacy was an entirely domestic issue.532 
Although bank regulators had expressed the concern over the deterioration of the levels of 
capital, this concern did not emerge until the early 1980s. The key event that captured the 
attention of bank regulators on levels of bank capital was the outbreak ofthe debt crisis in 
531 See Andrew Crockett, Banking Needs a New Basel Accord, Financial Times, Jan. 27, 2004, at 19. 
532 See Singer, supra note 508, at 545. 
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1982.533 Since banking institutions in the world's financial centers such as London, New 
York, and Tokyo confronted financial difficulties arising from substantial losses on their 
lending portfolios, the debt crisis of 1982 served as a wake-up call to regulators about the 
dangers of low capitallevels.534 The Basel Committee initiated to work on a set of 
guidelines for capital adequacy, but its progress was delayed. With a general 
understanding that levels of capital were too low to support the riskiness of bank portfolios, 
central bankers launched their negotiations for improving bank safety and soundness.535 
Nevertheless, the regulators could not decide how to properly define capital nor agree on an 
appropriate minimum level that banks are required to hold.536 Also, Japanese banks were 
operating with substantially lower levels of capital than Western banks, which have placed 
them at a competitive advantage to especially U.S. banks through offering more favorable 
pricing than their competitors.537 French banks also had relatively low levels of capital and 
533 In the early 1980s, the Basel Committee initiated to investigate the wide-scale deterioration of capital 
levels in internationally active banks. 
534 See Singer, supra note 508, at 546. 
535 See Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma, supra note 404, at 337. 
536 See id. 
537 Id. at 339. 
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were resistant to any movement toward more stringent regulations.538 Japanese bank 
regulators resisted the creation of an international standard that would incur high cost to 
their banking markets.539 
In January 1987, the U.S. Federal Reserve and the Bank of England announced a 
bilateral agreement on common standards for capital adequacy.54o This Anglo-American 
agreement established a risk-weighed standard in which capital requirements would 
increase with the degree of risk of a bank's portfolio. 54! From the outset it was clear that 
"the agreement was not intended to last in isolation; rather it was a strategy to force the 
Basel Committee into multilateral agreement favorable to U.S. and U.K. regulators.,,542 
This Anglo-American "zone of cooperation" implies the warning of excluding 
noncompliant countries' banks from British and American markets.543 On December 10, 
1987, the Basel Committee issued the Basel Accord as a global standard for minimum 
538 See id. at 341. 
539 Id. 
540 Id. at 339. 
541 Id. at 339-340. 
542 See Singer, supra note 508, at 546. 
543 See Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator'S Dilemma, supra note 404, at 340. Kapstein argues that "[t]he 
tacit threat of preventing foreign banks from expanding operations or establishing new ones within that zone 
Was apparently credible enough to move discussions to the multilateral level." See id. at 344. 
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capital levels which superseded the U.S.ID.K. accord after several months of negotiations 
to mitigate the discrepancies between the U.S.ID.K. coalition and the nonmembers of the 
Committee. 
iii. The Origins of the Basel Accord 
Under what conditions did the regulators seek to establish the Basel Accord? This 
study attempts to answer this question through reviewing the current literature on the Basel 
Accord. 
a) Functionalist Theory 
Functionalists claim that the creation of the Basel Accord was led by international 
"consensual knowledge" of the systemic risks of bank lending, combined with the 
leadership of the United States and the u.K. 544 This theory highlights that the Herstatt 
collapse and the Franklin failure of 1974 triggered the creation of the Basel Committee 
in emphasizing the significance of consensual knowledge. This view asserts that these 
544 See Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator'S Dilemma, supra note 404, at 341-342. 
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prominent banking institution collapses followed by the debt crisis of less developed 
countries (LDC debt crisis) in 1982 led to a consensus among regulators of the systemic 
risks of global financial markets.545 In particular, the failure of Continental Illinois 
bank in 1984 caused the U.S. regulators to acknowledge the inadequacy of existing 
prudential regulations in the context of risks confronted by banks, and attracted an 
increasing attention of the urgent need for a more comprehensive capital adequacy 
framework. 546 In this regard, this view argues that crisis acted as an impetus for the 
introduction of new ideas in policy circle.547 This claim acknowledges that consensual 
knowledge of systemic risk was necessary but insufficient to produce an international 
agreement. With respect to the creation of the U.K./U.S. accord leading to the 
establishment of the Basel Accord, this view implies that although all the G-10 states 
wanted to create a global standard, it took a demonstration of market power to move the 
negotiations along. 
545 See Kastein, Between Power and Purpose, supra note 436, at 277. In this regard, one argues that the issue 
of capital adequacy emerged by the supervisors, but not in a multilateral context. Further, an international 
agenda to strengthen the safety and soundness of banking system emerged as a result of domestic politics in 
the United States rather than a collective solution to the debt crisis on the part of central bankers. See 
Kapstein, Supervising International Banks, supra note 434, at 12. 
546 See Kapstein, Between Power and Purpose, supra note 436, at 277. 
547 See Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma, supra note 404, at 338. 
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Some critics charge its inability to explain the dynamics of the Basel negotiations.548 
The point to note is that capital adequacy regulations cost too mush, as they influence 
bank's profit margins.549 Ifregulators are rational, there are a great number of 
incentives for countries to free ride, and let other states suppose the costs of global 
financial stability.55o Systemic risk is not a helpful variant because it cannot provide an 
answer to the question of why U.S. and U.K. regulators made their efforts to produce an 
agreement, while Japanese regulators were resistant to an increase in capital standards. 
b) Redistributive Cooperation 
Some observers charge the functionalist logic by arguing that the Basel Accord was 
an instance of redistributive cooperation.551 With the Mexican announcement of their 
inability to meet their upcoming interest payment obligations to foreign banks, the 
industrialized countries tried to address the LDC debt crisis through the IMF in order to 
548 See Singer, supra note 508, at 550. 
549 See id. 
550 Id. 
551 See Oatley & Nabors, Redistributive Cooperation, supra note 499, at 36. 
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bailout large Western banks struggling due to the crisis.552 In particular, the U.S. 
regulators initially sought to cope with the debt crisis through a wealth transfer from 
voters to commercial banks and a risk transfer from commercial banks to voters rather 
than by enacting stricter regulations governing internationallending.553 The IMF was 
deemed to achieve both objectives.554 That is, with additional capital the IMF was to 
provide Latin American debtor governments with new credits that could then be used to 
service their loans. This process led to the transfer of the ownership of a portion of 
developing countries' debt to the public sector. 555 As part of this arrangement, 
commercial banks were required to restructure their existing commitments and extend 
additional loans. 556 Since implementing this strategy required the IMF to boost its 
resources by 47 percent, and thus part of this revenue was to come from a $4.7 billion 
552 See Kapstein, Supervising International Banks, supra note 434, at 12. 
553 See Oatley & Nabors, Redistributive Cooperation, supra note 499, at 42. In this sense, the weakness of 
commercial banks was not sufficient to bring about a demand for international financial regulation. See id. 
554 See id. at 43. 
555 Id. ("Through this process, "society as a whole," rather than the commercial banks, would bear the risk of 
default by less-developed countries ... "). 
556 See Thomas Oatley, The Dilemmas of International Financial Regulation, Regulation, Vol. 23, No.4 
(Spring 2001) at 37. 
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outlay from the United States. The U.S. Congress approved the expenditure,557 but 
requested tightening of domestic banking regulations and an increase in commercial 
banks' levels of capita1.558 In response, the U.S. banks protested this unilateral measure 
in arguing that the proposal could lead to both a decrease in international and domestic 
lending, and an exacerbation of their competitive difficulties in relation to foreign, 
particularly less-regulated Japanese banks and nonblank financial institutions due to 
cross-national differences in existing capital adequacy regulations.559 
In addressing the competing pressures from voters and commercial banks, Congress 
synthesized the IMF quota increase, regulatory concerns about capital levels, and the 
banks' concerns over unilateral regulation in the International Lending Supervision Act 
(ILSA) of 1983. The ILSA required the U.S. regulators to increase domestic capital 
adequacy standards, and it encouraged other major banking countries' regulators to 
557 With a deepest recession in the 1980s, voters opposed to using of taxpayer dollars to rescue a number of 
commercial banks. See Oatley & Nabros, Redistributive Cooperation, supra note 499, at 43. In response to 
this analysis, one argues that additional government spending or taxes are not required for an IMF quota 
increase. See Singer, supra note 508, at 551. 
558 See Oatley, The Dilemmas, supra note 556, at 37. From the perspective of Congress, its advantage to 
raise new capital would be a demonstration that taxpayers (voters) would not bear the full costs of the debt 
crisis. See id. 
559 See Kapstein, Supervising International Banks, supra note 434, at 13; see also Oatley & Nabors, 
Redistributive Cooperation, supra note 499, at 44. 
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work toward strengthening the capital bases of banks involved in international 
lending. 560 The redistributive theory contends that the ILSA met voter demands by 
forcing banks to raise new capital and take at least part of the responsibility for their 
unsound lending practices.56l Concurrently, it claims that an international agreement 
mitigated the banks' concerns over the loss of market share due to their potential 
placement at a competitive disadvantage to other competitors.562 In other words, an 
international agreement on capital adequacy provided American legislators a means to 
satisfy both demands: the voters would get regulations to prevent their responsibility for 
unsound bank lending practices; the commercial banks would be compensated by 
mitigating the regulatory advantage enjoyed by foreign banks.563 In this way, Congress 
linked stricter capital standards in the U.S. to the successful competition of an 
international agreement. 564 More importantly, this theory argues that there was no 
evidence of international market failure once capital adequacy reached the G-l 0 
560 
12 U.S.C. 1280, 128l. 
561 
See Oatley & Nabors, supra note 499, at 45. 
562 See id. 
563 Id. at 45-46. 
564 See Oatley, The Dilemmas, supra note 556, at 37. To the contrary, one argues that "[I]fthe banks were 
going to be forced to raise, at least it would be done on a multilateral rather than a unilateral basis." See 
Kapstein, Supervising International Banks, supra note 434, at 14. 
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agenda.565 Moreover, widespread commercial bank weakness was not evident, nor did 
all G-10 regulators believe that harmonized capital adequacy regulations would create 
benefits relative to the regulatory status quO.566 Finally, this view asserts that the 
exercise of U.S. financial market power led to a multilateral agreement of the Basel 
Accord.567 The Basel Accord is arguably a case of redistributive cooperation.
568 
In response to the redistributive theory, some observers acknowledge the significance 
of the U.S. market power in the creation of the Basel Accord, but point to the 
inconsistency of congressional view on the Basel Accord. Thus, this perspective 
emphasizes that a principal-agent framework is necessary for a full explanation of the 
preferences of U.S. regulators during the Basel negotiations.
569 
565 See Oatley & Nabors, supra note 499, at 48. Oatley and Nabors argue that "even if we accept the premise 
that the debt crisis revealed an international financial market failure, this was not sufficient to generate a 
demand for international regulation." See id. at 45. 
566 Id. 
567 See id. at 49. 
568 Id. at 52. 
569 See Singer, supra note 508, at 552. 
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c) The Confidence-Competitiveness Framework570 
During the 1980s both the United States and the UK. confronted an increased threat 
from Japanese banks.571 Moreover, US. markets were home to a rising proportion of 
Japanese bank assets.572 By 1988, more than 38 percent of the assets ofthe Japanese 
banks were held in overseas branches, mostly in the United States and the UK.573 In 
1985, Japanese intemationallending surpassed US. lending for the first time.574 As a 
result, both the United States and the UK. experienced an exogenous shock to 
competitiveness in the mid-1980s.575 Some observers argue that if Japanese banks were 
to hold the same capital level as their competitors in the United States and the UK., 
their competitive advantage would be severely lowered.576 Exogenous shocks to 
570 The assumption of the confidence-competitiveness framework is that regulators choose policies that 
defend their decision-making from direct political intervention. See id. at 553. As a result, regulators can 
strike a balance between the competitiveness of regulated finns and voter confidence in the stability of 
financial institutions. Id. Accordingly, regulators are more likely to seek international regulatory 
hannonization when confidence is declining, or when less-regulated foreign finns impinge on the market 
share of domestic finns. Id. 
571 See id. at 554. The data for the total assets of the ten largest banks in the world for 1974, 1984, and 1994 
shows the remarkable growth of Japanese banks at the expense of U.S. and U.K. banks. See id. at 555. 
572 See id. at 554. 
573 See Henry S. Terrell, The Activities of Japanese Banks in the United Kingdom and in the United States, 
1980-88, Federal Reserve Bulletin (Feb. 1990). 
574 See Financial Times, January 31, 1986, at 24. 
575 See Singer, supra note 508, at 554. 
576 See Devesh Kapur, Reforming the International Financial International System: Key Issues, in Global 
Financial Refonn: How, Why and When? (2000). In 1986, Citicorp and Barclays (U.K.) had capital-to-asset 
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confidence were also remarkable in the Basel Accord case. As witnessed by the debt 
crisis of 1982, despite an IMF quota increase to deal with the crisis in the short term, 
market confidence was badly shaken by the imprudent lending practices of a number of 
u.s. commercial banks.577 The failures of Continental Illinois and John Matthey 
Bankers (U.K.) in 1984 were distressing to regulatory authorities, and called into 
question the stability of their countries' banking system.578 Due to a tremendous 
number of bank failures in both countries during the 1980s, voter confidence was badly 
shaken in both countries.579 
While the United States and the u.K. were experiencing simultaneous shocks to 
competitiveness and confidence, regulators in each country were in agreement on the 
ratios of 4.73 and 4.71, respectively, whereas Japan's Dai-Ichi Kangyo, Sumitomo, and Fuji had ratios of2.38, 
2.89 and 2.95. See Herve De Carmoy, Global Banking Strategy: Financial Markets and Industrial Decay 
(1996). 
577 See Singer, supra note 508, at 554. Exposure among the dozen largest American banks in the five most 
indebted Latin American countries ranged from a low of 82.7 percent to a high of262.8 percent, with most 
banks falling between 140 and 180 percent. See Oatley & Nabors, supra note 499, at 42. 
578 See Arturo Estella, Dealing with Financial Instability: The Central Bank's Toolkit, New York Federal 
Reserve Bank Discussion Paper (Jan. 23, 2001). 
579 See Singer, supra note 508, at556. By contrast, Japanese banks were not much exposed to LDCs during 
the debt crisis, and there were no high-profile bank insolvencies throughout the 1980s. Because of a close 
linkage between banking industry and government in Japan, and implicit guarantees of government support to 
business in difficult times, exogenous shocks to confidence are rare. Id. at 557. 
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urgent need for international regulatory hannonization.580 These regulators recognized 
that sufficient levels of confidence and competition could not be obtained without a 
change to Japanese regulations.58l This view argues that regulators from the United 
States and the u.K. made their sustained efforts to establish international capital 
adequacy standards, thereby creating a variable win-set for regulatory policy, as 
evidenced by the Anglo-American Accord in 1987.582 
d) Concluding Remarks 
The dynamics underlying the creation of the Basel Accord imply that a more general 
negotiating process lies at the heart of international financial regulation. Regulatory 
authorities shift regulation from the domestic arena to international arena in order to 
avoid domestic battle with their banking institutions. As a consequence, international 
financial regulation has little with rectifying market failures resulting from international 
580 See id. 
581 See id. ("More stringent regulations were necessary to bolster stability, but the resulting loss of 
competitiveness was too great to bear."). 
582 Id. 
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financial integration. Rather, regulators adopt international regulations to minimize the 
distributional outcomes ofregu1atory reform in an increasingly integrated international 
financial system.583 
The principal-agent relationship between legislatures and regulators is significant to 
understanding when and why states seek global financial standards. As such, regulators 
as well as legislatures are deemed crucial players in the negotiating process. Thus, the 
regulator's incentives derive from the possibility oflegis1ative intervention. In tum, the 
legislature's incentives arise from the need to choose an optimal trade-off between 
confidence and competitiveness. In particular, regulators are required to use regulatory 
policy as the only tool at their disposal to strike a balance between confidence and 
competitiveness. In the event of an exogenous shock to competitiveness, or confidence 
regulatory policy may be ineffective in maintaining this balance unilaterally, in which 
case regulators have incentives to seek an international regulatory agreement to maintain 
their autonomy. 
583 
See Oatley, supra note 556, at 37. 
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Here the issue of the Basel Accord needs to be addressed by focusing on the varying 
preferences of national regulators in the context of legislative constraints rather than on 
systemic concepts such as international market failures and global public goods. In 
addition, it is significant to note the trade-off between voter confidence and financial 
sector competitiveness. 
c. Evaluating the Basel Accord 
i. The Basel Accord of 1988 
The Basel Accord of 1988 (Basel I) set forth minimum standards for internationally 
active banks pegged at eight percent of risk-weighted assets.584 Since its inception, Basel I 
is still the basis for the requirements of the size and the structure of the capital banking 
institutions in more than 100 countries all over the world. 585 Basel I goes further on the 
584 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards, Publications (July 1988), available at http://www.bis.org/pubVindex.htm (last visited January 10, 
2003). 
585 See Patricia Jackson et aI., Capital Requirements and Bank Behavior, supra note 224, at 1; see also 
Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, Regional Financial Institutionalization and the Creation of a Zone of Law: The Context 
of Financial StabilitylRegulation in East Asia, 35 Int'l Law. 1627,1647 (2001) ("While many countries have 
adopted the Basel principles, they are not necessarily rigorously enforced due to the high threshold for an 
emerging economy and the low compliance rate ofthe regulations. This reflects an acceptance of principles 
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premise that a single capital structure, based on minimum capital ratio of eight percent, was 
universally optimal for banks both in terms of return on equity and adequate protection for 
depositors and their insurers.586 As such, a determinist notion of economic efficiency is 
embedded in Basel I as in the Core Principles. As the unintended outcomes led by 
regulations often get regulators away from their goals, the Basel 8 percent standard, based 
on a single, lockstep model of economic efficiency, has inevitably brought about its adverse 
consequences. In short, due to its simplicity of the "one-size-fits-all" standard, the Basel I 
framework could not catch up with the ongoing evolution of banking fueled by the 
emergence of new complex financial instruments and techniques in banking. Accordingly, 
banking institutions have learned to exploit its loopholes, that is, they can evade higher 
standards through regulatory capital arbitrage,587 which is not strictly cheating but lawful 
because otherwise they would not be able to attract foreign investment or fmance in the international financial 
market."). 
586 See McCoy, supra note 331, at 439. 
587 Regulatory capital arbitrage refers to the gaming of the capital standards, that is, the exploitation of 
loopholes that allows banking institutions to lower the amount of capital for a given level of risk. It is not 
necessarily undesirable, because in many cases, regulatory capital arbitrage acts as a safety valve, preventing 
the capital rules from distorting bank behavior in noneconomic ways. Put differently, regulatory capital 
arbitrage serves to reduce the adverse effects that are in excess of the levels warranted by a specific activity's 
underlying economic risk. In this way, arbitrage may appropriately lower the effective capital requirements 
against safe activities that banks would otherwise be forced to drop by the effects of regulations. See Alan 
Greenspan, The Role of Capital in Optimal Banking Supervision and Regulation, Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York Economic Policy Review (Oct. 1998) at 164-165. 
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exploitation of intentional and unintentional regulatory loopholes in contravention of the 
objectives of the standards. 
Despite its desirable effects, arbitrage may undermine the effectiveness of the capital 
rules and cause some economic distortions in that it is not costless and thus not without 
implications for resource allocation.588 Because regulators did not interestingly want to 
influence banks' resource allocation decision, the formal capital standards do not 
include very many risk buckets.589 As a consequence, the "one-size-fits-all" standard 
does that by forcing the bank to strive to negate the capital standard, or exploit it in case 
of a significant disparity between the arbitrary standard and internal, economic capital 
requirement. 590 The disparities between internally required economic capital and the 
regulatory capital standard create another problem of the possibility that normally high 
regulatory capital ratios may mask the true level of insolvency probability.591 This 
possibility becomes more acute as banks arbitrage away inappropriately high capital 
588 See id. at 166. 




requirements on their safest assets by removing these high quality assets from the 
balance sheet via securitization.592 Through securitizing assets, banks can unbundle and 
repackage risks to transform on-balance sheet assets into off-balance sheet assets that 
fall into lower risk weight categories.593 The issue is not only the appropriateness of 
the capital requirements on the bank's residual risk in the securitized assets, but the 
sufficiency of regulatory capital requirements on the assets remaining on the book.594 
Such "cherry picking" goes further to leave on the balance sheet only low quality assets 
for which economic capital allocations are greater than the 8 percent regulatory 
standard.595 In other words, against this lower quality balance sheet, the Basel Accord's 
eight percent capital requirement may be insufficient, and thus the bank's capital ratios 
may not offer an appropriate measure of the bank's true financial condition.596 Thus, 
592 Id. 
593 See Oatley, supra note 556, at 38. 
594 See Greenspan, The Role of Capital, supra note 587, at 166. 
595 See id. 
596 See Oatley, supra note 556, at 38. 
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banks can sell off loans to avoid higher capital requirements that otherwise would apply 
if those loans would remain on the books.597 
Moreover, the Basel Accord's simple risk classification scheme has called into 
question. Under the Basel Accord's relatively crude system of weighting risk, 
according to its supposed level of risk, assets are divided into four broad categories, 
referred to as buckets: a zero risk weight to governments of states in the OECD, a 20 
percent risk weight to OECD banks and non-OECD governments, a 50 percent risk for 
mortgage lending, and a 100 percent risk to all other loans.598 Under this system, nearly 
all private sector loans are dealt with as equivalent from a risk standpoint, with identical 
capital holding requirements. Banks have taken advantage ofthis simple risk-weighted 
capital system, thereby altering their lending practice in ways that they evade regulatory 
oversight. For example, the risk classification offers incentive to bank to hold riskier 
loan portfolios than they would have otherwise. Moreover, banks have incentives to 
shift: toward higher-risk, higher-interest assets within each category, because the 
597 See id. 
598 See id. at 38. 
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regulations assign the same risk weighting and capital costs to all loans within a given 
category. For example, a loan to a AAA-rated company receives the same risk 
weighting as a loan to a junk-rated company, even though the loan to the junk has a 
much higher probability of default. Because the banks charge higher interest to the 
junk, they are more likely to make that loan than to lend money at a lower interest rate 
to the secure company. In classifying sovereign debt, the four-bucket system assumes 
that assets with higher weights have higher risks than lower-weighted assets, but that is 
not always the case. For example, relatively risky loans to Mexican banks require four-
fifths less capital than loans to secure corporations with AAA credit, simply because 
Mexico is a member of the OECD.599 This problem of simplification has created 
increasing distortions over the years. 
Given these difficulties with one-size-fits-all nature of the capital regulations, it is 
understandable that calls have arisen for the reform ofthe Basel Accord of 1988. The 
599 It is widely acknowledged that assigning a 20 percent weight to short-term bank lending, as opposed to the 
100 percent that lending to most private nonblank institutions carries caused an increase in lending to Asian 
banks, which in tum contributed to the Asian crisis of 1997. Sixty percent of the $380 billion in international 
bank lending to Asia at the end of 1997 had a maturity of one year or less. See Z. Minton-Beddoes, A Survey 
of Global Finance: Time for a Redesign?, The Economist, Jan. 30, 1999. 
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last decade have witnessed considerable economic turbulence and the increased new 
complex financial instruments and techniques in banking sector. Under the 
circumstances, banking institutions have made significant improvements in risk 
management, and thus there has been a need for the reform of the Basel Accord to keep 
pace with market developments. In response, The Basel Accord has been modified 
twice. 
As the 1988 Basel Accord's focus on credit risk was too narrow, it could not 
adequately address the complexities and risks inherent in the growth of international 
bank participation in swaps and aTe derivative activities.6oo That is, understandably 
the Basel Accord ignored market risk as well as many new complex financial 
instruments. Indeed, this gap in risk treatment arose largely because new scope and 
degree of financial innovation did not exist at the time when it was originally drafted. 
600 See Joseph J. Norton & Chridtopher D. Olive, The Ongoing Process ofIntemational Bank Regulatory and 
Supervisory Convergence: A New Regulatory-Market "Partnership", 16 Ann. Rev. Banking 227, 298 (1997). 
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Additionally, Internally active banks conducted more heavily traditional banking and 
intermediary functions where credit risk was the most significant factor. 601 
The 1996 Amendment602 mainly coped with the ways banking institutions should 
adjust their capital based on market risk that arises from broad factors in contrast to risk 
of loss from specific loss from specific loans and investments. Its significance is the 
addition to the Basel Accord of qualitative standards for banks basing their capital 
requirements on the consequences of internal models, a relatively new approach to the 
measurement of capital proposed to the banking community in 1995. Tentatively 
accepted in the 1996 amendment was the use of the bank's own internal model as an 
evaluation of specific risk. The 1996 amendment allowed banks to choose between a 
standardized approach developed by the Basel Committee for measuring market risk, or 
to use their own internal value-at-risk (V AR). The purpose of this choice was to 
recognize that many international banks develop and use risk management systems that 
601 In April 1993, the Base Committee formally addressed guidelines concerning capital adequacy 
requirements for market risk. See Basel Committee, The Supervisory Treatment of Market Risks (Apr. 1993). 
602 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Overview of the Amendment to the Capital Accord to 
Incorporate Market Risks (1996), available at http://www.bis.org/publlbcbsc23,pdf(lastvisited Oct. 1,2004). 
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are far more sophisticated and tailored to the international institutions than could ever be 
developed by a regulatory authority. However, recognizing the shortcoming in its 
policy, the Basel Committee amended its market rules so that banks can use internal risk 
measurement systems if they can demonstrate that the systems adequately capture 
risk.603 
Here it is significant to note that the 1996 amendment adopted self-regulation 
concept in its market risk guidelines.604 Also, the guidelines require close working 
relationships between banks and their supervisors in a pUblic-private partnership.605 
The 1998 Amendment is the second modification.606 Under the 1998 Amendment, 
the Basel Committee resolved certain speculations contained in the 1996 Amendment. 
Its chief purpose in the 1998 Amendment was to confirm the bank's ability to use its 
own internal model to estimate both market risk and specific risk. Although it is not 
603 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Explanatory Note: Modification of the Basel Capital Accord of 
july 1988 (Sept. 19,1997), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p970918a.htm (last visited Oct.!, 2004). 
604 See Norton & Olive, The Ongoing Process of International Bank Regulatory and Supervisory 
Convergence, supra note 600, at 309. 
605 This partnership, among regulators, and large and complex banking organizations (LCBOs), so called elite 
banks, shows at least greater reliance by public sector on private sector involvement. See Joseph J . Norton, 
A Perceived Trend in Modem International Financial Regulation: Increasing Reliance on A Public-Private 
Partnership, 37 Int'l L. 43, 43 (2003). 
606 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks 
(1996, updated 1998), available at http://www.bis.org/publlbcbsc222,pdf(last visited Oct. 1,2004). 
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provided in the 1998 Amendment, the bank's internally created model is deemed as the 
device of the future in the establishment of bank capital. The use of the model was 
contingent upon the bank's establishing supervisory approval of the model from both 
home and host countries. 607 The approval is on the basis of four principles: (1) the 
bank's risk management system must be conceptually sound and implemented with 
integrity; (2) the bank has a sufficient number of trained staff; (3) the model must have a 
record of reasonable accuracy; and (4) bank conducts stress tests of its model. On its 
face, the amendment seemed to be another example of the Basel Committee's 
responsiveness to industry trends. However, its attempt to keep up with market 
developments has fallen short of the mark. Consequently, a widespread recognition 
that the Basel Accord needs to be revised to match capital to risk has created Basel II. 
607 See id. at 38. 
226 
ii. Basel II 
On June 26, 2004, the Basel Committee released Basel II, a new capital adequacy 
framework for banks, with the endorsement of G-l 0 central bank governors and heads of 
supervision.608 Following the publication of the Committee's first round of proposals for 
revising the capital adequacy framework in June 1999, an extensive consultative process 
was set in train in all member countries and the proposal were also circulated to supervisory 
authorities worldwide. The Basel Committee subsequently released additional proposals 
for consultation in January 2001 and April 2003, and furthermore carried on three 
quantitative impact studies related to its proposals. As a consequence of these efforts, 
many valuable improvements have been made to the original proposals.609 While the 
Basel Accord focused on the bank's capital level, Basel II emphasizes the measurement and 
management of significant \>anking risks, such as credit risk, market risk, and operation 
608 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework, Basel Committee Publications No. 107 (June 2004), available 
at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs103.pdf(lastvisitedJuly 3,2004). Basel II will be implemented in two 
phases. The so-called standardized and foundation levels of capital adequacy-which will still be set by 
regulators-are due to come into force at the end of 2006. The advantage system, which will see more 
sophisticated banks use their own systems to calculate the required amount, will follow a year later. See 
Elizabeth Rigby, G 1 0 nations put Basel II on the map-Bank Capital, Financial Times, June 28, 2004, at 24. 
609 See id. 
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risk.610 Basel II framework seeks to compare the maximum losses that the bank may suffer 
over the year ahead with the available buffer for the losses.611 Its purpose is to provide a 
methodology for the bank to prepare a statement that compares risk and buffer. 
Basel II framework builds on two significant trends to incorporate a new philosophy for 
banking supervision.612 It combines a risk-focused approach to supervision with incentives 
for prudent risk-taking into coherent policy objective that seeks to promote adequate 
capitalization. Basel II reinforces the focus of management on control structures through 
incorporating in all three of its pillars clear incentives for banks to improve their 
management ofrisk.613 
• First, in Pillar 1 (Minimum Capital Requirements) regulatory capital charges are 
aligned more closely to the bank's own measures of risk. This creates immediate 
incentives for banks to improve those measures. 
• Likewise, Pillar 2 (Supervisory Review) emphasizes that responsibility for 
610 See Ryozo Rimino, Basel II-towards a new common language, BIS Quarterly Review (Sept, 2004) at 4l. 
611 See id. 
612 See Jaime Caruana: Making diligent preparations for Basel II, Opening Remarks at the 13th International 
Conference of Banking Supervisors (Sept. 22-23, 2004), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r040928h .. pdf 
(last visited Dec. 5, 2004)., supra nopte . 
613 The Basel Committee, Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards: a Revised Framework (June 2004), supra note 608. 
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assessing capital adequacy lies with the bank's management. Supervisors wi111 
review and respond to those internal assessments, thereby creating incentives 
for banks to evaluate their exposures thoroughly and to plan their capital strategies 
carefully. 
• Finally, Pillar III (Market Discipline) seeks to make the bank's risk profile more 
transparent to outside investors and market participants. This should better enable the 
market to reward banks that takes a responsible approach to risk management and penalize 
those that do not. Market disciple can serve as a powerful incentive for prudent behavior in 
that markets are sometimes stricter than supervisors. 
Basel II's combination of a process-oriented focus with incentives for banks to improve 
their risk management intends to provide benefits both for individual banks and for the 
banking system as a whole.614 For an individual bank, Basel II attempts to encourage 
management to adopt approaches that are related to the risks the bank confronts and that are 
appropriate for its level of sophistication so that it can ensures that the bank takes prudent 
614 See id. 
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steps to protect itself against losses, including making appropriate use of its capital 
resources. 
Since a consultative paper for a new capital adequacy framewok was put forward in 
1999, the Basel Committee's proposals have attracted critiques from financial practitioners, 
academics, and politicians. One of the main concerns over Basel II is its complexity. 
Basel II comprised of 251 pages is filled with high technical language and arcane 
mathematical formulations, while the Basel Accord of 1988 comprised 30 pages. The 
complexity is an obstacle to enforcement and makes it easier for vested interests to find 
ways around new rules.615 Its enormous complexity will impose a heavy cost burden on 
bankers who are required to design systems and educate staff to deal with the complex new 
rules.616 Moreover, it is very difficult to implement even-handedly across numerous 
regulatory regimes. Accordingly, Basel II framework needs to be relatively simplified. 
615 See Avinash Persaud, The Basel plan must get back to market basics, Financial Times, Sept. 3, 2003, at 21. 
616 Basel II Bombshell, The Banker (April 1, 2003) (quoting Comptroller of the Currency John J. Hawke). 
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Another concern about Basel II is that its sophisticated prescriptions place emerging 
countries and companies at disadvantage.617 Banking regulation should not be too 
prescriptive. Good banking involves the ability to use different information in a different 
way, to lend safely to borrowers to whom others do not lend. In this sense, the special 
situation and concern of emerging countries should be taken into account. Additional 
mounting criticism is that Basel II penalizes small and medium sized enterprises. In this 
regard, American unilateralism over Basel II has upset Europeans. Because of the 
criticism that Basel II will give larger banks an advantage, the U.S. regulators plan to apply 
the new risk-based capital standards only to the largest banks, whereas Basel II is to be 
incorporated into EU law and applied to all banks and investment firms, not just 
internationally active bankS.618 As noted above, Basel II is decidedly controversial. Thus 
the adoption of Basel II should not be the end ofthe story. As we have learned from 
considerable financial turmoil and policy responses over the past decades, a mechanism for 
continued review of the capital regulation should be included in financial regulation. 
617 
See Persaud, supra note 615, at 21. 
618 
Basel II Bohmshell, supra note 616. 
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C. Lessons to be Drawn from Basel 
As witnessed in the Basel Committee's creation of the bank supervisory standards, the 
Committee's attempts to keep pace with the improvements of risk management in banking 
organizations have fallen short of the mark. Since the 1996 Amendment, the Basel 
Committee has incorporated the concept of the pUblic-private partnership between bank 
authorities and leading large and complex banking organizations (LCBOs), called as elite 
banks, approach into bank supervision. Notably, this partnership approach vests elite 
banks with greater independence and discretion to identify, measure, monitor, and manage 
the material risks arising from trading book and banking book activities, subject to 
compliance with qualitative and quantitative parameters.619 As a result, banking 
supervision paradigm increasingly guides the commercial banks to develop and implement 
comprehensive risk management and internal control frameworks that are suitable for their 
619 See Joseph J. Norton, Selective Bank Regulatory and Supervisory Trends Upon Entering the 21 st Century, 
Essays in International Financial & Economic Law, No. 34 (2001) at 30. 
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particular institutional risk profiles-a fonn of qualified self-regulation--subject to 
prudential standards.62o 
Nonetheless, elite banks and their banking authorities have recently been caught in 
significant risk management and internal control failures including the OTC derivatives and 
counterpart credit episodes underscoring the Asian financial crises over 1997-1998, and 
more significantly the LTCM episode of 1998. These cases imply that the risk 
management and internal control standards created by the Basel Committee may not be 
successfully implemented or self-enforced by the elite banks. Indeed, the collective 
motivation and incentives for elite banks to successfully implement and enforce these 
standards seem to be absent or compromised by profitability concerns. 621 Accordingly, the 
framework for risk management and internal control systems needs to establish a careful 
and transparent rebalancing of power such that elite banking interests do not unduly affect 
or overcome the safety and soundness interests of banking authorities.622 In this regard, it 
is noteworthy the Basel Committee's adoption of three pillars in Basel II despite 
620 See id. at 31. 
621 See Norton, A Perceived Trend in Modem International Financial Regulation, supra note 605, at 57. 
622 See id. 
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considerable criticisms against the Basel II. In particular, the pillar 2-a higher priority on 
bank supervision: an increased supervisory review of a bank's internal assessment of its 
own capital adequacy- is a new approach relying more than before on the internal 
measures and management practices of banks, and giving them more incentives to invest in 
better information systems and controls. Likewise, the pillar 3-an increased emphasis on 
market discipline: additional disclosure of bank risk profiles- may be a dramatic change 
from many practices. Although market judgments would never be perfect, market 
feedback can playa larger role as banks develop and disclose better information. For their 
part, bank supervisors can certainly use the market's help as they deal with ever-more-
complex rules and banking practices. These developments could herald a fundamental 
transformation of the regulation as a pure public function to a joint pUblic/private 
undertaking. 
The premise ofthese two pillars is that well-functioning markets can go a long way to 
induce firms to make socially optimal decisions. There is a role for government, but the 
best way to carry out that role is to encourage the banking market to do as much of the 
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work as possible. However, it seems idealistic for bank regulatory authorities to direct 
market incentives to attain the regulatory goals of safe and stable banking markets, which 
enhance maximum sustainable growth. In this sense, it can be said that market discipline 
is not a panacea, because financial disclosures do not always provide the market with 
sufficient information to fully assess a bank's risk position and overall capital adequacy. 
At the same time, there are limits to how much informed and timely discipline the banking 
market can assert, because of the inherent difficulty of measuring and understanding 
banking risks. Furthermore, Basel II's vagueness that gives national bank regulators a lot 
of discretion with regard to the validation of banks ' internal systems and the disclosure 
necessary to use those systems for the determination of capital charges creates uncertainty 
among market participants and regulators alike, which most certainly does not contribute to 
providing financial stability. As a consequence, bank regulatory authorities will easily be 
able to engage in regulatory forbearance and be subject to corruption. In these 
circumstances, it is not easy to predict how Basel II will work well although it is premature 
to do so. 
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As noted, vigorous efforts have been made by the Basel Committee to establish 
international bank regulatory and supervisory standards that build on and offer the potential 
to globalize the standards that exist within the most advanced countries. Similarly, other 
international financial institutions urge developing countries to adopt global financial 
standards through the harmonization of regulatory frameworks. If the harmonization 
conflicts with domestic economic imperatives, legitimate forms of global financial 
governance may be called into question. In this context, international policy makers 
should fully consider local conditions, such as national legal, business, and political 
practices and institutions when they design and formulate global standards. Most 
importantly, developing countries active on global financial markets should be allowed to 
comply with international standards by different routes and through divergent institutional 
arrangements. Consequently, the establishment of the new Basel capital adequacy accord 
(Basel II) should not be the end of the story. 
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v. The Search for a New International Financial Order 
A. The Dilemmas of International Financial Regulation 
Arguably, there are probabilities for regulatory arbitrage to occur where countries adopt 
identical capital adequacy policies but totally different rescue policies for failed banks 
among countries.623 The bank rescue policies adopted by central banks are highly 
divergent in ranging from strict market discipline denying recovery to shareholders of 
failed banks to full bailouts for bank shareholders prevalent in emerging economy markets. 
The bank rescue policies have feedback effects that change the future risk propensity of 
banks.624 No variance of capital adequacy rules in different countries has provided 
internationally active banks incentives to charter in countries with lenient bank rescue 
policies since they are not required to reserve additional capital to offset the heightened 
incentives for risk created by lenient bank rescue policies. Furthermore, international 
banks in less-regulated countries that operate abroad through branches rather than 
623 In the United States, approximately three quarters of failed banks are resolved through assisted mergers 
with other banks, whereas Japan, Finland, Sweden, and Norway rely principally or exclusively on open bank 
assistance (government bailouts). See Acharya, Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy 
Regulation Desirable? 16 (Nov. 2, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/abstracUd=223768 (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2003). 
624 If a state bails out the bank's shareholders, the bailout encourages other banks' shareholders to increase 
risk-taking with impunity. See id. at 24-26. 
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separately incorporated subsidiaries have higher incentives to increase their risk-taking 
abroad and at home. This is because if the bank becomes insolvent, the generous rescue 
policies of the lenient country will apply to the entire banking group including its overseas 
branches. As one argues, global convergence of capital regulation is desirable only if it is 
accompanied by a standardization of other aspects of banking regulation, such as monetary 
policies and bank rescue packages as well.625 Thus, an appropriate divergence in capital 
requirements may be necessary where such accompanying convergence is infeasible. 
"Differences in economic conditions and organizational structures across countries may 
also accentuate the need for such divergence.,,626 
These circumstances take this study to another significant issue: ifbanks should be 
regulated by governments, is there a need for international financial regulation to manage 
international financial integration? In other words, has governments' ability to look to 
national regulation to maintain stability of banks incorporated in their jurisdictions been 
eroded by increasingly changing financial activity, and thereby necessitates a shift to 
625 See id. at 16. 
626 See id. 
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international regulation? Arguably, governments need not shift regulation away from 
independent national regulatory authorities, because international financial integration 
creates no new market failures. 627 Here international coordination of regulatory 
responsibility is necessary, but states can arrange this coordination through agreement 
rather than internationally harmonizing prudential regulation. 
There is another question to be answered. If domestic regulation and international 
agreements can cope with banks' exposure to risk, then why does international financial 
regulation coexist with domestic regulation? As witnessed by the U.S. proposals for 
hannonized capital adequacy regulations, states created this regulation primarily as a 
political response to banks' fears about international competition. That is, disparities 
between domestic regulations brought about cost differentials that place banks at a 
competitive advantage or disadvantage. As a result, the banks in less-regulated states can 
provide banking services to customers at a lower price. Accordingly, international 
627 
See Oatley, supra note 556, at 37. 
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regulation that requires all governments to adopt a set of common standards removes these 
disparities by creating a level playing field in international finance. 
However, harmonizing international regulation may harm banks' safety through 
creating a level playing field. As regulation always creates unintended outcomes, there is a 
potential for harm arising from the interaction between the unintended consequences of 
financial regulation and the hostile nature of international decision-making.628 This 
interaction leads to a less safe banking system. 
Given the unintended outcomes, the Basel Accord may have made banks less secure. 
As noted, these problems have driven the revision of the Basel Accord. As evidenced in 
Basel II, the negotiations have produced, efforts to attain a better national banking 
regulation has not been in progress until the conclusion of a better international agreement 
on banking. 629 A better international banking agreement has been in no progress by 
distributive struggles between banks incorporated in distinct jurisdictions, between banks of 
628 See id. 
629 See id. at 38. 
240 
different sizes, and between banks and other non-banking institutions.63o Due to these 
attempts to use international regulation to create a level playing field have caused harmful 
delays in the introduction of necessary regulatory reforms. 
As national banking regulations are quickly outmoded, regulators struggle to catch up 
with the market development and unexpected negative effects. In these circumstances, 
governments need to retain the ability to regularly adjust and revise the regulatory 
framework. By contrast, international negotiations are not well suited to the task.631 
The ongoing international financial integration causes governments to continuously 
encounter a difficult regulatory dilemma. National financial regulation appears to create a 
safer financial system, but it can also cause financial institutions to shift their business to 
less regulated states. 632 To the contrary, international financial regulation can remove the 
unwanted competitive outcomes of unilateral national regulation, but it may create a 
weaker financial system.633 Hence, a domestic approach to regulation creates safer 
630 rd. at 38-39. 
631 See id. at 39. 
632 See id. 
633 rd. 
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financial institutions but less domestic financial business, whereas an international 
approach protects domestic financial business at the price of potentially weaker financial 
institutions. 
As discussed, the better solution may lie in domestic regulation supported by an 
international agreement on broad principles rather than opting for either domestic or 
international regulation.634 Governments can move further away from one-size-fits-all 
international regulations in favor of establishing broad regulatory goals that each state can 
then pursue through domestic regulation. To ensure that each state adopts regulations 
consistent with international objectives, the international community can implement a 
review process.635 Such an approach would not only eliminate the competitive 
consequences of purely national regulation but also maintain the flexibility of national 
regulation.636 
However, this perspective emphasizes exclusively the significance of governments, that 
is national regulators' role in regulating banking and other financial institutions. 




Accordingly, this view does not reflect the increasing importance of role of private sectors 
at both national and international financial markets, which will be addressed later. 
B. The Role of Private Regulation 
As noted, the world's bank regulatory authorities have been struggling to catch up with 
the market innovation over the past decades. This situation pertains in both developed and 
developing countries. Moreover, government central banks have been obsolete,637 whereas 
advances in information technology have increased the advantages of private interest 
regulation in several respects. Even though central banks currently enforce a variety of 
legal constraints on commercial banks, many of these restrictions have been undermined by 
financial innovations fueled by the information revolution. In particular, depositors too 
easily avoid any inefficient restrictions on domestic banks, as the price of remote access to 
offshore banking services is falling toward zero. In this regard, private clearinghouse 
637 Today central banks play five major roles: monopoly issuer of currency, banker's bank, regulator of 
commercial banks, lender of last resort, and conductor of monetary policy. See Lawrence H. White, In What 
Respects Will the Information Age Make Central Banks Obsolete?, Cato Journal, Vol. 21, No.2 (Fall 2001) at 
219. 
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association have always found it useful to improve and to enforce solvency and liquidity 
standards for their members, to ensure that their clearing partners would not default at the 
next clearing session.638 In this way, private clearinghouses are fully able to assess and 
internalize settlement risks and have a great track record even if central banks recall 
doomsday scenarios and fear about systemic risk in private delayed-settlement systems.639 
To prevent shrinkage of domestic banking industry, regulators are required to put an end to 
inefficient public regulations. The traditional public regulations that will survive will be 
those that provide advantages both to banking organizations and their customers. 
638 See id. at 223. The membership of clearinghouse that is a members-only club, with high standards for 
membership, has provided a credible seal of approval for depositors seeking a safe ballie Id. In the United 
States, private clearinghouses were never completely suppressed, they rather continue to process some checks, 
automated payments, ATM transfers, and large-volume transactions. The clearing volume on the private 
Clearing House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS) of the New York Clearing House Association (NYCHA) 
continues to rival the volume on the Federal Reserve's Fedwire system. See id. at 221-222. The CHIPS 
which is owned and operated by the NYCHA, an organization of the major New York City banks is a 
communication and net settlement system for payments by and two classes of participant banks located in 
New York city: settling and non-settling participants. For the detail, see Scott & Wellons, supra note 5, at 
600-615. As another type of the U.S. large value transfer system, the Fedwire is a communication and 
settlement owned by the twelve U.S. Federal Reserve Banks. For its operation, see id. at 599-600. A crucial 
point to note is that clearinghouses and organized exchanges are the classic examples of the private strategic 
responses to concerns about the stability and integrity. See Randall S. Kroszner, The Role of Private 
Regulation in Maintaining Global Financial Stability, Cato Journal, Vol. 18, No.3 (Winter 1999) at 356. 
639 See White, supra note 637, at 222 ("If commercial banks are freed from the constraint of holding account 
balances at the central bank, more of the clearing business may return to the private sector. This is 
particularly likely if central banks continue their current fixation with imposing real-time gross settlement in 
place of the more efficient netting and delayed-settlement systems, but not for any reason that withstands 
serious scrutiny."). 
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In fact, numerous international financial transactions take place in a realm that is close 
to anarchy. The offshore markets harbor safe from financial regulation and international 
agreements. When contractual disputes arise in international financial transactions, it is 
not easy to determine where they would be litigated and what laws would apply. The past 
several decades have witnessed the rapid expansion of global financial markets, and the 
remarkable growth of internationally active banking and financial institutions. The point 
to note is that the growth of many of the largest and most active global financial markets 
have actually been driven by the avoidance of traditional government regulations. 
Whereas frauds, mismanagement, and bankruptcies take place, market forces have been 
effective regulators that have created order, rule and norm out of the apparent catastrophe 
of the international banking and financial markets.64o As the collapse ofBCCI and the 
debacle ofBarings have shown, regulatory structures set forth and operated by national 
governments and designed to supervise domestic financial activities have been outmoded if 
not obsolete. Even though the overall stability and integrity of these markets is due 
640 See E. Kane, How Market Forces Influence the Structure of Financial Regulation, in Restructuring 
Banking and Financial Services (R.M. Kushrneider ed., 1988). 
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primarily to the role of private regulators rather than public regulatory authorities, many 
committees and institutions have attempted to coordinate domestic regulatory policies and 
negotiate international standards without projecting regulatory oversight into a global 
economy to avoid the complexity of multiple, overlapping regulatory structures that have 
been an important problem in financial market regulation. 
In that regard, it deserves noting one observer's application ofthree approaches to the 
allocation of regulatory authority: centralization, competition, and privatization.641 
According to these approaches, the Basel Accord is the best example of centralization of 
regulation of banking and financial institutions. As is always the case with centralization 
of regulatory standards, the critical question in the area of financial institutions regulation is 
whether wide-scale compliance or even compliance within the narrow range ofthe Basel 
Committee member countries or the OECD countries is a realistic aspiration. As shown in 
the Asian financial crisis, countries have found it difficult to coordinate domestic regulatory 
641 See Howell E. Jackson, Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in Financial Regulation, 2 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 649, 664 (2001). 
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structures with international standards. 642 Domestic interest groups and political 
consideration, which created different and typically lax regulatory structures in the past, 
remains resistant to reforms, despite the existence of international standards.643 
Centralization of regulatory functions is difficult to implement in the context that lacks a 
coordinating public authority, a characteristic that is often absent in the transnational arena 
and may even be only marginally effective in regional alliance such as the Europe Union.644 
On most of these dimensions, allocation of regulatory authority among member states 
represents an intermediate solution. It can create competitive pressures on regulatory 
officials if regulated firms have mobility to select among a range of legal regimes and that 
other conditions of competition are present. If centralization of regulatory standards 
cannot always deal with issues of regulation of financial institutions in international 
markets, models of competition or privatization could provide alternative solutions. 
642 See Raudi Bonte et aI., Supervisory Lessons to be Drawn from the Asian Crisis, Basel Committee 
Working Paper No.2 (June 1999), available at http://www.bis.org/publlhcbs_wp2.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 
2003). 
643 See Scott, supra note 259. 
644 See Jackson, supra note 641, at 670. 
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The elements of regulatory competition that already exist under the Basel Concordat of 
the 1970s have been redefined in the aftermath of the BCCI failure of the early 1990s.645 
To allow private firms to choose among the regulatory systems of member states raises the 
probability of sub-optimal outcomes in contexts where the mechanisms of competition are 
incomplete or where substantial agency costs and negative externalities may be present. 646 
An instructive demonstration of the privatization solution is the international swaps 
market. 647 The swaps market is an example of the kind of complex contractual networks in 
the global economy. It is primarily regulated by privately developed legal rule, most 
notably the standard agreements of the International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA).648 
However, even in the swaps market, where privatization is the dominant regulatory 
paradigm, a debate has been increasing over whether national or supranational, that is 
645 Under the Basel Concordat, domestic regulators were assigned to supervisory responsibility over certain 
foreign branches of domestic banking organizations so that for some time, national fmancial supervisors have 
had to taken an interest in the offshore activities of domestic banks. See Mandanis Schooner & Michael 
Taylor, Convergence and Competition: The Case of Bank Regulation in Britain and the United States, 20 
Mich. J. Int'l L. 595, 599-605 (1999); see also Basel Committee, supra note 465. The collapse of the BCCI 
called upon domestic supervisory agents to look upstream where domestic banking organizations are 
controlled by foreign financial conglomerates to evaluate the efficacy of the entity's consolidated supervision. 
See Daniel M. Leifer, Note, Putting the Super Back in the Supervision oflntemational Banking, Post-BCCI, 
60 Fordham L. Rev. S467 (1992). In this way, the world's bank regulators have increasingly been projecting 
their oversight internationally and offering the rudimentary structure of global supervision rather than 
concerning themselves exclusively with financial activities occurring within their own national boundaries. 
646 See Jackson, supra note 641, at 670. 
647 See id. at 665. 
648 See the ISDA homepage at http://www.isda.orgJindex.html. 
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centralized regulatory constraint should supplement existing safeguards.649 In particular, 
the failure of Long-Term Credit Management Limited in 1999 has drawn calla for reform in 
this area of financial supervision. Privatization of regulatory functions provides the 
greatest degree of flexibility and space for experimentation. 650 More importantly, private 
firms often have elaborate internal procedures for controlling risks, and those procedures 
may be likely to provide an efficient substitute for more traditional forms of mandatory 
governmentaloversight.651 Accordingly, innovations in strategic organizational design and 
governance for financial institutions can handle international regulatory challenges more 
effectively than traditional public regulation. 
649 See Jackson, supra note 641, at 666. 
650 See id. at 670. 
651 In this regard, one observer argues that "[w]hile there are ample reasons to doubt whether private 
incentives for risk-regulation are, in fact, appropriately aligned with the public interest, one can appreciate 
how private fIrms and their representatives could perceive private regulatory solutions as a cost-effective 
alternative to more familiar systems of supervision." See id. Further, it is asserted that "while representatives 
of private entities are not unmindful of issues of systemic risk and negative externalities, they may be less 
attuned to the possibility that the optimal level of risk-taking from a public perspective may well be lower 
than the optimal level from the perspective of the individual fIrm. As the costs of systemic risk and negative 
externalities are borne in large part by parties not in contractual privity with private fIrms, the market is not 
likely to force fIrms to internalize these costs. In addition, moral hazard problems, collective action problems, 
and the incentive-suppressing effects of public regulation may deaden cost internalization on the part of some 
parties, like depositors, who are in contractual privity with regulated fIrms. Finally, industry representatives 
involved in policy debates are likely to be drawn from better-managed and more successful fIrms. They may 
be less cognitive of the problems of incompetent managers and the perverse incentives facing fIrms in 
fInancial distress than are governmental offIcials, who deal with bad apples on a regular basis." See id. at 671 
n.58. 
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The private strategic responses to concerns about stability and integrity take many 
forms. 652 A traditional solution had been to create a members-only club, with high 
standards for membership, such as clearinghouses and organized exchanges. However, 
most recent growth in the global financial markets has been occurring outside of traditional 
members-only institutions. Over-the-counter derivatives trading has grown sharply during 
the past decades. It is noteworthy that much of the movement toward OTe markets is 
spurred by the desire to avoid the domestic regulation that has been imposed over time on 
organized exchanges.653 National financial regulatory authorities have struggled with 
claiming that such financial activities fall within their jurisdictions. In these effectively 
unregulated OTe markets, the strategic responses to the challenges of stability and integrity 
have taken a variety of forms. Independent credit-rating agencies playa key role in 
certifying the quality of potential counterparties to a transaction.654 Thus, private 
regulators have carried out the auditing, screening, and monitoring functions of the public 
regulators and have been quite effective even if they do not have the same legal powers to 
652 See Kroszner, supra note 638, at 356. 
653 See id. 
654 Id. 
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obtain information that public regulators do. By contrast, public regulators cannot be 
insulated from political and interest group pressures.655 The political pressures offer a 
background incentive different from that for the private regulators. Moreover, the public 
regulators have much greater difficulty than do the private regulators. Giving public 
regulators wide discretion is an invitation to political and interest group pressure. One 
argues that whereas the market is not a perfect regulator, the public regulatory alternative 
should not interfere with the creative experimentation and innovation.656 Further, a unified 
international regulator seems to slow the engine that generates the innovations that have 
driven the growth of the global financial markets without any clear stability advantages.657 
C. The Market as a Regulator 
Over the past decades, debates over the proper allocation of regulatory authority in 
banking and financial sectors have increasingly been common. This trend mainly 
attributes to the globalization of finance. In earlier times, technical constraints have not 
655 Id. at 359. 
656 See id. at 360. 
657 Id. 
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enabled issuers and intermediaries to engage in substantial volumes of financial 
transactions across national boundaries. As a consequence, regulatory jurisdiction could 
be allocated on a territorial basis. However, the evolution of technologies and financial 
markets has eroded national boundaries, and forced regulatory authorities to choose 
between the imposition of overlapping, potentially inconsistent supervision on a territorial 
basis and the creation of new paradigms for allocating or coordinating regulatory 
jurisdiction. In these circumstances, there is a need for the creation of a new regulatory 
paradigm.658 
This new regulatory paradigm necessitates a radical rethinking the scope of regulation 
and regulatory techniques. One possible option would be to use the market as the primary 
regulator, and insofar as traditional public regulation would continue to exist, it would seek 
to work with market mechanisms.659 This view highlights that the supervisory function 
might be limited to monitoring compliance with a few simple principles leaving the more 
difficult issues to be evaluated by the marketplace, such as other financial intermediaries, or 
658 See Michael Taylor, The Search for a New Regulatory Paradigm, 49 Mercer L. Rev. 793, 793 (1998). 
659 See id. at 802. 
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credit rating agencies on the basis oflegislatively mandated full disclosure of a bank's risk 
exposures. In this regard, the obligation to disclose may be backed up by stringent 
punishment of directors to make sure that they bear full responsibility both for the activities 
of their institutions and for the information released into the public domain. However, 
there are still some problems with reliance on greater disclosure.66o Most of banks active 
in foreign country are subsidiaries of major international banking organizations, and thus 
subject to the consolidated supervision of their home country supervisors. Additionally, 
there remain serious obstacles to the reliance on enhanced public disclosures as a way of 
dealing with the problem of supervising of institutions with active trading options. As 
noted above, the use of derivative instruments has increased the complexity and opacity of 
the risk profiles of financial institutions in ways that traditional accounting techniques 
cannot cope with. Moreover, the new financial instruments are off-balance-sheet in the 
context that entering into a derivatives contract does not give rise to immediate cash flows 
to the extent of the contract's face value, which is different from traditional loans. Since a 
660 Id. at 803. 
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derivative contract concerns future rights and obligations, how to value this is of 
significance. 
Although an exclusively disclosure-based regime might have its difficulties, it could be 
supplemented by enhanced reliance on the forces of self-regulation.661 However, there are 
still two fundamental problems with relying on greater public disclosure or self-regulation 
as a substitute for supervision.662 The first is the residual contagion risk that may result 
from the bank's failure, either through a loss of confidence in the banking sector as a whole 
or through banks' complex interplay in the payments system. As discussed above, the loss 
of confidence argument has been exaggerated in the integrated global economy, because 
there is little evidence that the bank's failure drive a widespread systemic crisis as the result 
of panic withdrawals by depositors.663 The payments systems aspects of contagion risk are 
also being lessened by remarkable improvements to the payment and settlements system 
661 See Group.ofThirty, Global Institutions, National Supervision and Systemic Risk 12 (1997) ("the 
fundamental responsibility for ensuring the stability of financial institutions, and thereby limiting systemic 
risk, rests with the board and management of global institutions themselves."). The standing committee 
notion is in effect a proposal for the leading international financial institutions to adopt a system of self-
regulation. See id. 
662 See Taylor, supra note 658, at 804. 
663 In fact, the evidence of recent banking crises in the East Asia is that bank collapses were entailed by a 
flight to quality in which depositors tend to move their funds to well-capitalized institutions authorized by 
jurisdictions with a high regulatory reputation. See id. 
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themselves. As risks within the payment systems become legal risks-the ability to take a 
charge over the collateral- rather than the credit risk of large intra-day exposures, the 
character of risks changes even if they are not abolished entirely. Although a large 
banking organization may theoretically fail without being the cause of widespread 
disruption to the whole banking system, there remain residual risks which it may be 
difficult to abolish.664 
The second reason that exclusive market-driven regulation may not be the solution is 
that it is politically impossible if the taxpayer continues to underwrite banks' deposit 
liabilities in the form of deposit protection schemes and access to lender of last resort 
facilities in most of countries although there are some differences in deposit guarantee 
arrangements.665 The movement toward relying on greater use of market forces and self-
regulation can only be fulfilled provided that there remains an explicit or implicit taxpayer 
guarantee against the outcomes of bank failure. Since the continued existence of deposit 
guarantee arrangements is a legacy of the old regulatory paradigm that provided a publicly-
664 See id. at 804. 
665 Id. at 804-805. 
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funded indemnity to consumers against the risk of loss, the potential risk to taxpayers was 
supposedly limited by a regulatory system that emphasized stability. Accordingly, deposit 
insurance schemes could exist precisely because an excess of regulations ensured that bank 
failures would be rare even if the price ofthis was steadily accumulating inefficiency in the 
financial system.666 
The point to note is that the techniques or regulation applied under the old paradigm 
cannot be transplanted to the new environment of financial services. Market forces may 
not be the exclusive substitute for the need for regulation. As such a new regulatory 
paradigm needs to involve much less of a role for traditional public regulation, that is 
external governmental regulation than was case before. There is a growing consensus that 
the partnership between regulatory authorities and market actors (private interests) is 
essential for the good governance and prudential regulation of global financial markets. 
666 See id. at 805 ("[A] key component of the new regulatory paradigm must be to rethink the role of deposit 
insurance schemes now that their symbiotic relationship with restrictive regulation has vanished."). 
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D. Public-Private Partnership 
Global financial integration has considerably challenged the policy autonomy of the 
state to supervise and regulate international transactions. National regulatory authorities' 
efforts to cooperate with their foreign counterparts in order to design and formulate 
effective regulatory standards have often become problematic. This is partly because of 
the difficulties of cooperation in an international system, and partly because of variations in 
domestic market structures, financial institutions and legal systems. Attempts by national 
and international supervisory and regulatory authorities are often proved insufficient for the 
effective formulation and implementation of global financial standards in emerging market 
economIes. 
While the private sector activities have increasingly dominated global financial 
transactions, the wider public sector policy and regulatory objectives of financial 
governance have become more difficult. As such, powerful private interests have 
increased their dominance of national economic policy making, and have played an 
important role in formulating financial market rules and structures, whereby state policies 
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tend to promote market-led adjustment policies.667 The process of global financial 
integration has strengthened the position of private market actors in governance of financial 
system at national, regional and international levels. Given that private sector activities 
have increasingly dominated global financial transactions, and private interests are crucial 
to the governance of financial systems, private market actors need to be incorporated into 
the rule-making process. An important issue examines how to design private sector 
involvement in formulating and implementing financial standards and regulations. 
The private sector must be involved in the standard-setting process in two ways: (1) the 
private sector's integration of the use of standards into their risk management techniques, 
(2) the private sector's development of best practice standards in the financial sector.668 
These goals may be accomplished either through private-public collaboration or by the 
private sector themselves. Given that private market actors have played an important role 
667 Geoffrey R. D. Underhill & Xiaoke Zhang, Global Structures and Political Imperatives: In Search of 
Nonnative Underpinnings for International Financial Order, in International Financial Governance Under 
Stress: Global Structures versus National Imperatives 82 (Geoffrey R. D. Underhill et al. eds., 2003) (arguing 
that the process of global fmancial integration has altered the notions of the public interest that underpin the 
operation offmancial order, changed regulatory parameters and objectives in public sector responsibility, and 
posed a problem of democratic accountability). 
668 George Vojta & Marc Uzan, The Private Sector, International Standards and the Architecture of Global 
Finance, in International Financial Governance Under Stress: Global Structures versus National Imperatives, 
supra note 667, at 284. 
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in developing financial structures, and identifying and refining international standards for 
acceptable practices, they can help enhance the limited expertise and capacity of regulatory 
authorities.669 In this sense, the private sector should be fully incorporated into the process 
of standard formulation and implementation. If the task of standard setting and 
enforcement would be exclusively left to the public sector, market disciplines may fail to 
play their role in financial governance and regulation. 
While a consensus that the private sector is crucial to the governance of financial 
system at national, regional and global levels has been reached, how to fashion the 
appropriate balance between the public authority and private interests is a crucial issue. 
That is, to what extent and under what conditions should the regulatory authority's rule-
making power be ceded to private market forces? Since the recent global financial crises 
have revealed that the private dominance of financial sector and regulatory process would 
lead to the legitimacy deficit, economic instability and turbulence, the changing balance 
between public authority and private market power in the financial regulatory process 
669 See id. All this demonstrates the significance of private sector involvement in the formulation and 
implementation of global financial standards. 
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affects both the stability of the financial system and the nature of the democratic order.67o 
In this sense, the impact of private domination of regulatory processes on financial stability, 
democratic accountability and legitimacy should be addressed. 
A proper balance of public and private interests is essential to the legitimate functioning 
of a market economy. Although financial transactions in the market-based economies are 
mainly private, the way in which the financial system operates makes it part of the essential 
infrastructure in any economy, of the value to the operation of markets, to the needs of 
states and to the well-being of civil society that it should be placed at the center of the 
public domain.671 Over time, regulatory authorities need to have more close relationship 
with private market actors to respond promptly to their demands, and work in communion 
with private interests to monitor and supervise properly financial transactions. Symbiotic 
relations and shared-world views developed in public-private interactions provide private 
market actors with the opportunity to be incorporated into regulatory processes in the 
670 See id (noting that the private dominance of regulatory process has altered the notions of the public 
interest that underpin the operation of fmancial order, changed parameters and obj ectives in public 
responsibility, and generated a fundamental problem of democratic accountability). 
671 See Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, The Public Good versus Private Interests in the Global Financial and 
Monetary System, International Comparative and Corporate Law Journal, Vol. 2, No.3 (2000) at 335-359 
(discussing the notion of the public domain and corresponding interpretations of the public interest in relation 
to the financial order). 
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financial system and to affect the nature of financial governance.672 As a result, it is 
getting difficult to distinguish the public interest from the claims of private market actors in 
relation to the financial system673 
Although private interests need to be incorporated into the process of regulatory 
reforms, the private sector itself is diverse and far from being monolithic and 
homogeneous.674 This diversity implies the complexity of interactions between regulators 
and market actors who have conflicting interests and are marked by different relationships 
to national regulatory authorities. This difficulty has called into question how regulators 
can effectively coordinate diverse private market actors to design and formulate standards 
that are to be applied to financial sectors. In this sense, regulatory authorities at national, 
672 See supra note 667, at 84. 
673 See id. 
674 See supra note 668, at 298. The banking sector, particularly in emerging market economies, is usually 
composed of commercial, specialized and development institutions. Diverse types of banking organizations 
tend to have dissimilar business activities, varying degrees of international exposure and divergent 
preferences for the design of standards for sound managerial practices. As a result, it is difficult to coordinate 
different private institutions and their respective interests in standard formulation and implementation within a 




regional and global levels should consider these constraints in their attempts at designing 
new market disciplines. 675 
The private domination of the financial sector and regulatory process can change the 
notions of public good which underpin the formulation of regulatory standards designed to 
ensure market stability, compromise the policy autonomy of states to maintain their 
legitimacy, and pose a fundamental problem of democratic accountability.676 In this regard, 
the clear definition of public interests distinct from the claims of private market actors is 
the key to ensuring the predominance of such interests in the financial system. The 
problems of democratic accountability and legitimacy become more acute in the 
international domain as witnessed in the recent episodes of economic turmoil resulting from 
the undue dominance. of financial regulatory processes by powerful profit-seeking private 
market forces. In the absence of strong public authority over private market forces, 
international regulatory standards may not only conflict with economic and financial 
imperatives in developing and emerging market countries but also pose serious problems of 
675 Id. 
676 See id. 298. 
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policy management. 677 In these circumstances, existing institutional arrangements in the 
global financial system are more likely to facilitate the interests of powerful private actors 
and institutions from the leading industrial countries than to address the major concerns of 
the developing world and further financial market stability.678 Unless this issue is 
addressed, deep skepticism will run over ongoing efforts to reform the international 
financial architecture. 
E. The Need for Regional Cooperation 
Despite strong pressures for the convergence of one-size-fits-all standards throughout 
the global system, the current global governance agenda has given little attention to the 
tension between harmonizing pressures of financial globalization led by advanced financial 
centers and prevailing diversity of financial systems and to their economic consequences. 
677 Maintaining strong public authority over private market power requires the strengthening of democratic 
institutions of accountability in the national, regional and global levels of governance. See Geoffrey R. D. 
Underhill & Xiaoke Zhang, Conclusion: Towards the Good Governance of the International Financial System, 
in International Financial Governance Under Stress: Global Structures versus National Imperatives, supra 
note 667, at 367. 
678 See supra note 668, at 299 (arguing that "[t]he real issue about private involvement in standard 
formulation is thus a normative one about who can and ought to benefit from new regulatory standards and 
about whose interests these standards are to serve."). 
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Prevailing variations in national financial practices continue to complicate policy and 
regulatory cooperation through international institutions. Given that the failure of national 
governments to collaborate effectively at the international level, prospects for the 
successful restructuring of the global financial regime through international cooperation 
based on harmonization have been attenuated. Hence, persistent national differences in 
financial market structures and institutions have significant implications for international 
cooperative efforts at global financial governance. In order to enhance global financial 
governance toward a new world order in the international finance, it needs to explore 
specific policy and regulatory options to national and international policy makers in 
devising patterns of regional and international cooperation. 
Since international cooperation has demonstrated little aptitude for effective 
cooperation in the past, regional cooperation has an important alternative that could operate 
alongside global monetary and financial governance.679 The process of regional economic 
and monetary integration experiences of European countries provide valuable lessons. In 
679 It can be argued that regional cooperation is not immune to the difficulties of institutional collaboration. 
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these circumstances, many countries, particularly developing countries have shown 
increasing interest in regional institutional cooperation to manage the global monetary and 
financial system. At the regional level, emerging market governments have increasingly 
realized that they tend to encounter similar problems with market integration and have 
similar interests in financial regulatory framework, and would be better able to prevent 
financial market instability and to insulate vulnerable economies from negative spill-over 
i!11 
effects from crises. The effects of financial contagion and the growing pressures for global 
financial integration have emphasized collaborative ties among Asian governments. Due 
to the tough conditions ofIMF rescue packages, regional central bankers and financial 
regulators strived to seek the chance for the establishment of regional facilities. In 
particular, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 proved that the region did not have a regional 
financial mechanism to prevent and manage such crises. Since the crisis, the plan of a 
regional stability fund as a regional supplement system for the IMF has been put 
forward. 680 In general, the proposal targets to create a fund that is exclusive to Asia, while 
680 The Asian Monetary Fund would have been capitalized to the tune ofUSD 100 billion from the reserves 
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maintaining the decision-making within Asia. This attributes to a deep suspicion toward 
the decision-making ofthe major international financial institutions dominated by the 
United States.681 The U.S. was opposed to the idea, claiming that funds were likely to be 
loaned on lenient terms that could be damaging in the long-term. 682 
As a matter of fact, the greatest obstacles to regional cooperation in East Asia have 
corne from outside the region itself. Even if a regional monetary fund can provide 
countries with contingent credits during crisis periods under much more favorable 
conditions than those mandated by the IMF, and make Asian governments more 
independent and less subject to the policy demands of international institutions, greater 
regionalization faces a strong opposition from the institutions dominated by the U.S. 
Nevertheless, various proposals ranging from modest plans on more effective coordination 
of Japan, China and Taiwan. See generally Walden Bello, Inviting Another Catastrophe, 162 Far E. Econ. 
Rev. 42 (Aug. 1999). 
681 See HK bank chief argues for Asian Monetary Fund, Fin. Times, Jan. 6,1999. Both the U.S. Treasury and 
the IMF were opposed to the proposal for a regional stability fund because it would weaken the IMF. See 
Bello, supra note 680. 
682 See Japan seeks Asian Monetary Fund, Fin. Times, Dec. 16, 1998. Interestingly, the U.S. Treasury has 
been critical of economic cooperation in areas where it cannot exert influence and produce practical outcomes 




among financial regulators and joint efforts to create more extensive Asian monetary union 
or common currency have been set forth. 683 
Although the Asian Development Bank (ADB)684 has the potential to support policy 
dialogue on regional financial regulation, its diversity of membership may attenuate the 
development of financial regulatory aspects within. Other institutions such as Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
Executives' Meeting of East Asian and Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP), and Soth East 
Asia, New Zealand, Australia Forum of Banking Supervision (SEANZA) are not 
appropriate because of the informality of these institutions.685 Hence, it needs to explore 
the benefits of a regional financial regulatory institution, because there is a strong desire to 
establish the institution within East Asia. 
A regional financial regulatory institution would benefit East Asia since it would be 
possible to take advantage of geographic proximity and cultural understanding of the 
683 See East Asian nations reach accords on further co-operation, Fin. Times, Nov. 29, 1999. 
684 The ADB is the only fonnal institution with a large number of Member States and legal entities. In 1966, 
the ADB was founded to promote social and economic progress of the Asian and Pacific region. See 8 Basic 
Documents of Asian Regional Organization 8 (M. Haas ed., 1980). 
685 For the analysis of regional institutions in Asia, see Yokoi-Arai, supra note 585, at 1648-1654. 
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region.686 As for the advantages of a regional institution, it deserves noting one observer's 
analysis of the institutional approach.687 First, a regional institution could have the 
advantage of being a "midway" between national regulatory authorities and international 
bodies. Such an institutional approach could play an important role in local specifics, and 
could design an appropriate regulatory framework for international standards to be applied 
in order to produce the identified effect within the region. Second, an appropriate regional 
institution could help attenuate the tension of applying regulations that are politically 
difficult to adopt. In a regional institution, negotiators could use regional peer pressure for 
the change of domestic policy on the basis that the regional institution is more aware of 
financial regulation. Third, cooperative formulation of financial regulation is likely to 
prevent the race to the bottom in financial regulation and to encourage the application of 
new international standard. Moreover, a regional institution could also be used to 
686 See Yokoi-Arai, supra note 585 at 1659 ("National regulators do not always have the objectivity or 
political will to conduct adequate supervision and to penalize non-compliant parties. International bodies may 
not have sufficient access to local particulars necessary to conduct adequate supervision."). 
687 See id. at 1660 
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encourage the enforcement of international regulatory standards by more effective 
involvement in the process of its formulation. 
However, there are many arguments against the establishment of a regional institution 
for the supervision of financial activities and the formulation of financial regulation.688 
One counterargument is redundancy of international institutions, and another is opposition 
to an international organization constraining financial regulation based on sovereignty. 
The redundancy of international institutions lies in their inefficiency, not necessarily in the 
number of organizations. Over time, many international institutions and agencies become 
obsolete due to their bureaucratic inefficiency, mismanagement, and corruption. This is 
because ofthe difficulty in measuring their achievements relative to their objectives. In 
this sense, all public institutions at national, regional and international levels need to be 
structured to be more accountable. In response to the argument with traditional 
sovereignty of states, it should be noted that sovereignty is not preserved within the 
national domain. 
688 See Yokoi-Arai, supra note 585, at 1666. 
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As noted, a regional institution can coordinate the implementation of financial 
regulation in order to obtain the identified effect, and can provide safety and soundness to 
the financial system. Given the benefits of a regional financial regulatory institution, the 
establishment of such an institution in East Asia would arguably require the existence of a 
regional community within the region to facilitate and support its operation. 689 
East Asia has a successful model of a regional community in the EU. It is important to 
note that European countries could move faster toward a community, because they have 
shared similar culture with languages based on the same Latin roots. In contrast, lack of 
linguistic, ethnic, religious, political homogeneity hinders cooperation within East Asia. 
Compared to other regions, East Asia has no converging sense of regional interests and the 
accompanying drive for regional integration. 690 Due to the experience of colonialism and 
imperialism, East Asian countries do not enthusiastically seek strong ties with advanced 
states, in particular Japan. Skepticism is still running over Japan, because the Japanese has 
justified past aggression and colonization of neighboring countries, and distortion of history 
689 See id. at 1664. 
690 Id. at 1665. 
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textbooks that whitewashed atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers against neighboring 
countries during W orId War II. In order for East Asian countries to forge a future-oriented 
relationship of cooperation, Japan needs to apologize for the country's past militarism in 
Asia. Since East Asia is the region, where ethics and feelings may be considered more 
important than economic benefits, a feeling of togetherness, self-confidence and mutual 
understanding of each other are essential to regional cooperation. There is still a glimmer 
on regional cooperation within Asia in that Asian countries are enthusiastic of creating 
Asian Monetary Fund based on Asian values.691 These moves may strengthen the kind of 
collaborative ties that will support more ambitious programmes of regional and monetary 
cooperation in the near future 
Since the rule of consensus has been a norm for most East Asian community, the initial 
stage ofthis community will depend on its consensus-making more than legal orientation. 
691 Their attempts at the establishment of a regional stability fund are displayed in the participation of central 
bank governors and fmance ministers from Japan, Korea and China in the swap agreement of ASEAN. See 
Asian Currencies: Swapping Notes, Economist, May 13, 2000. Korea agreed to swap arrangements with 
Japan (USD 7 billion), China (USD 2 billion), Thailand (USD 1 billion). See Ministry of Finance and 
Economy, Republic of Korea, at http://www.mofe.go.kr/mofe2lhtml/mainindex.php3 (last visited March 15, 
2004). This fund would be based on the core function ofinter-govemmental forum, member surveillance, and 
technical assistance. The fund should be supported by the creation of a zone of law in the region to enhance 
the law-based nature of the framework. See Yokoi-Arai, supra note 585, at 1668. 
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To attain and sustain economic development, East Asian countries should adopt new 
principles to further integrate. In any event, this objective can be accomplished only if 
there is legitimacy and procedural fairness in its decisions, and there is support from the 
legal orientation of the institution.692 Needless to say, regional cooperation involves not 
only regulators but also private sector actors and their interactions with regulatory 
authorities at national and international levels. 
692 See Yokoi-Arai, supra note 585, at 1666. 
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VI. Conclusion: Toward a Just World Order in the Global Finance 
A. International Standards and Global Governance 
The past decades have witnessed a significant evolution of the international financial 
system. The globalization of finance has led to a remarkable increase in the economic 
integration in the world economy, and greater cross-border capital flows around the globe. 
Moreover, the emergence of new and complex financial instruments over the preceding 
decades has posed formidable challenges to financial regulatory authorities. The impact of 
financial globalization has raised considerable concerns in the wake of economic 
turbulence around the world. As such, the globalization of finance has attracted increasing 
attention to the integrated international regulation of financial institutions. 
At the same time, the question of global governance has become an agenda for 
rethinking about the rules and norms that underpin the world order as a result of the Asian 
crisis of 1997. The financial crisis has shifted the focus in global and domestic policy 
debates back to the notion of market failure. Liberalization, deregulation and privatization 
are not likely to be simply considered as sound economic theory. They are viewed to have 
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negative redistributive consequences that the invisible hand cannot address rather than 
welfare enhancing outcomes. The consequence is a need for a new paradigm for 
governing globalization, because the global governance agenda that emphasizes the 
universalization of understanding of global governance based on efficiency and 
effectiveness through one-size-fits-all formulas, in which democratic accountability and 
participation is a secondary viable even though a diverse world cannot have rigid rules and 
regulations uniformly. Continued national differences in financial market structures and 
institutions have the important implications for international cooperative efforts at global 
financial governance. Since international cooperation based on harmonization will 
continue to be difficult, the regional solution can be a more effective alternative for 
governing and regulating the global financial markets. As a consequence, many countries, 
particularly deVeloping countries have shown increasing interest in regional cooperation 
through regional institutional coordination. Regional solutions may help attenuate the 
tension between harmonizing pressures of financial globalization led by the advanced 
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financial centers and persistent national variations in financial systems and regulatory 
frameworks. 
Furthermore, the ongoing standard-setting process has a crucial shortcoming in that 
most developing countries have had little participation in the standard-setting process, and 
thereby do not have the incentives to embrace and implement international financial 
standards. That is, the current global governance agenda is dominated by the powerful 
states, alliance constructions and interest representations that feature in the structures of 
international institutions and groupings. If less developed countries are excluded from the 
standard-setting process, the process may come to little consequence. In these 
circumstances, calls for the expansion of the membership in nontraditional international 
organizations recognize that institutional constructions of key global policy fora are not 
adequate in the context of global collaboration on a range ofpolicy issues. Without the 
global collaboration through the extended participation, the global governance agenda 
aiming to construct a new world order is in need of reevaluation due to the inequitable 
nature of the negotiating processes themselves. Further, there is a need to devise effective 
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and legitimate international institutions for the global era in a world infused by democratic 
norms. 
B. Democracy, Legitimacy and Accountability in the International 
Financial Order 
Transgovernmentalists arguably look to the evolving practice of formal and informal 
governmental networks as the most realistic hope for asserting democratic principles, not 
to the empowerment of traditional international organizations as the way forward for 
democracy.693 Yet the transgovernmentalism is undoubtedly controversial. The 
sharpest charge against networks is their lack of accountability in that they are networks 
of the world's technocrats. As there is no formal recognition of the role of government 
networks, accountability remains a concern. In response to the critiques on the lack of 
accountability in the networks, some highlights the difference between the creation of the 
Basel Accord and other global public policy initiatives.694 According to the observer, 
one significant difference to note between the Basel case and the other cases, such as 
693 See Slaughter, Government Networks: The Heart of the Liberal Democratic Order, supra note 298, at 199. 
694 See Reinicke, Global Public Policy, supra note 181, at 113. 
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international trade is the participation of nongovernmental actors in the various 
policymaking stages is limited in the Basel case to one set of interests. Thus, the absence 
of conflict among domestic interests in the Basel case expedited the agreement reached 
by central bankers from member states. This loss of accountability at the domestic level 
was not compensated for at the international level in that the postwar international 
institutional structure was built to accommodate international economic interdependence, 
which, from a public policy perspective, is best accommodated by facilitating 
intergovernmental relations, and thus did not concern its democratic deficit. This view 
emphasizes that a democratic deficit facilitated the conclusion of a compromise. Further, 
the absence of accountability and transparency is arguably welcome for the timely 
conclusion of an agreement, and the prevention of a global financial crisis.695 In this way, 
trans governmental networks can arguably operate more quickly and effectively than 
formal bodies. This efficiency-oriented perspective is problematic in that trade-off 
695 See id. at 114. Here it deserves noting a charge against the Basel Committee in light of its slow response 
to the Asian economic crisis in 1997. Until the fall of 1997-more than a month after the Thai fmancial 
crisis exploded-that the Basel Committee did not start moving, apparently realizing the severity of the crisis 
facing developing countries. See Jaret Steiberg, The American Banker, Dec. 8, 1998, at 1. 
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between democratic accountability and efficiency in global public policymaking may not 
be based on a full consideration of equity and justice. 696 
In fact, trans governmental networks do not provide mechanisms for either delegated 
or participatory accountability. 697 It is often unclear which organizations have delegated 
powers to them because the networks are informal. Moreover, participatory 
accountability is minimal in that the general public is not involved and transparency is 
typically lacking. Although abuses of power may in some instances be controlled by the 
fragmentation of power and conflicts of interests between the participants, cooperation 
among the members of the networks can easily become collusion of outsiders. It can be 
said that there is some peer accountability within trans governmental networks, because 
the entities involved may request information from one another and sanction other entities 
696 Nevertheless, it is argued that "the informality, flexibility, and democratization of networks mean that it is 
very difficult to establish precisely who is acting and when. See Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy, 
supra note 193, at 193-194. In response to the critiques of democratic accountability, Slaughter claims that 
the critics often miss several key points: legitimacy may derive from performance as well as process; 
government networks typically operate through persuasion rather than authoritative decision; and these 
networks may actually empower democratic politicians and their governments by promoting cooperation 
among them when the alternative could be leaving decisions to markets. See id. 
697 See Grant & Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power, supra note 275, at 11. 
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for perceived misbehavior. 698 However, there are no clear mechanisms of accountability 
since accountability requires a public standard of legitimacy to which political actors are 
held. Nonetheless, there is the potential for negotiation constraints. The power of an 
entity in the network may be checked only where abuses are against the interests of 
principles of the other entities within the networks.699 In this regard, diversity among 
parties is a precondition for negotiation constraint. Otherwise, collusion is likely to 
follow.700 However, serious issues of democratic accountability still remain because 
trans governmental regulatory organizations operate like clubs. In short, the 
organizations look like closed and secretive clubs to functional outsiders, even in the 
same government. 
By pointing to democratic deficit, globalization protesters call into question the 
legitimacy of international institutions and trans governmental organizations in that they are 
undemocratic, but their rules have powerful effects despite the weakness of the institutions 




and organizations.70t As such, consistency with democratic procedures has become 
increasingly important in today's world. In this context, there is a need to develop the 
legitimacy of global governance. To that end, three key things are required: (1) greater 
clarity about democracy, (2) a comprehensive understanding of accountability, and (3) a 
willingness to experiment. 702 In short, the club model requires modification. As one 
argues, it is significant not to put more weight on the organizations than they can bear.703 
Rather than pursue strong institutions to strengthen deep integration at the international 
level, it is more appropriate to pursue "networked minimalism.,,704 Putting too much 
weight on the organizations before they are sufficiently legitimate to bear leads to deadlock. 
701 It deserves noting the protesters' interesting points: long lines of delegation from multiple governments 
and lack of transparency often weaken accountability; although the organizations may be agents of states, 
they often represent only parts of states. See id. 
702 See id. at 109. It is argued that "[ d]emocracy is government by officials who are accountable to the 
majority of the people in a jurisdiction ... For democracy to work well, "the people" have to regard 
themselves as a political community .... Democratic governments are judged both on the procedures they 
follow (inputs) and on the results they obtain (outputs)." See Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, The Club 
Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in Efficiency, Equity, and 
Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium 281-282 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001). 
Further, both inputs and outputs influence legitimacy at the international level. Thus, for international 
institutions to be legitimate, their practices and the result of their activities need to meet broadly democratic 
standards. See id. 
703 See id. at 290. 
704 Id. According to some observers, "[n]etworked minimalism is a broad principle of governance--more a 
matter of what not to try (hierarchy and intrusiveness in domestic policies) than what to do." See Josph S. Nye 
& Robert o. Keohane, Introduction, in Governance in a Globalizing World 37 (Joseph S. Nye et al. eds., 
2000) Further, "[n]etworked minimalism seeks to preserve national democratic processes and embedded 
liberal compromises while allowing the benefits of economic integration." See id. 
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In short, government networks may reinforce the traditional undemocratic features of 
international law by consolidating the position ofthe state over the individual unless 
transparency and certainty over the impact of such processes are present. In this 
prescriptive process, the benefits of greater plurality will be lost. Hence, developing 
appropriate measures to judge the transparency and democratic accountability in the 
institutions is crucial to deal with global problems.705 
Similarly, national governments need to achieve a balance between expertise and 
representativeness, and accountability to ensure democratic governance at the domestic 
level. While globalization has played a major role in convincing many countries to free 
their central banks from political control, what has been overlooked in the rush to make 
central banks independent is the fact that such political insulation does not come at a price. 
Indeed, the insulation of central banks from popular control has become one ofthe 
signifiers whereas achieving a balance between representativeness and independence is a 
tough task. Supporters of central-bank independence defend it in two related ways. The 
705 Through their participation in decision-making, global civil society, in particular, epistemic communities, 
and markets playa role in enhancing the legitimacy of global governance. See Keohane & Nye, The Club 
Model of Multilateral Cooperation, supra note 702, at 291. 
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first is theoretical and justifies treating monetary policy differently from other kinds of 
policy due to its supposed special characteristics. The second is practical and justifies 
treating monetary policy differently because so doing supposedly creates significant 
economic benefits.706 In response, some observers note that monetary policy is simply not 
that distinctive and need not be treated differently while they admit that monetary policy is 
actually complicated and confusing; politicians and public do often view with a short term 
perspective.707 The second rationale for central-bank independence is also strictly practical 
and unconvincing.708 As far as developing countries as opposed to industrial ones are 
concerned, the positive impact of independent central banks on inflation do not simply 
continue to exist, both because politics in developing countries is often misguided by 
informal rules rather than coercive laws and formal procedures, and because such countries 
706 According to advocates of central-bank independence, monetary policy cannot be entrusted to normal 
policymaking process because it is complicated and requires a disciplined, long-term perspective to succeed. 
Further, ordinary people and politicians cannot also think far into the future or accept pain now for gain later 
in the context of time inconsistency problem. See Sheri Berman & Kathleen R. McNamara, Bank on 
Democracy: Why Central Banks Need Public Oversight, Foreign Affairs, Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 3. 
707 See id. 
708 It is argued that central-bank independence has no measurable effect on real economic performance. That 
is, insulating a country's central bank from popular control from politicians and publics, and giving it to 
technocrats seems neither to span economic growth nor to reduce unemployment. See id. at 4. The one area 
where a possible boon from central-bank independence has been detected may be in fighting inflation. 
However, some note that independent central banks have little positive long-term impact on inflation unless 
backed by a societal consensus on the need for stable prices. Id. at 5. 
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, 
lack the range and depth of institutions required to carry out full policy implementation and 
coordination. 
By turning over monetary policy to unelected and often unaccountable technocrats, 
countries concede much control over their economic fates. 709 Since surrendering such 
authority would be a critical decision, it is worth taking only after full national debate. 
Since economic benefits are questionable, fully taking control of monetary policy away 
from government regardless ofthe particular national or economic context could have dire 
outcomes. Moreover, one argues that even though "transparency--openness-is now 
recognized as a critical aspect of democratic process[, and t]here cannot be effective 
democratic governance without information[, y]et central banks continue to operate in 
secrecy.,,710 In short, transparency and democratic control on balance create moderation, 
709 In this regard, it is enough to ask whether national policy should not be delegated to independent delegates. 
See id. at 4 ("Anyone unwilling to go so far should be prepared to let monetary policy be just as subject to 
democratic control as everything else.). On the opposed perspective, see Keohane & Nye, supra note 702, at 
277 ("U.S. institutions that are deliberately insulated from elections--in particular, the Supreme court and the 
Federal Reserve Board---routinely publish their deliberations or opinions, so that not only the results, but the 
reasoning and disagreements involve, can be publicly known. These institutions are held accountable through 
criticisms by professional networks, such as legal scholars writing in law journals and economists writing 
scholarly articles and offering opinions in the public media. Without transparency, these means of 
accountability would be eviscerated."). 
710 See Berman & McNamara, supra note 706, at 7 ("If the [central] bank's decision-making processes were 
reasonably transparent and open to democratic oversight, the pain could perhaps be explained and justified."). 
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success, and most importantly legitimacy whereas they may produce mistakes and 
embarrassment. These are exactly the qualities that the world economy needs in the global 
era. Consequently, the rhetoric of democracy has an important role in the absence of 
systemic democracy at the national and international levels in a globalizing world. 
c. The State-Market Condominium of Global Finance 
While the global financial community is still in a state of transition, much more 
understanding of the relationship of the state to the market is required to govern and 
regulate properly an increasingly integrated world economy in the global era. Indeed, the 
relation between states and markets has varied by place and by time. Over time markets 
have become more extensive, more integrated, and more intricately interwoven into the 
fabric of life. Evolving and integrated markets pose different challenges for governance 
and regulation than those it was sought to master when markets were simpler, more 
In this context, Keohane and Nye assert that"[t]ransparency does not imply governance through elections, as 
the examples of the Supreme Court and the Federal Reserve Board show. Transparency does mean that the 
arguments and reasoning on trade rules, and the adjudication of those rules, are made public. Democratic 
societies demand this of institutions that allocate values profoundly affecting people's lives." See Keohane & 
Nye, supra note 702, at 277. 
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segmented, less audacious in their reach. The growing scale, reach, and complexity of 
market institutions and market players are reopening everlasting questions about the role of 
the public and private sectors, and redefining what it means to govern and regulate properly. 
In this regard, from the more state-centric perspective one argues that the state is still very 
much in control ofthe process of global financial integration, working through the 
cooperative regulatory and supervisory process of the Basel Committee among others.711 
By contrast, the other claims that the market was winning in the contemporary period of 
transnational integration, which yielded a retreat of the state in the face of market 
ascendancy,712 largely self-induced, with serious dangers for the legitimacy and functioning 
ofthe global financial system. These two viewpoints recognize the continuous interaction 
or interdependence of states and markets in the process of governance and regulation, but 
they imply that states and markets are antagonists competing blueprints for social 
organization. As a result, it is argued that when one advances, the other gives away. 
711 See Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy, supra note 209, at 103-128. 
712 See Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy 121 (1996) 
(arguing that the balance between the state and the market shifted after 1970s in a way that made the state just 
one source of authority among several and left "a yawning hole of non-authority or non-governance"). 
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Although the state-market dichotomy approach viewing states and markets as separate 
(if interacting) entities is often a useful abstraction, it is critical to note that states and 
markets are part of the same integrated ensemble of governance and regulation, a state-
market condominium, and should be thought of as SUCh.713 The regulatory and policy-
making institutions of the state are one constituent of the market, one set of institutions, 
through which the overall process of governance and regulation operates.714 At the same 
time, the state is and should be involved in the market, because the market cannot function 
as a system without political and regulatory processes that national regulatory authorities 
represent.715 Likewise financial regulation and supervision has always involved private 
sectors. Recent financial regulatory and supervisory trend is toward more market-oriented 
in a global context, and a corresponding adjustment of national practices. Furthermore, the 
state has progressively delegated a number oftasks either to private bodies or international 
organizations. In this sense, there is not so much a retreat of the state in the face of market 
713 See Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, States, Markets and Governance for Emerging Market Economies: Private 
Interests, the Public Good and the Legitimacy of the Development Process, International Affairs, Vol. 79, 
No.4 (2003) at 765. 
714 See id. 
715 Id. at 779. Democratic accountability is required to build the state-market condominium where 
functioning democracy is absent or poorly embedded because the condominium is not immune from rent-
seeking, powerful and predatory private interests. See id. at 777. 
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forces as transformation of the state in symbiosis with transformation ofmarkets.716 The 
form and functions ofthe state will rather continue to evolve, as they did in the past. As 
such, the private sector plays a crucial role in regulating global financial markets, even as it 
seems to operate in private ways. 
However, the significant to note is that the market will become discredited as an 
instrument of policy and regulation when the private market processes reveal only greed 
and privilege for the very few, and the extent to which private agent cannot fulfill their 
responsibility to society as shown in the Enron debacle.717 As a matter of fact, the private 
sector can playa crucial role in the financial system at national, regional and international 
levels as long as there is an appropriate balance between public authority and private 
interests in the domain of global financial governance and regulation. To that end, there is 
a need to maintain strong public authority over private market power in the financial system 
716 See id. at775 
717 Id. at 779. 
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because ofthreats posed to democratic accountability by the undue private dominance of 
public purpose become more severe in the international domain.718 
As noted, the global era is a time of unprecedented opportunities and unique challenges 
to market participants, and regulatory authorities alike in that the increasing complexity of 
globalization brings with it in a global system of governance and regulation. Needless to 
say, both the public and private sectors are required to playa key role in dealing with 
challenges posed by technological advancements and the rapid innovations, and pursuing 
the objective of a modem, flexible yet stable economic system. Although the perspectives 
of the public and private sectors may differ from time to time, the objective of both parties 
is the same-to maintain a strong and vibrant economic system. It is evident that each 
satisfying one's responsibilities and reinforcing the other through the sustained cooperation 
will be able to properly govern a rapidly evolving, ever-more integrated world economy in 
the global era. 
718 Democratic accountability is required to build the state-market condominium where functioning 
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